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Abstract: Why are people interested in money? Specifically, what could be the biological basis for the extraordinary incentive and
reinforcing power of money, which seems to be unique to the human species? We identify two ways in which a commodity which is
of no biological significance in itself can become a strong motivator. The first is if it is used as a tool, and by a metaphorical
extension this is often applied to money: it is used instrumentally, in order to obtain biologically relevant incentives. Second,
substances can be strong motivators because they imitate the action of natural incentives but do not produce the fitness gains for
which those incentives are instinctively sought. The classic examples of this process are psychoactive drugs, but we argue that the
drug concept can also be extended metaphorically to provide an account of money motivation. From a review of theoretical and
empirical literature about money, we conclude that (i) there are a number of phenomena that cannot be accounted for by a pure
Tool Theory of money motivation; (ii) supplementing Tool Theory with a Drug Theory enables the anomalous phenomena to be
explained; and (iii) the human instincts that, according to a Drug Theory, money parasitizes include trading (derived from
reciprocal altruism) and object play.
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1. Why are people interested in money?
This target article seeks to provide a biological explanation
for one of the strongest motivations of humans living in
modern societies: the desire to obtain money. We start
by establishing some definitions. What do we mean by a
“biological explanation”? What do we mean by money?
And what do we mean by the motivation to obtain money?
1.1. Biological explanation
By the 1950s, the “grand theories of everything” that had
emerged in early twentieth-century psychology seemed
to have become extinct. But with the publication of
Richard Dawkins’ (1976) book The Selfish Gene, the
strongly Darwinian approach that has been called, with
slightly varying nuances, sociobiology or evolutionary psy-
chology emerged as a new and potentially universal way of
addressing the Why questions about human behaviour. If
people do something, the sociobiological argument runs, it
must be because (a) doing it confers a selective advantage;
or (b) although doing it does not now confer a selective
advantage, it did at some period in our evolutionary past,
most likely in the early history of Homo sapiens, within
the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation; or (c) the
tendency to do it is a by-product of some other tendency,
which does or did confer such an advantage.
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Biological explanation does not imply that human beha-
viour is “innate,” “hard-wired,” or will inevitably take a
particular form. Humans are social and cultural animals,
and any observed human behaviour is the product of a par-
ticular social and cultural environment interacting with
human nature: genetically adaptive instincts are always
manifested in culturally specified ways. Selective advan-
tage is not an alternative to social and cultural factors as
a kind of explanation, but if an explanation is to be
classed as “biological,” then selective advantage must be
part of it – even if the behaviour currently being
explained, in current circumstances, confers no such
advantage.
1.2. The nature of money
In talking about money, we mean just that – money itself,
money as a distinctive economic institution and its physical
embodiments in particular kinds of money stuff. We are
investigating the psychology of money, not using it as a
metaphor for property and possessions (for which see
Rudmin 1991) or economic activity generally (for which
see, e.g., Lea et al. 1987; Webley et al. 2001). It may
well be that someone who seeks out money is seeking it
out for the sake of what it can buy. Indeed, one of the
two theories that we consider here supposes that this is
always the case (we call this the Tool Theory). But the
point of our target article is that this is not the only concei-
vable theory, because although the desire for money is
undeniably closely connected to the desire for the things
that it can buy, the two are logically distinct and need to
be investigated separately. Part, but only part, of that
investigation is to establish whether and how the psychol-
ogy of possessions, and of other human motives, leads to a
psychology of money.
Although we are talking about money in a narrow, con-
crete sense, our notion of money stuff is broad. We include
the coins and notes that are at the core of people’s concept
of money in present-day societies (cf. Snelders et al. 1992),
but we also include both the so-called primitive moneys
(Einzig 1966) and more modern ones, such as cheques,
credit cards, marks in bank ledgers, and memory states
of bank computers. Any substance or medium is within
the scope of our discussion if it fulfils or appears to fulfil
the three basic functions of money: as a medium of
exchange, a unit of account, and a store of value (discussed
further in sect. 3.1).
1.3. The motivation to obtain money
By saying that people are motivated to obtain money, we
mean that when people live in a culture where money is
used, money enters into human behaviour in some of
the same ways as commonly recognised motivators such
as food or sex. More specifically, (a) money acts as an
incentive: if people can perceive or understand that a par-
ticular action is likely to lead to them obtaining money,
they are more likely to perform that action (though they
will not inevitably do so, since there may be constraints
from conflicting motivations); and (b) money acts as a rein-
forcer: actions that in the past led to a person receiving
money are more likely to be repeated (though again,
they will not inevitably be).
We treat these effects of money as “stylised facts.” They
could be questioned, but in this article we accept them
without further discussion. Our aim is to explain them
by reference to other known human motivations, known
features of human nature, or particular features of the
socialization of children.
1.4. The problem
Most strong human motivations have two characteristic
properties, which make them easy to explain in evolution-
ary terms:
1. Adaptiveness: The motivations direct people
towards, or away from, stimuli of obvious significance for
the survival of individuals or the propagation of their
genes. This is true not only of motivations such as
hunger and thirst that are related to individual tissue
needs, but also of such motives as the need for social com-
panions, sexual drives, and parental care.
2. Darwinian continuity: The motivations are either
exact homologues of motives that exist in all or many
related species of animals, or (more commonly) they are
obviously derived from such motives. Continuity does
not require that human motives should be identical to
those of other animals. Humans hunger for a wider and
more culturally defined range of foods than do other
apes (cf. Mennell et al. 1992); human sexual motivations
are unusually independent of the biological need to repro-
duce (e.g., Symons 1979); human curiosity takes us into
scientific explorations that are unparalleled by the explora-
tory motivations shown by many other species (cf. Berlyne
1960); human politics are much more complex than the
socially motivated behaviours of, say, chimpanzees (cf.
de Waal 1982; 1996). Many of these variations on motiva-
tional themes are informed by, and informative about,
cultural differences. But we have no difficulty in under-
standing where these complex human motivations come
from, evolutionarily speaking, and we can speculate in
sensible ways about how they have become more
complex over the five million years or so since the diver-
gence of the ancestral lines that led to chimpanzees and
bonobos on the one hand, and humans on the other.
Most human motives show adaptiveness and Darwinian
continuity in an obvious way. It is therefore reasonable to
talk about people as displaying a “hunger instinct” or a “sex
instinct” or even a “political instinct” – though we must
always recognise that the way in which those instincts
play out in actual human behaviour is a function of
culture and individual experience; they are not instincts
in the sense of being inflexible, hardwired micro-
mechanisms. The motivation to acquire money, however,
is not directly adaptive, and has no obvious parallels in
the behaviour of other animals. Furthermore, it cannot
be imagined to result from some evolutionary process
that has occurred within the hominid period: money has
emerged only within the last 3,000 years or so (Davies
2002), too short a time for significant genetic adaptation
to its existence; besides, individuals born into cultures
that have never used money quickly come to use it if
they move into a money-using culture. Money, therefore,
is a problem for a biological account of human motivation.
We cannot reasonably talk about a “money instinct.”
It is possible that there is no biological basis at all for our
attraction to money, that it is a pure creation of culture,
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with no connection to human nature at all. That would
make it an exception, perhaps even a unique exception,
among strong human motives. We do not consider this
“pure cultural” hypothesis directly in this target article,
but indirectly it is under test since our task is to offer the
best account we can of the biological origins of the money
motive. If that account fails to convince, the pure cultural
option would be all that remained. However, we cannot
leave culture out of our account, because human instincts
are always manifested in a cultural context. Much empirical
and theoretical work on the human interest in money has
been done within the culture-dominated sciences of
sociology and anthropology. We will draw on data from
these sources throughout this article, and in particular we
will return to those analyses when we come to offer a
synthetic account of the money motive (sect. 5).
1.5. Previous work
Despite the obvious power of themoneymotive,money has
been given little attention by psychologists writing about
human motivation. There are no chapters devoted to it in
general textbooks such as those by Mook (1987) or
Weiner (1992), though extended accounts of specific
psychological theories in relation to money can be found
(e.g., Bornemann 1976). Conversely, although economics
naturally deals with money, it has been so little influenced
by evolutionary ideas (at least until fairly recently; cf.
Boulding 1981) that economists have not recognized the
problematic nature of the money motive. The questions
we are interested in have mainly been addressed by
writers who have crossed disciplinary boundaries and con-
sidered money from an economic but also from a more
general point of view: these include economists (e.g.,
Maital 1982; Scitovsky 1976), but also anthropologists
(e.g., Crump 1981), sociologists (e.g., Simmel 1900/1978;
Zelizer 1989), cultural historians (e.g., Seaford 2004), and
literary theorists (e.g., Shell 1982), as well as psychologists
(e.g., Furnham & Argyle 1998; Lea et al. 1987, Ch. 12; Van
Veldhoven 1985). However, these sources offer general,
comprehensive accounts of the psychology of money. The
present article addresses a single more specific question:
Is there a biological reason why money is such a powerful
incentive? The question necessarily assumes that there is
coherent set of behaviours that we can class as human reac-
tions to money as an incentive, and that they have a single
explanation. To the extent that we are able to find a biologi-
cal reason for the strength of the money motive, we will be
giving support to that assumption.
2. Tool Theory and Drug Theory
Although money is unusual among powerful human
motivators in having no immediate adaptive origins, it is
not unique. There are other examples, and between
them they furnish two classes of theory that can be
applied to the problem of money motivation. We argue
that between them these exhaust the possibilities for a
biological psychology of that motivation.
2.1. Tool Theory
Frequently, humans’ advanced culture and technology
provide us with biologically unprecedented means to
familiar ends. For example, humans (and only humans)
will use time and effort to acquire such modern artefacts
as newspapers, radios, or television sets. The incentive
value of newspapers is not biologically problematic. They
are a means of gaining information about the environment,
and most advanced animals can benefit from such infor-
mation: dogs use time and effort to sniff lampposts and
chaffinches use time and effort to listen to one another’s
songs. The biological value of information has been
formally analysed in studies of group foraging in many
species of vertebrate (e.g., Mesterton-Gibbons &
Dugatkin 1999; Ward & Zahavi 1973), and operant
psychologists have shown that information may function
as an effective reward in nonhumans (e.g., Catania 1975;
Hendry 1969b), though only when it is correlated with a
reduction in the delay before reward (Case & Fantino
1981). Similarly, many mammals seek out shelter to
spend the inactive period of their daily cycles and to
hide their developing offspring; many manufacture shel-
ters for such purposes; badgers dig setts, beavers build
dams, and chimpanzees weave nests. None use bricks,
mortar, and timber to build themselves houses, but we
do not regard human house building as a biologically pro-
blematic activity, or the incentive value of building tools
and materials as a biologically problematic motivation.
The Tool Theory sees money in the same light. Econ-
omists have argued since the earliest days of the discipline
that when two people exchange scarce resources, the
exchange can increase the wealth of both parties (e.g.,
Smith 1776/1908). Money is the most efficient means yet
discovered of making such exchanges possible. It is not
the only means: among the other examples that have
been analysed are the gift-mediated exchanges that were
used by the Trobriand Islanders (Malinowski 1922), and
the bartering systems by which tools were traded over
quite long distances in New Guinea and Queensland
(Sahlins 1974, Ch. 6). But these exchanges do not circulate
goods anything like so quickly, nor do they produce such a
large social gain in wealth, as money-mediated exchanges.
On this view, money is not an incentive in itself; it is an
incentive only because and only insofar as it can be
exchanged for goods and services. Those goods and ser-
vices are among that majority of incentives that do demon-
strate adaptiveness and Darwinian continuity, and if
money is a strong incentive, it is because the goods and
services it will buy are strong incentives. According to
Tool Theory, we do not need a psychology of money at
all, or we need it only in a limited sense: we only have to
understand the job that money does and the human cogni-
tive system that enables us to use it. Cognitive psychology
may allow us to understand why a system of a 100 cents to
the dollar has replaced Charlemagne’s system of 12 pence
to the shilling and 20 shillings to the pound, but such
understanding hardly deserves the name of a psychology
of money. In the same way as a literal tool like a screwdri-
ver mediates between our need to connect pieces of wood
and the limited strength and dexterity of our hands and
arms, so money mediates between our need to exchange
commodities and the limited evaluating power of our
brains.
Obviously money is a tool only in a metaphorical sense.
You can use money as a literal tool – as when you use a
coin to undo the battery compartment of a bicycle lamp
or use a $100 bill to light a cigar. Flaunting a well-filled
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wallet as a means of social display is almost as crude. But
such aberrant uses of money are not what we are talking
about in Tool Theory. Tool Theory accepts the metaphori-
cal extension of the idea of a tool inherent in the word
“instrumental”; it sees money as a means to an end. As
we shall discuss in sect. 3.1, economic theory recognises
that money has more than one function: it serves as a
unit of account and a store of value, as well as a means
of exchange. But that does not undermine the notion of
money as a tool – it means that, like a screwdriver, it is a
tool with a number of uses. Similarly, the possibility that
money is used for purposes such as social display, social
communication (Buchan 1997), or social protection
(Doyle 1998) merely extends the range of uses for
money as a tool. Furthermore, it would be a mistake to
describe money, or anything else, as a “mere” tool; the
idea of a tool is a potentially powerful one, and has been
used by philosophers such as Heidegger (e.g. 1927/1962)
and Innis (1984) to provide an account of basic phenom-
ena of cognition and perception.
2.2. Drug Theory
Although Tool Theory is the obvious account of the
motivation to acquire money, tools are not the only class
of biologically unprecedented objects that can acquire
strong incentive properties. A second class can be briefly
described as “drugs.” Just like the Tool Theory, the
Drug Theory of money depends on a metaphorical exten-
sion of the core idea, but we start with the most literal idea
of a drug.
2.2.1. Drugs sensu stricto. Certain chemical substances,
such as alcohol, nicotine, caffeine, tetra-hydro cannabinol,
cocaine, and morphine, can all become strong incentives,
but their incentive power does not depend on their
ability to produce other goods and services. Instead, they
produce distinct physiological states by direct action on
some part of the body, usually the brain. The nervous
system contains numerous receptors for natural sub-
stances that play a role in the body’s normal functioning,
and the existence of these receptors is readily explained
as adaptive. Drugs in the strict sense usually act on such
receptors, changing a person’s nervous state. But we do
not explain the existence of binding sites for drugs as adap-
tive. We do not envisage early humans, or our pre-hominid
ancestors, gaining a selective advantage by smoking mari-
juana. Instead, a psychoactive drug is thought of as a
substance that by chance or by chemical similarity acts
in the same way as a body chemical, and which is therefore
able to intrude upon the normal functioning of the nervous
system. By mimicking the action of some natural
substance, it produces an abnormal response without
being part of an ordered, functional sequence. The Drug
Theory of money motivation asserts that money, too,
intrudes on the normal functioning of the nervous
system. Clearly, however, money is not a psychoactive
chemical, so to develop the Drug Theory we need a meta-
phorically extended concept of a drug, just as the Tool
Theory of money requires an extended concept of a tool.
2.2.2. Perceptual drugs. Alcohol, nicotine, and the other
substances listed above are all familiarly recognized as psy-
choactive drugs. There are other substances, however, that
meet the essential definition of a psychoactive drug as
having a nonfunctional, direct, effect on the nervous
system that affects our mental state. An instructive
example is saccharin, which produces much the same
motivational effect as natural sugars like fructose or
lactose, without being a nutritive carbohydrate. It differs
from alcohol or caffeine in that it produces an instant,
perceptual effect instead of a longer lasting effect on
mood, and in the fact that the receptors it acts on are in
our sense organs, not in our central nervous system. But
neither seems to be an important point of principle: we
might reasonably call saccharin a “perceptual drug” to
note that it has a drug-like action, but not directly on the
central nervous system. The historian of sugar, Sidney
Mintz, refers even to sucrose as a “drug food” (e.g.,
Mintz 1986), on the grounds that its psychological effects
are disproportionate to those of the sugars found in unpro-
cessed foods.
If we grant this extension of the notion of a drug, we can
see that there are many other stimuli that produce the
same perceptual effect as some natural motivator, but
are not associated with any benefit to the perceiver.
Early ethologists discovered many stimuli that resembled
the Sign Stimulus for a Fixed Action Pattern sufficiently
to trigger a response: for example, cardboard disks elicited
sexual pursuit in Grayling butterflies, a striped knitting
needle elicited begging in herring gull chicks, and an
Easter egg elicited brooding in greylag geese (Tinbergen
1951). Although it is to a male Grayling’s evolutionary
advantage to court a female Grayling, the butterfly gains
nothing in fitness terms by pursuing a cardboard disk.
Furthermore, many natural sign stimuli will act as reinfor-
cers or incentives (e.g., Thompson 1963), and in all cases
that have been investigated, the artificial sign stimuli
discovered by the ethologists have the same reinforcing
or incentive effects as the natural stimuli they mimic.
They therefore constitute a kind of functionless motivator.
Like saccharin, they could be called “perceptual drugs.”
Any “dishonest signalling” system exploits this perceptual
drug action, and there are many such systems in nature.
Well-known examples include the chicks of cuckoos or
other brood parasites eliciting feeding from the host
parents by means of gaping behaviour and throat linings
that resemble those of host chicks, and deceptive orchids
eliciting copulatory probing from bumblebees and
thereby achieving pollen transfer. There are also situations
within human cultures that seem to work in the same way.
Visual pornography, or the exaggerated drawings used in
cartoons and advertising, can elicit and in some sense
satisfy sexual or parental motivations (Lea 1984).
Such stimuli are only functionless in the strict,
evolutionary sense of function. Within the life of the indi-
vidual organism, they provide the same kind of gratifica-
tion as the corresponding fully functional stimulus. But
unlike that stimulus, they are not associated with the incre-
ment of biological fitness that, we assume, drove the
evolution of the motivational system in question.
2.2.3. Cognitive drugs. Pornographic pictures mimic
natural visual stimuli that are instinctually sexually arous-
ing, for functional reasons that are well understood in prin-
ciple even if the details are open to much debate. But what
about pornographic text? Such material can undoubtedly
be sexually arousing, but it does not mimic any stimulus
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that could be supposed to have an innate effect. Porno-
graphy here serves as an extreme example of a general
fact: we can be emotionally engaged by many kinds of
text, and therefore motivated to read them. Any such
text must be thought of as a “cognitive drug.” Its effect
depends on what we know and understand, not on what
we perceive; but like nicotine, like saccharin, and like
the knitting needle that Tinbergen showed to herring
gull chicks, it elicits a response without delivering the
effects that make it adaptive for the organism to make
that response.
2.2.4. The drug metaphor and Drug Theory. It may seem
that we have extended the concept of a “drug” unreason-
ably, so let us recapitulate what we have discarded and
what we have retained. We have discarded the idea of a
chemical with an identifiable locus of action in the
central nervous system. But we have retained the idea of
a drug as a deceiver: a stimulus that is of no biological
significance in itself, but which has motivational properties
because it produces the same neural, behavioural, or
psychological effect as some other stimulus that is
biologically significant. A drug in this extended sense is
any functionless motivator, obtaining its motivational
effect by a parasitic action on a functional, evolutionarily
adaptive system.
It is from this metaphorical definition of a drug that we
derive our second biological account of the psychology of
money, which we call Drug Theory. On this account,
money acquires its incentive power because it mimics the
neural, behavioural, or psychological action of some
other, more natural incentive. Obviously, we are not
suggesting that there are biochemical receptor sites in the
brain on which, say, chemicals released by used five-
pound notes react. Nor are we suggesting that money has
a direct effect via the sense organs, like saccharin or
visual pornography. But we do suggest that money can
“act like” natural incentives at a cognitive level, and itsmoti-
vational power flows at least partly from this. In describing
money as a cognitive drug, however, we do not mean to dis-
embody its action. Although the response tomoneymust be
mediated through the cognitive system, it is nonetheless an
affective response, just as the response to pornography, or
fiction, is not coldly cognitive. Cognitive drugs involve hot
cognition (Anderson 1981). Furthermore, cognitive pro-
cesses do imply correlated brain processes. The rapidly
expanding research field of neuroeconomics (Glimcher
2003) has already shown, through brain imaging studies,
that specific brain centres are activated in the presence of
money (e.g., Zink et al. 2004), and immediate monetary
incentives stimulate parts of the brain that are associated
with immediate reward, not delayed reward (McClure
et al. 2004). This is the opposite of what would be expected
from Tool Theory, since on such a theory money is only
interesting because of the biologically relevant rewards it
can produce at a later time – a conclusion that is reinforced
by the fact that in McClure et al.’s experiment, money was
delivered in the form of tokens for an online bookshop, so
the final reward could only be obtained after a delay of days.
Why should we use the drug metaphor for money,
rather than some other alternative to Tool Theory? The
core reason is that a drug is a functionless motivator, and
that is what we want to assert that money sometimes is.
But there are also other features of classic drugs that
help make the metaphor persuasive. Drugs can be very
strong motivators; they are often addictive; an attraction
to them frequently has bad consequences for the individ-
ual; and they give immediate reward where “real” motiva-
tors can only do so over an extended period. As we discuss
in section 4, all these features have been alleged of money.
But while these additional features of the money motiv-
ation make the idea of “money as drug” attractive, they
do not define it. Finding that money did not possess
these additional drug-like properties would make the
Drug Theory less attractive, but not useless; finding
that money never acts as a functionless motivator would
undermine it completely.
2.3. Alternatives
Could there be other accounts of the incentive value of
money which do not fit within either Tool Theory or
Drug Theory? Both assert that money gives access to bio-
logical rewards. Tool Theory covers cases where money
gives real but indirect access to such rewards; Drug
Theory covers cases where it gives direct access to the
systems that subserve such rewards, but in an illusory,
nonfunctional way. Given that we are looking for a biologi-
cal understanding of money motivation, and given that we
are taking as unarguable that there has not been time for
the evolution of a direct, functional, brain system to
detect and respond to the acquisition of money, the two
theories seem to exhaust the range of possibilities
between them. Tool Theory covers the cases where
acquiring money is motivated by a real underlying func-
tion; Drug Theory covers the cases of functionless
money motivation. It remains possible that an alternative,
completely nonbiological, model could give a more econ-
omical account of the phenomena (see sect. 1.4). This
means that only in a limited sense can we infer a role
for Drug Theory from any failure of Tool Theory. If
Tool Theory fails, Drug Theory is then the only possible
biological theory, and vice versa. But that is not evidence
that it is a satisfactory biological theory, only that there
is no better biological alternative.
Money is neither literally a tool nor literally a drug.
These are both metaphors, which we have used in an
attempt to capture and contrast two distinct ways of
explaining money within a biological approach to motiv-
ation. We believe that between them they do exhaust the
field of human behaviour towards money, but clearly
they are not the only conceivable way of partitioning
that field. With sufficient sophistication, it is virtually
certain that the tool metaphor could be extended to
cover all the phenomena which we shall conclude are
better explained by a drug metaphor, and vice versa.
Our most fundamental aim in this target article, therefore,
is not to establish the superiority of one of these metaphors
over the other, but to deploy these metaphors in a rela-
tively simple form to demonstrate the complexity of the
phenomena of money psychology.
3. Theories of money and money motivation
Tool Theory and Drug Theory, as we have developed them
here, are broad classes of psychological theories about the
money motive. We now consider some particular theories
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that explicitly or implicitly specify psychological mechan-
isms for money motivation. We are not attempting an
assessment of the plausibility of these theories, but
rather characterising them as versions either of Tool
Theory or Drug Theory. These categorizations are of
course ours, not those of the original authors, who might
well have disagreed with them.
3.1. The economic theory of money
A typical economic textbook account states:
whether money is shells or rocks or gold or paper, in any
economy it has three primary functions: it is a medium of
exchange, a unit of account and a store of value. Of these
three functions, its function as a medium of exchange is what
distinguishes money from other assets such as stocks, bonds
or houses. (Mishkin 1992, p. 21)
All that matters, for something to function in these ways,
is that all members of the relevant society should accept
that it does so function. As Carruthers and Babb (1996)
put it, money is a “self-fulfilling collective prophecy.”
Economists (and others) have divided sharply on what
enables something to be accepted as money. On the one
hand, there is the view – which, as Schumpeter (1954/
1994) shows, goes back to Aristotle – that money must
either have an “intrinsic” value, or at least be backed by
a reliable promise from the issuing authority to exchange
it for something of intrinsic value. Money that has this
property is called “commodity” money, signalling that
the substance that is used as money, or that backs
money, would be sought for its own sake even if it were
not used as money. It is also referred to as “convertible”
money, signifying that the money substance can be con-
verted into the underlying commodity. Because in
complex economies the source of intrinsic or commodity
value has usually been gold, the view that money must
be convertible in order to be effective is known as “metal-
lism” or “bullionism.” It is by no means extinct; modern
monetarist economic theory is its direct descendant (Bell
2001; Ingham 2001).
The alternative view claims that money becomes
acceptable by government fiat, that is, by its designation
as legal tender. Money with this property is called “fiat,”
“fiduciary,” “chartal,” or “nonconvertible” money. As Bell
(2001) shows, this view, too, is ancient, but it first came
to prominence with Adam Smith (1776/1908). Fierce
political debates between bullionists and chartalists arose
in Great Britain following a suspension of convertibility
in 1797 (Perlman 1986), and in the United States after
the end of the Civil War, during which both sides
suspended convertibility (Carruthers & Babb 1996).
Both commodity and fiat accounts of money face diffi-
culties. The well-documented emergence of cigarettes as
a money substitute in prisoner-of-war camps looks like
excellent evidence for a commodity theory, but it poses
two core problems: Why should people trade with a com-
modity instead of consuming it, and if they do use a com-
modity for trade, why does it generally circulate at a higher
value than it is worth for consumption (Burdett et al.
2001)? To bullionists, on the other hand, fiat money
poses two problems. First, why should people ever trust
a purely arbitrary token? Second, if the value of money
is created by the mere act of declaring it to be legal
tender, what is to stabilise its value – especially as the
government may well be motivated to change the value
for policy reasons, to the detriment of economic affairs?
Bell (2001) and Ingham (2001) trace from Adam Smith,
through Keynes and other twentieth-century economists,
the argument that government gives fiat money its value
by declaring that it is acceptable in settlement of tax liabil-
ities. Ingham extends the argument, suggesting (following
Grierson; e.g., Grierson 1978) that the process of money
creation has an older history in the use of money to
settle other kinds of non-market debts such as bride-
price and the compensations for injury (Wergeld) that
were common in early Germanic societies. The creation
of value through tax demands answers the metallists’
theoretical questions, and the historical observation that
governments often do interfere with the value of money
is good evidence that modern money is in fact fiat money.
The chartalist account of money is an obvious Tool
Theory. However, from our perspective, the metallist
notion that abstract money must be backed by real
goods is a version of Drug Theory. Gold and silver make
good coinage because of their durability. But, according
to metallism, nothing can work as money unless there is
a market for it for non-money purposes. Such a market
requires the substance to be scarce (which is true of
gold and silver) but also desirable as a result of some
human motive, which must therefore ultimately have a
biological grounding. In the case of precious metals,
their ultimate incentive value is aesthetic: the desire for
beauty seems to be a biologically grounded motivation
for our species, and gold and silver are useful in making
beautiful and durable objects. According to the metallists,
money backed by gold functions as a representation or
symbol of that desirable thing, and though they were at
pains to distinguish the symbol from the thing symbolised
(see Carruthers & Babb 1996), they were clear that it is
because of the thing symbolised that money, the symbol,
is desired. It is only because of this drug-like, mimicking
property that money is able to function as a tool.
3.2. Psychological theories of money
We review briefly here some historically important
accounts of the psychology of money; they have been sur-
veyed in more detail elsewhere (e.g., Furnham & Argyle
1998, Ch. 1; Lea et al. 1987, Ch. 12).
3.2.1. Depth psychology. Freud (1908/1959) commented
explicitly on the question of money, and in his discussion
of the anal character acknowledged that style of money
management was one of the most obvious ways in which
people differ. Like modern evolutionary psychologists,
Freud recognized the need to provide a biological expla-
nation of social behaviour. His explanation for the
money motive was, characteristically, developmental. He
suggested that psychological involvement with money
must start with its most familiar form, coins, and that inter-
est in these must derive by displacement from interest in
faeces. Thus, for Freud, and for later psychoanalysts like
Ferenczi (1914/1976) who developed Freud’s ideas, the
different individual behaviours and attitudes towards
money, from the miser’s hoarding to the spendthrift’s
self-destructive carelessness, represented varieties of
anal eroticism. This is a basic Drug Theory: money acts
on the developing human brain in the same way as
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faeces, with the important difference that it is acceptable
to parents and society at large for a child to take a close
interest in money.
3.2.2. Operant psychology. A very different kind of bio-
logical psychology provides a further example of a Drug
Theory. Skinner (1953, p. 79) accounted for money
within his radical behaviourism as a generalised token
reinforcer. It is well established that stimuli paired with
unconditioned reinforcers can acquire reinforcing power
and are then called conditioned (or secondary) reinforcers;
if the stimuli are tangible objects, they are called token
reinforcers. Skinner argued (p. 77) that if a single kind
of conditioned reinforcer was paired with many different
kinds of unconditioned reinforcers, its reinforcing effect
would become independent of deprivation of any of
them. Operant psychologists have seen this process as pro-
viding a good account of the reinforcing power of money.
To a cognitive psychologist, the token reinforcement
would be seen as a means to an end, and a conditioned
reinforcement theory of money would be a version of
Tool Theory. But within a radically behaviourist account,
the incentive power of tokens, and hence of money,
derives from mere association with the goods and services
it can buy; behaviour is not to be explained by supposing
that organisms understand causal relations. Skinner is
deliberately agnostic about the brain mechanisms of
reinforcement processes, but it is clear that, however
unconditioned reinforcers act, conditioned reinforcers
must act in the same way, marking Skinner’s theory as a
pure Drug Theory. Skinner’s is not the only behaviourist
account of secondary or conditioned reinforcement (see
the collections edited by Hendry 1969a and Wike 1966),
though it is the one that has been applied most explicitly
to explain behaviour towards money. However, other
accounts share the essential feature of Skinner’s, that
the attraction to money develops through mechanistic
principles of conditioning, and they too are therefore
drug theories.
3.2.3. The functional autonomy of drives. A similar
approach to money comes from social and personality
psychology. Allport (1937) coined the phrase “functional
autonomy” to describe motives that emerge from antece-
dent systems but become independent of them, so that
the link with the original motive is historical and not func-
tional and “‘young’ systems may become stronger than the
older systems” (p. 363). Money can be seen as a good
example of this process. This too is a kind of Drug
Theory: though the motive to acquire money is a self-
sustaining system, its origins are in more basic motives
and it presumably acts on the brain in the same way as
the comforts that it procures.
3.2.4. Cognitive development and money. As Webley
(2004) explains, Piagetians have proposed that children’s
understanding of money passes through a series of
stages. The number of stages proposed has varied, but in
all cases the notion is that children are, step by step, learn-
ing how to operate within the economy of adults and how
to use its institutions, especially money. This approach
clearly focuses on the instrumental use of money, and
thus qualifies as a Tool Theory.
3.3. Money in other social sciences
3.3.1. Classic sociology of money. The classic social
science view of money was shaped by Marx (1867/1932,
vol. 1, Chs. 1–3) and Weber (1904/1976, Ch. 5). Both
linked the psychology of money to the capitalist mode of
economic production. In Marx’s view, tradable economic
commodities are the products of human labour appearing
as “independent beings endowed with life” (Marx 1867/
1932, vol. 1, Ch. 1, sect. 4) through a process he describes
as “commodity fetishism,” in which certain compelling
images come to eclipse the objects they portray. The
conversion of labour into money requires a double trans-
formation (Ch. 3, sect. 2), and therefore a double alien-
ation (of labour into the commodity produced, and of
the commodity into money). For Marx, this abstraction,
or alienation, of perceived value from its origins in
human labour is a necessary step in the historical develop-
ment of a modern capitalist economy. Although lacking
technical psychological input, Marx’s account is plainly a
theory about the psychology of money, and in our terms
it is a clear example of a Drug Theory; a “fetish” is a
very reasonable description of a “functionless motivation,”
and incorporates well the notion of deception that is at the
core of the drug metaphor. Weber also saw the accumu-
lation of money as essential to the development of capital-
ism, though in his account accumulation flows not from
desire, but from the paradoxical way in which Protestant-
ism equated working at worldly callings with virtue while
disallowing consumption. This view leads to a Drug
Theory more by default: since the tool use of money is
disallowed, money can only be sought for its own sake,
even though, as Weber recognised, it is not within
human nature to do so (cf. Needleman 1994, pp. 143–44).
These classical views are capable of wider application
than the specific economic historical settings in which
Marx and Weber deployed them. The idea of commodity
fetishism continues to be used in modern sociological
and anthropological analyses (e.g., Carruthers & Babb
1996; Desforges 2001; Snodgrass 2002), and the Protes-
tant Ethic has acquired new significance in the psycho-
metric analysis of behaviour towards money (Furnham
1990). But long before the recent period, a wider view
of the sociology of money had been taken by Simmel
(1900/1978) in his major work, Philosophie des Geldes
(The Philosophy of Money). Simmel explored “just about
every conceivable topic connected to money” (Deflem
2003). He agreed with Marx in seeing money as an instru-
ment of alienation, but he did not see it solely in the
context of the emergence of capitalism. For Simmel, it is
money itself, not capitalism, that transforms goods into
commodities. Money is both the means and the symbol
of the process by which in modern society impersonal,
quantitative social relations between autonomous individ-
uals replace the determinant relations imposed by
traditional society. Simmel was specific about money
motivation: normally money is not a purpose in itself,
but it has infinite capacities of application in exchange
relations, and so it becomes desired for itself. In our
terms, we can see here both an assertion of Tool Theory
and an assertion of its inadequacy, and the need for
some kind of Drug Theory. This is most obvious in the
extreme case: “For the miser, all other goods lie at the
periphery of existence and from each of them a straight
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road leads to the centre, to money. The whole specific
sense of enjoyment and power would be misinterpreted
if one were to reverse this direction and wished to lead
it back again from the terminal point to the periphery”
(Simmel 1900/1978, p. 245).
Although Simmel was a significant figure in the history
of sociology, he had relatively little immediate influence;
for example, Philosophie des Geldes was not translated
into English until nearly 80 years after its first publication.
The major development of social science thinking about
money in the early twentieth century came instead from
anthropology, with the work of Malinowski (e.g., Mali-
nowski 1922) and, in particular, Mauss (1925/1954) on
gift exchanges in non-Western cultures. These ethno-
graphic studies supplied an empirical basis, lacking in
the classic sociologists’ work, for assertions about what
exchange might be like in the absence of money. They
showed that exchange can take place without money –
but also that it is distinctly different from exchange in a
modern economy. They thus tended to confirm that
money is not just a neutral tool, but an institution with a
transformative potential.
Even from this brief survey, it can be seen that there are
many different nuances within the classic sociological and
anthropological analyses of money. However, these ana-
lyses share a rejection of a purely economic account –
not necessarily as wrong, but certainly as inadequate. In
different ways, they see its invention or introduction as
corrupting or transforming previous patterns of exchange;
but even if money diminishes the social content of
exchanges, it does not abolish it. As a result, money is
sought for reasons that go beyond its instrumental func-
tion. To varying degrees and in differing ways, therefore,
these classic sociological accounts are versions of Drug
Theory.
3.3.2. Modern sociology of money. Recent decades have
seen a revival of interest in the sociology of money, often
involving a fusion of ideas from classic sociological
theory (especially that of Simmel) with more recent
anthropological data. Important contributors to the
modern sociological theory of money include Carruthers
(e.g. Carruthers & Espeland 1998), Dodd (1994), Doyle
(e.g., 2001), Ingham (e.g., 1996; 2001), Singh (e.g.,
1996), and Zelizer (e.g., 1994). Less strictly academic
accounts such as those of Buchan (1997), Millman
(1991), and Needleman (1994) have also contributed to
the modern view of the place of money in society.
These writings cover many aspects of money other than
the motivation to acquire it, so a full review of them would
be beyond the scope of this target article. A recurring
theme within them, however, is the social interactionist
perspective, resulting in a tension between two pervading
ideas. On the one hand is the notion that money anon-
ymizes social interactions, and on the other is the recog-
nition that money is imbued with social meaning and
thereby links things and people together (Newton 2003).
Zelizer, who has taken a less hostile and pessimistic view
of money’s role in society than have many other modern
social theorists, particularly stresses how money retains
meaning beyond the particular transaction in which it is
obtained or used (e.g., Zelizer 1989; 1996). Conversely,
Ingham (2001) argues that the fundamental nature of
modern money is the abstract recognition of a debt, so
that its representation by a commodity is merely contin-
gent; for him, money stuff always symbolises abstract
money. But he is at one with Zelizer and other sociologists
of money in rejecting the simple economic view that
“money is what money does.” From a different back-
ground comes the striking hypothesis of Seaford (2004)
that it was the invention of coinage that enabled pre-
Socratic Greek metaphysicians to conceive of impersonal
universal forces: on this view, money can actually be said
to give birth to abstract symbolic thought (see also Shell
1982).
The sense that money is essentially a symbol, perhaps
multiply symbolic (cf. Lea et al. 1987, Ch. 12), seems
hard to reconcile with any kind of biological analysis of
money motivation; it leads, furthermore, to a cognitive
rather than a motivational analysis of behaviour towards
money. We will return later (sect. 5.2) to the question of
whether there is a fundamental conflict between this
kind of social-cognitive theory of money and our attempt
to construct a biological account. Within the confines of
our current account, however, we need to classify the
modern sociological theories. Clearly they go beyond the
simple notion of money as a tool for economic exchange,
but they do not align in an obvious way with what we
have called Drug Theory. Rather, modern sociology
tends to see money as a tool, but as a tool for more than
exchange, and, as we have already noted, that idea is expli-
cit in several modern social accounts of money function;
see, for example, Buchan (1997). In the final section of
this target article (sect. 5.2), however, we shall argue
instead that the modern sociological account should be
classified as a Drug Theory, because its conclusions paral-
lel those of the specific version of Drug Theory we develop
there. At this point, we merely note that if money is sought
for the meanings it carries, that allows for a disconnection
between those meanings and the reality that is believed to
underlie them, and thus creates an opening for the decep-
tive processes that characterize Drug Theories.
3.4. Summary
This brief survey has shown that a number of leading the-
ories of money in psychology and other social sciences are,
in terms of the metaphorical dichotomy we have drawn up,
best classified as Drug Theories. However, we have not
found a simple economics versus psychology opposition.
Surprisingly, the most conservative economic theory of
money (metallism) appears to be a Drug Theory, while
at least one much-used psychological theory is clearly of
the Tool Theory type, and modern sociological approaches
may be best described as “sophisticated tool” theories.
4. The empirical psychology of money
Modern approaches to the psychology of money have been
strongly affected by the emergence of the specialised sub-
disciplines of economic psychology and behavioural econ-
omics. A number of lines of investigation have proved
fruitful within the empirical economic psychology of
money, and these shed some light on the issue of Tool
Theory versus Drug Theory. Several of them overlap
with recent empirical work in the sociology and anthropol-
ogy of money. Not surprisingly, these lines of investigation
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have shown that quite a lot of human behaviour towards
money can be accounted for in terms of what we are
calling Tool Theory, because this is the “obvious”
account. In this section, we review several lines of evi-
dence showing that something beyond the rational use of
a tool is involved. We argue that many of these exceptional
findings are well accounted for by a Drug Theory.
4.1. Perceiving coins
Bruner and Goodman (1947) found that children tend to
overestimate the sizes of coins relative to other, physically
similar, stimuli. This report caused considerable contro-
versy, and a series of experiments by other authors clari-
fied the result, without however shaking the basic claim
that there is something special about money objects at
the psychological level (Saugstad & Schioldborg 1966).
More recent research has supported that claim by
looking at how the perception of money is changed by his-
torical changes in the money system and the value of
money. Lea (1981) found that pre-decimal British coins
were remembered as larger than the identical coins
under their decimal names, devalued by a decade of
rapid inflation. Furnham (1983) found a similar effect
for an obsolete design of pound note, and further research
along the same lines has been carried out in other
countries by Leiser and Izak (1987) and Brysbaert and
d’Ydewalle (1989). A Drug Theory can account for these
phenomena by asserting that the value of money gives it
a special status, which interferes with normal perceptual/
cognitive processing. It is not obvious how a Tool Theory
can accommodate these phenomena.
4.2. Money illusion
In the presence of inflation, economic events and choices
that take place over time can be denominated either in
terms of nominal values – the actual money amounts – or
in terms of real values – purchasing power. If people are
influenced to some extent by nominal rather than real
values, they are said to be suffering from “money illusion”
(Fisher 1928). Although the possibility of money illusion
was for decades dismissed by theoretical economists, it
has now been demonstrated in economic experiments
(Fehr & Tyran 2001) and survey studies (Shafir et al.
1997). It is also ubiquitous in ordinary economic life. At
the population level, consumers demonstrate money illu-
sion in relation both to the entire economy (e.g., Dowd,
1992) and to individual commodities (e.g., Franke 1994).
Consumer money illusion can also be seen at the individ-
ual level, for example in price estimation in different cur-
rencies (e.g., Gamble et al. 2002) and in the effects of
currency change on charitable donation (Kooreman et al.
2004). Money illusion can also be demonstrated in produ-
cers: for example, in the borrowing behaviour of small
firms (Machauer & Weber 1998) and in the response of
independent professionals to changes in state-mandated
fees (Mayer & Rozier 2000). Investors, too, suffer from
money illusion (e.g., Miller & Schulman 1999; Modigliani
& Cohn 1979). The downward trend in the value of non-
resident fathers’ child support payments in the United
States seems to be in part attributable to money illusion
on the part of judges, lawyers, and parents (Hanson
et al. 1996).
Money illusion disconnects the psychological impact of
money from what money can do. Shafir et al. (1997) argue
that the disconnection is only partial, and that money illu-
sion in fact arises from people’s struggles to work with both
real and nominal values. But even a partial disconnection
of the motive for money from its instrumental effect is evi-
dence that a pure Tool Theory cannot be adequate.
4.3. Money conservatism
People frequently resist new forms of money, even when
the innovation is quite trivial. When the U.K. pound
note was replaced by a coin in 1983, reaction in the
press was absurdly hostile; and Hussein (1985) showed
experimentally that people did indeed behave differently
with the coins, spending them more quickly than notes.
In the United States, the introduction of the Susan
B. Anthony dollar coin in 1979 largely failed because of
public rejection (Caskey & St. Laurent 1994). Current
attempts to introduce a dollar coin are again meeting
with hostility and very low levels of usage; the coins
barely circulate, except for a few special purposes such
as the purchase of subway tickets in slot machines, while
dollar bills remain in widespread use. The reaction
against the euro in countries such as the United
Kingdom (see Routh & Burgoyne 1998) is similarly dispro-
portionate to any economic facts. Indeed, people are more
agreed about their dislike of the euro than they are about
the reasons for that dislike, a strong indication that their
hostility is rationalised rather than rational. That is not to
say, of course, that it is unreasonable: the euro is recogni-
sable as both a means and a symbol in the ongoing project
of “Europeanization” (Borneman & Fowler 1997) to which
many people in the United Kingdom remain opposed. Its
rejection is the rejection of an institution that is literally
foreign to them, and thus incapable of supporting the
trust that money is required to elicit.
At first sight, money conservatism seems to give strong
support to a Drug Theory. However, it is not an unlimited
phenomenon, and its limitations tend to support a Tool
Theory. Caskey and St Laurent (1994) produce an entirely
instrumental analysis of the rejection of the U.S. dollar
coins. When currencies lose their value because of econ-
omic or political change, people lose interest in them pre-
cipitately, as a Tool Theory would predict. Furthermore,
not all new forms of money are rejected. Credit and
debit cards have won wide acceptance quite quickly,
though penetration varies greatly between countries
(Humphrey 2004; Snellman et al. 2001). Nevertheless,
some of the phenomena of money conservatism do seem
to call for a Drug Theory. The loss of interest in super-
seded forms of money is rarely total. Anecdotes of
people hanging on “irrationally” to foreign or devalued
currencies are common, suggesting that money does not
lose quite all its power when it loses its function. Further-
more, although dramatic devaluations certainly do cause
people to lose confidence in a particular currency, they
have much less effect on people’s confidence in money
in general. The high inflation that has characterised
many Latin American and African countries for decades
has certainly caused their citizens to lose interest in acquir-
ing their local currencies, but they remain very interested
in acquiring dollars (e.g., De Boeck 1998; Guidotti &
Rodriguez 1992). The collapse of the rouble following
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the end of the Soviet Union caused a return to barter in
many sectors of the Russian economy (Woodruff 1999),
for lack of any alternative. But in Central Europe, where
other forms of money (dollars, Deutschmarks, and now
euros) were more readily available, it was these rather
than barter that filled the gap. Moreover, although some
forms of “plastic money” have spread successfully, others
have failed spectacularly. There have been a number of
high-profile attempts to introduce “electronic purses”, a
kind of “smart card” where the record of money available
is stored on the card itself rather than in a central bank
computer; all have failed to gain public acceptance,
despite apparent technical advantages (Truman et al.
2003). New forms of money are in general not less func-
tional than old forms, indeed the reason for introducing
them is that they will be better tools for exchange; but
they seem to need to show a substantial advantage over
old forms before people will adopt them. The reaction to
them is often emotive rather than calculative. We
conclude the people become attached to money objects
themselves, as predicted by Drug Theory.
4.4. Money attitudes
Economic psychologists have developed a number of
psychometric scales that assess attitudes towards money –
for example, the Money Attitudes Scale (Yamauchi &
Templer 1982), the Money Beliefs and Behaviour Scale
(Furnham 1984), and the Love of Money Scale (Tang
1995). These scales are always multifactorial, yielding
anything from three to eight factors. Although the details
vary between scales and studies, the common experience
is to find more or less orthogonal factors relating to
power and prestige, to distrust and anxiety, and to reten-
tion and other temporal issues. Tang and his colleagues
have found separate and virtually orthogonal factors for
an affective component (assessment of money as good or
evil), a cognitive component (money seen as an indicator
of achievement, respect, and freedom or power), and a
behavioural component relating to practical budgeting.
Furthermore, these factors enter into different relation-
ships with other variables of both economic and psycho-
logical interest, such as job satisfaction, business ethics,
work motivation, and life satisfaction (Luna-Arocas &
Tang 2004; Tang & Chiu 2003; Tang & Gilbert 1995).
These results demonstrate a dissociation between the
instrumental and affective aspects of money. In our
terms, therefore, they do not suggest that either Tool
Theory or Drug Theory is correct and the other wrong;
they suggest that money has both tool-like properties
and drug-like properties, and the two are psychologically
dissociated, so that neither kind of theory could give a
complete account on its own.
4.5. Restrictions on money use
The primitive moneys of non-Western societies often
could only be used for certain kinds of exchange, or
there might be several different money systems, each con-
fined to a particular class of commodities or a particular
group of people. Such restrictions on use represent a
failure of the tool function of money. It might be argued
that special-purpose moneys correspond to special-
purpose tools, which are after all common in most kinds
of technology. But money is, specifically, a tool for exchan-
ging. Any limitation on its exchangeability is a restriction
on its tool use. Economic psychologists have shown that
money in modern society, like primitive money, has
restrictions on its use, particularly in connection with
gifts. In Britain, young adults do not feel it is appropriate
to use money as a gift for their mothers (Webley et al.
1983), and identifiable social rules prohibit or allow
using money as a Christmas gift, depending on the
relationship, and relative age and status of the giver and
recipient (Burgoyne & Routh 1991; Webley & Wilson
1989). For example, the person giving money as a gift
must be of higher status, if only by virtue of being older
(cf. Motel & Szydlik 1999). Furthermore, the evaluation
of gifts, whether by the giver or the receiver, does not
depend only on their monetary value (Pieters & Robben
1999). A related phenomenon is the partial taboo on the
use of money to repay neighbourly help (Webley & Lea
1993a). These particular social rules are not universal:
there are cultures where to give money is a sign of
respect (e.g., in Ghana: van der Geest 1997) or is socially
required in certain contexts (e.g., in Cyprus: Hussein
1985). Whatever form it takes, however, there is a
general tendency to maintain a distinction between
market exchanges (where money is acceptable and
usually required) and gift exchanges (where money may
not be acceptable), to the point where some market-
motivated exchanges may be given the outward form of
gifts in order to appropriate a different social meaning
(Offer 1997).
A second sphere where money is often an unacceptable
medium of exchange is within sexual relationships.
Historically, cultures have generally provided ways of
legitimising the exchange of money or money’s worth for
sexual access, whether through bride price, bride
service, or the convention that husbands should be the
“breadwinners” for their wives and families. But it is not
socially acceptable for the exchange to be made too
starkly, or in other than the conventional forms: to do so
incurs the stigma of prostitution. The exchange has to be
cast within the rhetoric of gifts and giving rather than as
payment. Millman (1991) argues that this social conven-
tion acts to mask the real financial exchanges that do
take place within close relationships and are exposed
when relationships break down. Simpson (1997) takes a
slightly different position, arguing that on relationship
breakdown there is a shift of transactions from the non-
monetised gift sphere to the monetised sphere, and this
causes many extra difficulties between divorcing
couples – even as they seek that shift to symbolise the
social distance that now exists between them. Zelizer
(1996) has documented some of the ways in which
people in Western cultures try to keep spheres of
exchange distinct, using sex as a leading example; Wojcicki
(2002) describes the ways in which South African women,
with a very different cultural background, camouflage
money-for-sex exchanges as social relationships; and
Knauft (1997) reviews how the monetisation of extra-
marital affairs in both Amazonia and Melanesia has
resulted in increasing stigma for the women involved.
Converging evidence for the convention of separating
sexual from monetary exchanges comes from situations
where the monetisation of the transaction is actually
sought, precisely because it removes sexual acts from any
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affectional context. Thompson et al. (2003) document how
topless dancers in the United States use the fact that they
are paid for what they are doing to help distance them-
selves psychologically and emotionally from it, and from
their clients. Prasad (1999) shows that prostitutes’ clients
use similar mental strategies to distance themselves
morally and emotionally from the women they use.
The sense that there may be exchanges that should not
be conducted in money goes wider than gifts or sex. Devel-
oping ideas from Simmel (1900/1978), Holt and Searls
(1994) list the family sphere, and consumption of religion,
high art, and education, among the areas where people
resist “the market’s commodification of the good” that is
mediated by money. Even this list is not exhaustive:
Desforges (2001) documents how Western tourists some-
times feel that any monetary transactions at all between
them and local inhabitants in “exotic” travel destinations
render their travel experiences inauthentic. Fiske and
Tetlock (1997) make the point that people do not just
find it difficult to estimate the value of their children,
their loyalty to their country, or acts of friendship: they
find it morally offensive even to be asked to try. Zelizer
(1996) makes similar points about bonuses given by
firms. Thus, there are many situations where money is
not the preferred tool for exchange, or even is not accep-
table at all. Surprisingly, it is often much more acceptable
if money is replaced by something that is clearly money’s
worth, even something with a precise monetary value
such as a book token, a gift certificate of defined value
that can be used only for the purchase of books (Webley
et al. 1983).
These data suggest that money has special properties
that are not captured by the Tool Theory. But do they
give any direct support to the Drug Theory? What seems
to lie at the root of these social rules is a perhaps-unformu-
lated belief that to give someone money is to move the
transaction out of the realm of ordinary social exchange
into a different, economic, sphere, so that what should
be a gift or a means of thanks becomes payment – and
that is something quite different. The prevailing rhetoric
of most societies is that gifts are given, and sex is shared,
for reasons other than material benefit. Gifts and sex are
the currency of the moral and romantic economy, and to
confuse them with the currency of the material economy
is somehow to contaminate them. These social rules
restricting money use could be taken to suggest that
money is different from “real” incentives, such as “real”
praise, “real” affection, or “real” gratitude, and therefore
that money is a mere tool, different from the real objec-
tives it subserves – that though you can in a sense buy
love, happiness, and truth, there remains a love, a truth,
and a happiness you cannot buy (Needleman 1994, pp.
237ff). We argue, however, that these results show pre-
cisely that money is not, or not just, a tool. If it was a
tool, it would always be an acceptable surrogate for
other objectives. From an instrumental point of view,
money is the best gift of all because the recipient can
use it to buy exactly what he or she wants. The empirical
results show that this point of view cannot be complete.
Money-mediated exchanges are different from other
exchanges, and under at least some circumstances,
people avoid them. Under a Drug Theory, this avoidance
is easy to explain: such a theory asserts that money is psy-
chologically special and that it acts on us in ways other than
as a neutral medium of exchange, ways we sometimes want
to avoid. It might be argued that the restrictions on money
use can also be reconciled with a Tool Theory by taking the
tool metaphor more seriously and pointing out that tools
do not have to be universally useful. But the problem
with exchanging money for sex, for example, is not that it
cannot be done, but that it is not socially acceptable for
it to be done because the effects of doing it are socially
and psychologically destructive. It appears that money
exchanges have side effects, and that these give it drug
qualities.
4.6. Money in relationships
Sociologists and psychologists have shown that money
often has as a special status within relationships and a
special impact on them (e.g., Burgoyne 1990; Millman
1991; Pahl 1989; 1995; Simpson 1997). Within families,
access to and influence over money is rarely distributed
equally, and this inequality is frequently a focus for dissa-
tisfaction, strain, and dispute. Money issues are reliable
predictors of divorce (Amato & Rogers 1997), and as
Millman has shown, divorce courts (and also courts
adjudicating disputed wills) provide many illustrations of
the money problems that arise in close relationships.
Family financial disputes are not only about money. In
part, they are about the real power that money gives to
buy real goods and services, and in part they are about
more general issues of freedom and constraint within the
relationship (Vogler 1998). But they are also about
money as such. Disputes about money within the family
can concern the distribution of limited financial resources
(e.g., Zelizer 1994), but they can also be triggered when
one partner acquires new resources, disrupting the pre-
vious distribution of power. James et al. (1992) recorded
how some wives of unemployed men in Britain withdrew
from the labour market to avoid the marital strain that
went with their acquiring the powerful position of the
major earner. Money is a potent symbol and channel of
the power relationships within a family, and because this
is a direct impact of money rather than one mediated
through what money can buy, we argue that it has a
strongly drug-like quality.
4.7. Sacred and profane uses of money
The most systematic recent approach to the psychology of
money is that of Belk and Wallendorf (1990). Using
anthropological data, they draw a distinction between
“sacred” and “profane” uses of money. In many ways this
parallels our distinction between Drug Theory and Tool
Theory. Belk and Wallendorf’s profane uses are the
mundane, functional uses of money that fit easily into a
Tool Theory. But they put forward the hypothesis that
even modern money can be sacralized precisely in order
to explain “some of the more puzzling ways in which
people behave towards money.” Among such money
puzzles they include the social bar on the direct use of
money to buy slaves, brides, political office, or children;
the distinction made between earned and unearned
income; the restrictions on the use of money as gifts;
gender and class differences in the uses of money; and
the paradoxes and contradictions in the ethics of money
use. In sections 4.4 to 4.6, we construed many of the
Lea & Webley: Money as tool, money as drug
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2006) 29:2 171
same money puzzles as evidence in favour of a Drug
Theory. Like the data on money attitudes, therefore,
Belk and Wallendorf’s analysis supports the need for a
dual theory.
Related research includes Oliven’s (1998) examination
of the social functions of money in the United States
from the standpoint of an anthropologist from a less finan-
cially developed society, Brazil. Oliven argues that in
America, money is what Mauss called a “total social
fact.” Oliven argues that whereas in a society like Brazil’s
money is seen as polluting, in the mature capitalist
society of the United States it pervades all social relation-
ships and takes over all metaphors, being associated with
love, death, blood, semen, food, and God. Again in our
terms, it is hard to see how money can be regarded only
as a tool when it has become so involved in a society’s
expression of itself, though the dramatically extended con-
ception of the importance of tools found in the views of
philosophers of technology such as Innis (1984) might
provide a viable approach. We argue, however, that it is
easier to take these wide-ranging social phenomena as
evidence of a drug dimension to the motivation for money.
4.8. Money and social status
Both classic and recent sociologists and social psycholo-
gists have stressed the importance of money as a marker
of status within modern societies. To some extent money
here serves as shorthand for general wealth, possessions,
and consumption: Veblen’s (1899/1979) original develop-
ment of the idea of a status symbol was much more
concerned with things that money can buy than with the
possession of money itself. Status is established through
consumption in non-monetised or weakly monetised
traditional societies as well as in modern economies
(e.g., in the potlatch ceremonies of Northwestern Native
Americans; see Aldona 1991). Nevertheless, statements
of people’s wealth or income, in numerical money terms,
are a common part of discourse about status; nineteenth
century English fiction is rich in examples. People differ
in the extent to which they interpret wealth as a sign of
status, and indeed the extent to which they attribute
value to objects on the basis of their financial cost; the
tendency to do so is referred to as “materialism” and,
from Belk (1984) on, reliable and valid scales to measure
it have been developed [see Richins (2004) for a recent
review]. People high in materialism seek happiness
through wealth and possessions (and tend not to achieve
it; see, e.g., Burroughs & Rindfleisch 2002). This self-
defeating nature of materialism might lead us to claim
this area as one that is well explained by a Drug Theory
of money. However, it is probably better seen as calling
for an elaborated Tool Theory in which money is used as
an instrument to assess or obtain social status and happi-
ness. This is not among the functions of money conceived
of by economic theory, but it is different from the pursuit
of money for its own sake.
4.9. Money work
Even in societies that are not as money-dominated as the
United States, the ubiquity of money means that many
people work directly and continuously with money
they do not own. Jinkings (2000) explores some of the
ambiguities that this produces in the lives of low-paid
Brazilian bank employees, who face deteriorating pay
and conditions under circumstances where the money
they are processing is increasingly powerful. Given the
contradictions inherent in their situation, it is not surpris-
ing that he found the Marxian concept of money fetishism
useful in describing their psychological processes. More
commonly, people’s work has a direct financial dimension
which can be given more or less psychological promi-
nence. Schweingruber and Berns (2003) have analysed
the behaviour and attitudes of U.S. students recruited as
door-to-door commission booksellers, and show how
they had to both involve themselves in and distance them-
selves from the financial rewards that would be associated
with a successful sale. The idea of money acquired an
almost magical content for them.
4.10. Money addiction
If money is to be thought of as a drug, we might expect to
find addictive processes associated with it, though evi-
dently they would constitute a “non-substance addiction”
in the same way as compulsive gambling. The concept of
non-substance addiction remains controversial, but it has
been widely used. The idea of money addiction has been
put forward to explain some of the oddities of people’s
financial behaviour (Boundy 1993; Cameron & Bryan
1992; Forman 1987; Goldberg & Lewis 1978; Needleman
1994, e.g., pp. 115ff; Slater 1980). Most of these sources
are popular or semi-popular rather than academic, and
the idea of money addiction has found little use in soci-
ology or clinical psychology. Furthermore, many of the
references to it in fact deal with more specific addictions
or supposed addictions, such as “workaholism” (Harpaz
& Snir 2003), compulsive gambling (Dickerson 1984), or
compulsive buying (Black 1996). It is an interesting possi-
bility that all these are manifestations of a broader addic-
tion to money, but there is as yet no evidence to support
that proposition; and given our interest in understanding
the motivation to acquire money as such, rather than the
things that it can buy, compulsions to spend in various
ways are not relevant to our argument.
Slater (1980) did consider one case that is more specifi-
cally relevant to our argument: the hoarding of money per
se, or miserliness. Hoarding in Slater’s sense is distinct
from the accumulation of money for precautionary or
investment purposes, though of course it is possible that
at the mechanistic level there is overlap between these
motivations, or indeed the many other recognised
motives for saving (see Lea et al. 1987, Ch. 8). As we
have seen in section 3.2.1, miserliness was historically a
particular concern of psychoanalysts. Clinical and psycho-
metric work gives some support to the Freudian notion
that miserliness and hoarding are components of obses-
sive-compulsive disorder, and both seem to have some
connection to compulsive shopping (Frost et al. 2002;
Grilo 2004). As such, there does seem to be some
support for a Drug Theory of money motivation from
the evidence on money pathology. More recent clinical
psychological approaches, such as cognitive behaviour
therapy, have also been applied to money pathologies,
and as these too would see the pathological interest in
money as disproportionate the money’s actual usefulness,
they would also favour a Drug over a Tool account.
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4.11. Summary
A consistent theme emerges from these very different
kinds of empirical research on money. The evidence is
not that Tool Theory is wrong, but rather that it is
inadequate, and inadequate in specific ways. In a range
of situations, money is found to have a value and an
emotional charge that is not predicted by its economic
use. In some situations this leads to only marginal
effects, such as the sentimental clinging to a few outdated
coins. In other, closely related situations, the effects are
strong enough to determine the economic policies of
nations.
It is one thing to accept that money is not just a tool for
carrying out the functions that economic theory prescribes
for it. It is another to accept our suggestion that its
additional psychological effects can be captured by cate-
gorising it as a cognitive drug. We argue, however, that
this analysis is fruitful, on two grounds. First, because it
captures the parasitic, functionless quality of money
motivation that characterises many of the situations we
have described. Second, however, it leads on to an evol-
utionary account of these phenomena, and of the incentive
value of money in general, which we will set out in the final
section of this article. If that explanation is accepted, the
importance of the drug metaphor fades; it will have done
its job in linking together phenomena and rephrasing the
question about money motivation in a form that can be
more readily answered.
5. A synthetic theory of money
5.1. The need for synthesis
Lea et al. (1987) tried to accommodate what was then
known about the psychology of money within a loose
theoretical framework in which money was seen as multi-
ply symbolic. In evolutionary terms, this account is vague
and underspecified: What is meant by a symbol, and
what selective pressures does it respond to? What that
analysis did capture was the notion that money in
modern society has more forms, and more functions,
than the simple economic Tool Theory would allow. In
section 4 we showed that modern research in economic
psychology is uncovering an increasing range of money
phenomena that Tool Theory cannot account for. We
have argued here that these phenomena call for some
version of the Drug account: money seems to act on the
human brain in ways that mimic more natural incentives,
not just by being an instrument for access to them.
It would be foolish to deny the force of the Tool Theory.
Money does have functions, and new forms of money are
constantly being invented to fulfil those functions in new
ways. The range of new forms that money has taken in
recent decades, and the speed with which people have
adopted some of them (see sect. 4.3), show that the instru-
mentality of money is fundamentally important: the only
thing all forms of money have in common is their function
(cf. Ingham 2001). But not all tools for a given function
come equally easily to human hands or minds. All compu-
ter operating systems perform roughly the same oper-
ations on stored information, but the menu and pointer
system used in modern operating systems is more efficient
than a command line interface for all but the most skilled
users (Card et al. 1983) because it relies on recognition
rather than recall memory. The good tool always comes
with overtones of drug, whether it is a tool for data proces-
sing or exchanging. Thus we argue that, though money
certainly is a tool, it is too successful a tool for the Tool
Theory to be entirely right.
But the Drug Theory is not without problems. First, the
phenomena that we have identified as requiring some kind
of Drug Theory are not a coherent set. They could easily
be regarded as a mixed bag of marginal, second-order
phenomena that all have different explanations. This argu-
ment, however, only carries force if we are implicitly per-
suaded that Tool Theory must be the correct explanation
for most money motivation. If Drug Theory covers any
phenomena at all, then it may also cover some of the
phenomena that could be accommodated by a Tool
Theory. It need not be confined to the margins.
More seriously, Drug Theory is feeble unless we can
specify what the natural incentives are that money
mimics, and in this final section we therefore seek to do
that. For convenience, we refer to the incentive systems
concerned as “instincts,” though, as explained in section
1.4, we mean that term only in the sense of a motivational
system so widely observed that it can be taken to be cultu-
rally universal, like hunger or parenting. Those examples
are sufficient to remind us that even when motivations
are universal, the way they are manifested varies greatly
between cultures and periods of history. Here, we
suggest two motives that we believe are universal among
humans, and argue that they manifest themselves in
modern cultures as a desire for money. These are certainly
not the only possibilities, but we are seeking to establish
that there is at least some plausible means by which the
drug-like effects of money could have evolved.
5.2. Reciprocal altruism, trade, and money
A prime use of money, considered as a tool, is to facilitate
trade. Could trade itself be the incentive that money
mimics? At first this seems an unhelpful suggestion, since
it simply moves the problem from the evolutionary origin
of money to the evolutionary origins of trade, which is
also a uniquely human behaviour (see Lea 1994). Division
of labour occurs in other species, but there is little doubt
that its integration into a system of trade is uniquely
human; chimpanzees may be induced to barter in the lab-
oratory (Hyatt & Hopkins 1998), but there is no evidence
that trade forms any part of their natural social life. The
problem of the evolution of a motivation for trade,
however, may be tractable in a way that the problem of
the evolution of a money motive is not. Ridley (1997,
Ch. 10) has argued, from the archaeological evidence,
that though trade originates with Homo sapiens, it must
have done so early, in fact it must be as old as the species
itself; he sees trade as one of the distinguishing marks of
our species. So, whereas the use of money is too recent
to allow the evolution of a money instinct, trade could be
a human instinct on which the money motive might be
built through drug action. But Ridley concedes that most
anthropologists have thought of trade as a late develop-
ment in human prehistory; and even if he is right in assign-
ing it an early origin, we would still have to specify themore
widespread instincts from which it could have evolved,
because it does not occur in other apes.
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The most obvious such instinct is reciprocal altruism.
Sociobiological theory came to prominence because it
managed to reconcile the existence of altruistic behaviour
with the neo-Darwinian concept of the selfish gene. Most
altruism can be explained by kin selection – indirect selec-
tive advantage to an individual achieved through benefits
to his or her kin (Hamilton 1963). Humans, who have
long periods of juvenile dependency and tend to live in
groups of related individuals, should show such kin altru-
ism instinctively. But, in addition, Trivers (1971) showed
that there were circumstances under which instinctive
altruistic behaviour between unrelated individuals could
be favoured by evolution, because of the possibility of reci-
procation. Humans fit precisely Trivers’ specification for a
species within which such reciprocal altruism could
evolve: we are long-lived, intelligent, and live in perma-
nent social groups. But what Trivers and other sociobiolo-
gists describe as reciprocal altruism would usually, if it
occurred in humans, be referred to as trade, because it
depends critically on exchange: it is only sustainable if an
organism that gives up fitness at one moment can expect
to gain fitness in the future. Trivers’ argument can thus
be restated as implying that it might be adaptive for
humans to trade with unrelated individuals. And if trade
is adaptive for humans, and has been over a substantial
period of time, it is reasonable to suppose that natural
selection will have equipped humans with a motivation
to trade, and ensured that we will enjoy doing it – in a
word, that we might have an instinct to trade, in addition
to our instinct for unreciprocated giving towards kin.
Although this may sound an odd idea, there are both
theoretical and empirical arguments in its support.
At the theoretical level, Trivers’ (1971) argument sets
minimum conditions under which reciprocal altruism can
emerge. But once it is established, reciprocation has adap-
tive value over and above the goods or services a particular
trade makes available, because it makes it possible to have
with strangers at least some of the kinds of interactions that
normally only occur between kin. Long beforemoney came
on the scene, humans developed networks of social
relationships, involving individually known and at least par-
tially individually trusted persons, that were larger than
those of any comparable animal. In the Environment of
Evolutionary Adaptation, a person whose extended social
network was larger had many advantages – the primary
one being that he or she was safer against both social and
environmental threats. This added adaptive value should
strengthen the instinct to trade. The implication is that
there is not just a human possibility to engage in reciprocal
altruism in case of need, but amotivation to do so whenever
a reasonable opportunity presents itself. Margolin (1978/
2003, pp. 89–102) gives a graphic description of the motiv-
ation for reciprocal altruism and trade, and its adaptive
value, among the Ohlone peoples of the Californian
Central Coast. Studies of informal transactions in modern
society, within the “black economy” (Henry 1978) or in con-
sumer “swapmeets” (Belk et al. 1988), have shown that this
social function of trade remains strong. Interestingly, such
informal transactions are often imperfectly monetised.
Empirically, much evidence supports the idea that
there are two different motivational systems underlying
human giving and receiving. Economic anthropologists
such as Sahlins (1974) have shown that in societies
without money there is a continuum of exchanges. At
one extreme are truly altruistic exchanges within
households, where reciprocation need not be exact or
immediate, and may indeed never happen at all; at the
other are exchanges with members of other villages,
where reciprocation must be immediate and exact or no
exchange will take place. Conversely, in modern societies,
where there is repeated trading between the same individ-
uals, for example, in a continuing employment relationship
and particularly where employer and employee live
together, the language of trade tends to be replaced by
the language of kinship; for example, we hear of “paterna-
listic” employers – particularly where the reciprocation is
in fact unbalanced.
The idea of a trading instinct allows for a much more
precisely specified version of Drug Theory. Considered
as a tool, money is used extensively to serve the trade
motivation. In this role, it multiplies the reasonable oppor-
tunities for exchange by making it more instant, more sure,
and easier; it removes the need for an exact reciprocal
return of action for action, good for good. Considered as
a drug, however, it seems to be capable of giving the illu-
sion of trade and reciprocation even when it is absent. If
trade is a human instinct, we would expect there to be a
specific region of the human brain that has an innate
tendency to be active when the opportunity for trade
arises – a suggestion that once would have seemed out-
landish but, in the light of recent developments in neuroe-
conomics, seems merely obvious (cf. Glimcher 2003).
Money, we argue, acts like a drug on that centre, activating
it even when there is no real possibility of trading, or no
real advantage in it. And just as an artificial sweetener
like saccharine can stimulate our sweetness receptors far
more than the natural substances it mimics, so money
can overstimulate our trading receptors, with the effect
that, as Wordsworth put it, “getting and spending we lay
waste our powers.”
This specification of Drug Theory fits perfectly with the
social rules that constrain the use of money as a gift. The
data surveyed in sections 4.5 and 4.6 show that money is,
in a range of ways, socially awkward. The idea that
money is a trade-based drug explains that awkwardness
from the fact that trade is socially awkward, because it is
in tension with a different but overlapping instinct.
Within the circle of close kin, reciprocation need not be
insisted on – indeed, to insist on it would be to label the
interaction as taking place outside that circle. Within the
circle of slightly less close kin, where some reciprocation
is needed, too speedy reciprocation is equally a solecism.
Although it might be advantageous to mislabel a trade
relationship as kinship, to mislabel kinship as trade could
be a biologically fatal mistake, since it would be to relin-
quish the claim of kinship, a much more powerful and
reliable source of altruism than reciprocation.
As would be expected from its close fit to the data on
money as a gift, the idea of money as a trade-based drug
also fits well with modern sociological and anthropological
accounts. From a theoretical perspective, Newton (2003)
has argued that modern money and credit create increas-
ingly extended “dependency networks” of the sort
implicated in the civilising process as it is described by
Norbert Elias (e.g., 1994). Much modern empirical soci-
ology of money has aimed to uncover the social meanings
money acquires from the exchanges by which it is obtained
and in which it is spent, and the social meanings that are
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created when money is used to facilitate an exchange that
might have taken place by other means. Thus, Granovetter
(1985) insists on the “embeddedness” of economic action
within social structure and social relations; Offer (1997)
argues that where it is important to establish mutual
“regard,” money is avoided even when reciprocation is
needed; and Zelizer (e.g., 1989; 1996) shows how money
from different sources is used in different ways because
of its different social meanings. From the symbolic inter-
actionist point of view, money has symbolic value that
both derive from and help construct the social interactions
in which it is used, sometimes helpfully and sometimes
destructively (Schweingruber & Berns 2003). The nature
of its symbolic value varies between societies, and van
der Geest’s (1997) cautionary reminder that in West
African societies money can be a symbol of happiness
and security, and a vehicle of love and respect, needs to
be set against the generally corruptive symbolism of
money in European-derived cultures. Knauft (1997) simi-
larly emphasises that in previously non-monetised
societies, money often symbolises modernity, under-
cutting earlier cultural values – a tendency that can be so
extreme that dollars are animized as wild, undomesticated
items that behave in unpredictable or even demonic ways
(De Boeck 1998). There is also theoretical dispute about
exactly what money symbolises in the modern economy:
Ingham (2001) argues that previous sociologists of
money, such as Zelizer, have paid too little attention to
money’s symbolisation of the promise to pay. But the
idea of money as a vehicle of some kind of symbolic
meaning, and therefore as more than a neutral tool in
the economy, is universal among both theoretical and
empirical sociologists of money. The language of sociology
differs from the sociobiological approach we have taken
here, but in different terms both are saying that money
has value – which may be positive or negative – over and
above its usefulness.
5.3. Play and money
A second human instinct on which money might act as a
drug is object play. Considered as mammals, and even as
primates, humans are remarkable both for the length of
time we spend in a juvenile state and the strength of the
motive to play among juveniles (and even adults). Object
play is particularly well developed, as the extraordinary
scale of the toy market testifies. Lea and Midgley (1989)
argued that this might be one of the factors that have
allowed the evolution of money use. We agree with
Freud in seeing the interest in money developing first
out of the instinct to play with objects that can be held in
the hand, though we reject the Freudian belief (see
Bornemann 1976, p. 17) that faeces constitute a privileged
class of such objects. The plausibly instinctive human liking
for carrying around a few easily handled objects provides a
natural setting within which a money system can develop.
Money may be a drug partly because it provides something
of the same kind of stimulation as a plaything.
The trading and play accounts of money motivation are
not in competition, but complementary. If playthings are
valued because of an instinct towards object play, they
would make natural props in our first hesitant steps onto
the stage of economic exchange: having learned to
manage playthings as children, we are better equipped to
manage plaything-like money as adults. We have argued
elsewhere (Webley & Lea 1993b; Webley & Webley
1990) that playground exchanges of toys are a more realis-
tic scene of economic socialisation than the limited
exposure young children have to the formal economy of
adult shopping. Money might be an especially potent
drug because it can mimic the satisfaction both from the
instinct to play and from the instinct to trade, as children
first begin to play at trading or to trade their playthings.
5.4. Synthesis
We explained at the beginning of this target article that
there cannot be a “money instinct.” If we are to fit
money motivation into the framework of biological expla-
nation that applies to other strong human motives, then
we must explain how money gets its incentive power
through its action on other instincts. If we cannot do so,
we would be faced with a situation that would be scanda-
lous within the terms of a biological psychology – a power-
ful human motivation, perhaps even the most powerful,
with no real biological roots.
Reviewing a range of phenomena and theories of human
behaviour towards money, we have reached three
conclusions.
1. Although money is an efficient tool, and so gains
incentive power by enabling us to fulfil a wide range of
instincts, a Tool Theory of money motivation is
inadequate. The majority of non-economic accounts of
money (and even some economic accounts) either take
this view or require a more elaborated Tool Theory than
is usually assumed. Modern empirical work has uncovered
substantial evidence in favour of this conclusion, and we
believe that it would be widely if not universally accepted.
2. The inadequacies of Tool Theory can be overcome,
and the phenomena that it fails to explain can be inte-
grated, by asserting that money also acts as a drug. That
is, we conclude that money derives some of its incentive
power from providing the illusion of fulfilment of certain
instincts. This argument has formed the core of the
present article, and although we believe it is well grounded
in the data we have reviewed, it will inevitably be more
controversial. In particular, the alternatives of a more elab-
orate Tool Theory, or an entirely different way of partition-
ing the possible kinds of theory, cannot be ruled out at this
stage, and perhaps they never could be.
3. The incentive power of money depends partly on the
illusory fulfilment of the human instincts for reciprocal
altruism and object play, though there may well be other
instinctive systems that money can also parasitize. This
conclusion is more speculative, and is likely to be the
most controversial of all. However, insofar as it is persua-
sive, it would provide the best evidence in favour of the
Tool/Drug analysis, since it would show that the analysis
had been deployed fruitfully.
Thus, we are arguing that the scandal of a non-biological
motivation for money can be avoided, but not by the most
obvious means, which is a Tool Theory. We are not
arguing that Tool Theory is wrong, but that it needs to be
supplemented by a Drug Theory, and a Drug Theory of a
particular type. This is not a sloppy “much to be said on
both sides” argument. Rather, we argue that the extraordi-
nary effectiveness of money depends on a synthesis
between its two modes of action. One of the striking facts
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aboutmoney is its cultural dominance: it is taken up irresist-
ibly by any human society that encounters it. Other equally
functional social inventions are much less immediately
attractive. In both developed and less-developed countries,
governments have to engage in extensive and expensive pro-
motional campaigns to get beneficial health, education, or
birth control practices widely adopted, because those prac-
tices are not so readily compatible with human instincts and
therefore with perceived immediate self-interest.
A prediction follows from this analysis. If, in the future,
money is presented in forms that fit less well with the
instinctual structure of the human brain, it may be a less
effective tool. An obvious example is the representation
of money by abstractions such as the totals in bank or
credit card accounts, or the amounts in microchips on
smart cards. Such abstractions would not stimulate
humans’ instincts towards object play, and therefore our
management of them will not benefit from our early learn-
ing, through play, of how to manage objects effectively. It
is consistent with this view that each new form of money
seems to bring in horror stories of people who cannot
control their spending with it (see Prelec & Simester
2001; Schor 1998). Our argument, therefore, is that if
money had not been an effective drug, it might never
have emerged as an efficient tool. It is because it is both
tool and drug that it is such a strong incentive.
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Abstract: Why are people interested in money? This question is too
broad: there are many kinds of money, interest, and people. The
biological approach of Lea & Webley (L&W) makes them seek the roots
of this interest, and they contend that tool making and addiction qualify
as the roots. Curiosity and the quest for power, however, qualify too. As
L&W rightly admit, other approaches supplement their biological one.
Lea &Webley (L&W) ask “Why are people interested inmoney?”
They expand on the concepts of “people,” “interest,” and “money,”
but these are too broad for their concern. They mention different
kinds of money, from unfamiliar primitive kinds to plastic money,
only to ignore the differences between them. In its diverse
manifestations, money reflects a variety of phenomena rooted in
diverse aspects of diverse societies. These are of no interest to
L&W. Looking for the universally human, biological roots of the
interest in money (no matter what counts as roots and why),
they deliberately overlook social diversity. They center only on
consumers’ attitudes towards money. And, when they refer to
people, they exclude those who do not know what money is, or
who live in small communities or communes, or who are other-
worldly. Thus, L&W set the scene for discussion of their question
sufficiently narrowly so as to lead to their biological, universalistic
answer. Are leading questions permissible in research? It depends
on how interesting the discussion is.
The program of L&W is acceptable, then, on the condition that
we remember that their question is set towards a biological bias,
leaving the sociological and psychological biases for another day.
It is an error to claim more than that, in line with the “grand
theory of everything,” in what is known as intellectual imperialism
(the claim that only one approach fits). L&W agree: they stress in
the opening of their article that a “biological” approach (involving
“selective advantage”) “is not an alternative to social and cultural
factors as a kind of explanation” (sect. 1.1; see Agassi [1977],
pp. 184, 281, 320, and 326). So they merely sketch a few alterna-
tive theories – psychological, cultural, economic – that they
legitimately put aside.
Let me go along with the attitude of L&W and follow the bias
that leads them to seek the biological roots of the attraction of
money. They take for granted that what comprises such biological
roots is conduct, specifically the use of tools and of drugs. They
view money, first, as a tool (for those who intend to use it) and,
second, as a drug (for misers and for those who play with
money in the widest sense that includes all sorts of social
games). The tool that money is, however, is a means for the
acquisition of other tools – all those goods and services that
are on the market for sale. Hence, money always denotes sets
of options that are available for sale on the market. It is these
options, and not the money itself, that most people desire. This
desire – for a range of options as wide as possible – has
deeper biological roots than money. Nor is “interest” the same
as attraction: people in the capacity of researchers, including
L&W, have an interest in money different from what they have
as consumers, as do entrepreneurs, politicians, economists, econ-
omic journalists, gossip columnists, and so forth. So we should
include curiosity among our root biological drives. As to the
idea of money as a drug, L&W use the word “drug” loosely,
and include pornography as a drug though it usually functions
otherwise. Some people use pornography – and any other item
that stands for sex – as sex objects proper, in a kind of fixation
on them, as a diversion of the sex drive from the normal sex
object. These (and other fixations) are then often called (inade-
quately) fetishes. And fixation is nearer to biological roots than
addiction. (Addiction is a fixation of sorts.) In addition, money
helps in the acquisition of power and other abstract qualities
that are not commodities on the market. And the desire for
power or the wish to lead others is generally deemed as having
deep biological roots. Perhaps.
What good are facts? The “drug” value of
money as an exemplar of all non-instrumental
value
George Ainslie
Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Coatesville, PA 19320.
George.Ainslie@va.gov http://www.Picoeconomics.com
Abstract: An emotional value for money is clearly demonstrable beyond
its value for getting goods, but this value need not be ascribed to human
preparedness for altruism or play. Emotion is a motivated process, and
our temptation to “overgraze” positive emotions selects for emotional
patterns that are paced by adequately rare occasions. As a much-
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competed-for tool, money makes an excellent occasion for emotional
reward – a prize with value beyond its tool value – but this is true also
of the other facts by which we pace our emotions.
Lea & Webley (L&W) demonstrate well that money is often
valued for more than what it can buy. Among other things the
target article should warn experimental psychologists that when
they reward their subjects withmoney, the rewards have two com-
ponents: the value of possible purchases, which are necessarily
delayed, and an emotion attached to acquisition, which is immedi-
ate and imperfectly correlated with the amount and timing of
possible purchases. L&W have documented many situations in
which money takes on value beyond that of its potential to be
exchanged for goods. They point out that this value comes from
emotion, and they liken it to that of “being emotionally engaged
by many kinds of text” (sect. 2.2.3). In doing so, they have ident-
ified a gap in motivational theory, a gap which, I argue, affects far
more than the theory of money. Since social constructivists have
pointed out the extensive role of motivation in determining
those beliefs that are not shaped by the risk of failure, it has
been unclear what distinguishes belief from make-believe, and
texts1 that can support belief (which get called facts) from texts
that cannot. From the question of how money takes on value
beyond its tool value it is a short jump to ask how any facts that
do not help you get goods or avoid “bads” – non-instrumental
facts, those that are not tools – are worth attending to. And after
that, what about text that is not factual at all – pornography to
be sure, but also fiction in general? I agree that text is valuable
beyond its instrumental usefulness insofar as it is emotionally
engaging. I agree also that conventional motivational theory
lacks a rationale for this engagement, not just for the case of
money, but for all non-instrumental texts.
The authors look for specific underlying instincts that might be
energizing money’s drug effects. (“Drug Theory is feeble unless
we can we specify what the natural incentives are that money
mimics”; sect. 5.1, para. 4) This search seems unnecessarily
specific, like the early behaviorists’ attempts to trace each
emotion to a conditioning experience (Watson 1924). Nor does
the authors’ suggestion that money in its drug mode provides
“the illusory fulfillment of the human instincts for reciprocal altru-
ism and object play” (sect. 5.4) stand upwell in application to their
own list of the anomalies thatmake drug theory necessary:What is
it about reciprocal altruism or object play that should make coins
appear larger than they are, nominal values be impervious to
changes in real purchasing power, new forms be unwelcome, or
the purchase of some social relationships be taboo? All that
these two instincts supply is a nonspecific rationale for the value
of money to have an emotional component, and this can be
done at a more general level.
I have suggested that, instrumentality aside, the usefulness of
externally supplied texts comes from their pacing the consump-
tion of emotional reward; the usefulness of factuality comes
from its selecting adequately rare texts for this purpose (Ainslie
2001, pp 175–79; 2005). The motivational power of money-
as-drug is then an especially potent example of the power con-
ferred by factuality itself. To briefly summarize the theoretical
background: Emotion is well known to be a strong motivator,
but there is also substantial evidence that emotion is itself motiv-
ated. Granted that emotions are only marginally voluntary, the
voluntary control that is possible argues for their motivational
basis, for their being selected by expected reward rather than eli-
cited peremptorily by trigger stimuli. However, the lack of a
rationale for how a process that both motivates and is itself motiv-
ated can avoid collapsing into positive feedback has confined us
to the theory that emotions are unmotivated responses to external
turnkeys (Ainslie 2001, pp. 65–70, 164–71). Why not pig out on
positive emotions and simply withhold negative ones? The
answers to these questions reveal a motivational role for events
that do not necessarily have either instrumental value or a con-
nection to an innate instinct.
It has now been widely reported that there is a basic tendency
to discount delayed reward in a hyperbolic rather than an expo-
nential curve (Green & Myerson 2004; Kirby 1997). This lets us
conceive of emotions as rewarded processes, with positive feed-
back restrained as follows: An occasion for negative emotion
offers an immediate reward for participating in it, but the pro-
spect of its brief reward lasts only long enough to seduce; it is
experienced not as pleasure but as an urge. The dynamic I
propose is the same as that for a binge, except that each cycle
of seductive high and non-rewarding hangover is condensed
into the fraction of a second (Ainslie 2001, pp. 51–61; 2005).
For an acrophobic on a cliffside path, say, each moment of
giving in to the urge to panic is followed not by relief but by a
renewal of the urge, and by a growing inhibition of all other
sources of reward.
But L&W are talking about a positive drug effect. If positive
emotions are indulged in ad lib they become attenuated into
mere daydreams through habituation. This process cannot be
controlled voluntarily because of the hyperbolically weighted
overvaluation of small, immediate satisfactions relative to
larger, delayed ones. As a result, only patterns of generating
emotions in the presence of adequately rare occasions remain
robust. This contingency creates the familiar gambles that
seem to govern our positive emotions: Feats in sporting events,
news items, objects of collection, and, notoriously, victories in
romance incite feelings in proportion to their perceived rarity.
The rarity factor is what makes factuality important: Texts that
qualify as facts (by any stringent selective process, including com-
munal folklore) are more potent than a story, and the facts we
have reason to seek are more potent than facts in general. In
this manner, instrumentality, the value of facts for getting other
goals, confusingly becomes a source of non-instrumental value.
Gambling for money has more kick than gambling for points,
even when we gamble for money purely as recreation. In the
United States, at least, the variability of gasoline prices among
stations makes the search for cheaper gas a challenging game;
several acquaintances have admitted to a temptation to drive
uneconomically far out of their way just for the sensation of
winning at this game, even though they would not be playing it
if it did not ostensibly save them money. Once we authenticate
money as a prize, it becomes a tool for occasioning emotion;
that is, it becomes a drug.
Some of money’s drug value may come from how it fits into
specific hardwired preparednesses, among them not only
L&W’s altruism and playfulness but also competing, gloating,
envying, and especially hoarding. But all that is necessary to
give money emotional power is for it to serve as a sufficiently
hard-to-get goal that is set apart from equally hard but arbitrary
goals by its peerless tool value. As a tool it has many uses, but that
very fact makes it a unique pacing device in our quest for positive
emotions per se. When a currency loses its tool value it loses its
uniqueness and hence its pacing value, but this usually occurs, as
the authors point out (sect. 4.3), after a lag. When McClure
et al.’s (2004) subjects won an “immediate” Internet token,
they consumed the prize emotionally on the spot, even though
the token as tool would take some days to provide a “reward.”
There are many situations where tool and drug value are
clearly separable, not the least of which arises when income
becomes so predictable that it loses its value as an emotional
prize even though its tool value remains unchanged (Ainslie
2003). But the “drug” value of money does not differ in kind
from the emotional pacing value of anything else that has some
claim to be a prize.
NOTES
The author of this commentary is employed by a government agency
and as such this commentary is considered a work of the U.S.
government and not subject to copyright within the United States.
1. An irreplaceable term, despite abuse by deconstructionists, for
patterns of information that might or might not be factual.
Commentary/Lea & Webley: Money as tool, money as drug
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2006) 29:2 177
Scarcity begets addiction
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Abstract: As prototypical incentive with biological meaning, food
illustrates the distinction between money as tool and money as drug.
However, consistent neuroscience results challenge this view of food as
intrinsic value and opposite to drugs of abuse. The scarce availability
over evolutionary time of both food and money may explain their
similar drug-like non-satiability, suggesting an integrated mechanism
for generalized reinforcers.
In their discussion of the reinforcement power of money, Lea &
Webley (L&W) use the biological value of food to distinguish
between tools (useful to eventually obtain a biological incentive)
and drugs (parasitizing the biologically meaningful incentive
system). This opposition between intrinsically valuable food
and addictive drugs of abuse, however, may be less innocuous
than it appears on the surface.
As a source of metabolic energy, regulation of food intake
could be expected to be controlled by the hypothalamus, the
brain region that monitors and manages the neuroendocrine
system, ultimately modulating the blood concentration of
glucose. Instead, the subjective feeling of “hunger,” as meant in
the industrialized world, does not seem to correlate primarily
with hypothalamic activity. Brain imaging showed that, in
human subjects craving food after skipping one or two meals, it
is instead the dopamine system that lights up (along with the
orbitofrontal cortex), with an activation pattern similar to that
recorded in drug addicts awaiting their fix (e.g., Pelchat et al.
2004; Volkow & Wise 2005). However, in subjects fasting for
36 hours, the hypothalamus does show increased activation
(Tataranni et al. 1999). This protracted fasting period correlates
with considerable metabolic changes and subjective reports
nearly opposite to the feelings of people waiting to be seated at
restaurants (depressed state as opposed to unrest).
A converging (if on the face unrelated) line of evidence indi-
cates that caloric restriction significantly increases longevity in
laboratory animals. In particular, rats whose daily caloric intake
is limited to approximately 60% of ad libitum controls have a
life expectancy about 30% longer (Hadley et al. 2001; Mattson
2005). If confirmed in humans, these findings would complement
the recent recognition of obesity as one of the most lethal preven-
table diseases in the United States (Allison et al. 2001; Goldin
2005; Volkow & Wise 2005). Moreover, irregular diet (normal
meals alternated with fasting periods) is more beneficial in rats
than regular feeding (consistently light meals). Several mechan-
isms have been proposed to explain these observations, including
reduction of oxidative stress, strengthening of the shock-absorber
systems, and stimulation of growth factors (Mattson 2002; 2005;
Mobbs et al. 2001). Taken together, brain imaging and caloric
restriction studies invite the provocative hypothesis that
humans with virtually unlimited access to food do not normally
eat to gain a biological advantage, but rather because they are
addicted to food.
Now let us consider barter, which operates on the principle of
mutual advantage (McCabe 2003): each party has something the
other wants, and, by trading, both parties can be made better off.
The tool theory of money emerges from the observation that the
value from barter can be greatly expanded by using money to (1)
reduce the search costs of finding a potential trading partner, (2)
reduce the default risk of trading with a partner by getting money
in return, (3) define the relative value of goods and services by
pricing them in terms of money, and (4) allow greater specializ-
ation of human activity (North 1990). However, money can lose
value either through oversupply, as when governments print
money to cover their debts, or in competition with other
monies, as seen in international exchange rate fluctuations.
In experiments, people continue to trade money (McCabe
1989) even when it is losing value, thus providing evidence that
money itself is seen as valuable (consistent with the money as
drug hypothesis). A plausible explanation is that even as money
itself loses value, the barter it is producing continues to be valu-
able. So the built-in desire for money may be a secondary reinfor-
cer for barter. The anticipation and realization of earning money
is known to activate the same dopaminergic pathways as drugs
and other rewards (Knutson et al. 2001b), and contingent man-
agement strategies use monetary rewards as a substitute for
drugs in drug treatment programs (Higgins et al. 2000).
Food and barter exchange have interesting correlates in that
both were scarce (meaning hard to obtain) over evolutionary
time, and yet both contributed strongly to the inclusive fitness
of humans. Because they were scarce, it is reasonable to
assume that the biological system would recognize them as
rewarding. As suggested by reinforcement learning models
(Sutton & Barto 1998), it is important to encode these rewards
(including money as a secondary reinforcer for barter) as
values, which can then act as inputs into the actor-critic circuitry
in order to learn experientially about better action sequences.
Since the ecology makes the future availability of these rewards
uncertain, it seems advantageous that the value systems associ-
ated with seeking behavior would evolve as non-homeostatic
and non-satiable (i.e., linear or non-depreciated) and thus have
drug-like properties.
Paradoxically, then, the dopaminergic system underlying drug
addiction might have evolved precisely to incentivize mammals,
whenever possible, to eat above and beyond the minimal, and
in fact ideal, amount of food. Offsetting this impulse must then
be inhibitory systems of control, which seem to be more variable
across humans. Scarcity thus constitutes a powerful evolutionary
explanation for the addictive feature of money, food, and in fact
any scarcely available generalized reinforcer.
Research suggests that there are two systems competing for
behavioral control. The first system locks in behavioral responses
to predicted rewards using temporal difference learning (Shultz
et al. 1997). This system allows for habituation and may be the
primary route for a drug theory of money. Much of the proces-
sing in this system involves the dopaminergic neurons in the
striatum (O’Doherty et al. 2004). The second system uses contin-
gent goals to build the value of representative pathways for
decision-making, and may be the primary route for a tool
theory of money. Much of this processing occurs in the prefrontal
cortex (Cohen et al. 2000). Recent theories attempt to explain the
arbitration of these two reinforcement learning systems (prefron-
tal and striatal) in terms of the cost/benefit ratio of each system in
different circumstances. Such models can help clarify the neuro-
biological bases of the tool–drug distinction (or at this point,
integration), and at the same time extend it to the broader
domain of reinforcement learning with scarce resources.
The desire to obtain money: A culturally
ritualised expression of the aggressive
instinct
Ralf-Peter Behrendt
MRC Psych, The Retreat Hospital, 107 Heslington Road, York, YO10 5BN,
United Kingdom.
rp.behrendt@btinternet.com
Abstract: Social behaviour is but an expression of instinctive mechanisms
whereby the aggressive instinct is of particular importance, having given
rise to most of the complexity of social behaviour through processes of
phylogenetic and cultural ritualisation. The role of the aggressive
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instinct is to dynamically maintain the ranking order in a group, and much
of social interaction is concerned with this, including monetary exchange.
What is certain, is that with the elimination of aggression, . . . the
tackling of a task or problem, the self-respect [in] everything that a
man does from morning till evening, from the morning shave to the
sublimest artistic or scientific creation, would lose all impetus; every-
thing associated with ambition, ranking order, and countless other
equally indispensable behaviour patterns would probably also disap-
pear from human life.
— Konrad Lorenz (1963/2002, p. 269)
One can agree with Lea & Webley (L&W) insofar as “we must
explain how money gets its incentive power through its action
on other instincts” (sect. 5.4). Of course, money has “a value
and an emotional charge that are not predicted by its economic
use” (sect. 4.11), but affect and cognition that accompany the
pursuit of money do not testify to an underlying trading or altruis-
tic instinct, if ever one existed, but portray an attitude of envy,
greed, or quest for status or security. Money is indeed “an indi-
cator of achievement, respect, and freedom or power” (sect.
4.4) and a potent symbol of “power relationships” (sect. 4.6). It
may be money’s ability to mediate satisfaction of the instinct of
intraspecific aggression in a culturally conditioned way, not its
supposed “strongly drug-like quality” (sect. 4.6), that explains
some of what Belk and Wallendorf (1990) describe as the “puz-
zling ways in which people behave towards money” (as quoted
by L&W in their sect. 4.7) and why it is “taken up irresistibly
by any human society that encounters it” (sect. 5.4).
Lorenz (1963) observed that adaptive behaviour is commonly
determined by impulses of several instincts, often one inhibiting
the other. Phylogenetically, ritualisation creates new instinctive
motor coordinations by welding together conflicting impulses.
Social behaviour is dominated from a drive-motivational point
of view by successive impulses of “aggression, fear, protection-
seeking and renewed aggressiveness” (Lorenz 1963, p. 55).
Norms of social behaviour that developed by cultural ritualisation
started to play an important part in human society “when inven-
tion of tools was beginning to upset the equilibrium of phylogen-
etically evolved patterns of social behaviour” (p. 249), the
“equilibrium between the ability and the inhibition to kill”
(p. 242). As Lorenz remarked, on the basis of “the instincts of
animals,” “human culture has erected all the enormous super-
structure of social norms and rites whose function is so closely
analogous to that of phylogenetic ritualization” (Lorenz 1963,
p. 240).
Ranking order is an essential principle of organisation of social
life in higher vertebrates; it is maintained dynamically by individ-
uals’ aggressive impulses, although it has the effect of inhibiting
aggression within a society and limiting fighting between its
members (Lorenz 1963). Interaction between members of a
group, particularly in highly fluid forms of society, like ours,
involves frequent symbolic and paralinguistic display of each
individual’s potential for aggression and submission. Money is
but one symbol for self-esteem and self-respect, which are reflec-
tions of social ranking, particularly in modern society. Money has
become an increasingly important mediator of social organisation
as traditional networks of social reference became fragmented
and transient in modernity. As L&W summarise Simmel (1900/
1978) in section 3.3.1 of the target article: “Money is both the
means and the symbol of the process by which in modern
society impersonal, quantitative social relations between auton-
omous individuals replace the determinant relations imposed
by traditional society.” L&W themselves acknowledge “the
importance of money as a marker of status within modern
societies” and recognise that references to wealth or income
“are a common part of discourse about status” (sect. 4.8).
Indeed, money is a tool to obtain social status, allowing the
aggressive instinct to be expressed in accordance with our
culture.
Psychoanalysis provides another vantage point. As the infant
starts to crave a particular mental state that he senses in his care-
giver (“object”), namely admiration and devoted interest, he
starts to become sensitive to any threat to the exclusivity of this
relationship. To the competitive presence of a third person, the
infant starts to respond with a particular kind of anger – that is,
envy directed at the third person’s admirable qualities that
attract the caregiver (Oedipus complex). The origins of envy
and jealousy lie in the infant’s loss of complete control over his
object. It is the realisation of his dependence on his object and
the development of object-relations that turns constitutional
anger and aggression into envy, hate, and jealousy. Not only
may envy arise when there is a threat to the exclusivity of one’s
object-relation, but also when others’ qualities, being perceived
to be more attractive than one’s own, prevent one from establish-
ing such a relation. Competitive aggressiveness derived from the
Oedipal complex is a nonpathological and constructive force in
human relations (e.g., Wolf 1988, p. 78). Competitiveness is a
defence against unacceptable feelings of envy (e.g., Joseph
1986; Spillius 1993), which accords with Lorenz’s notion of
cultural ritualisation of conflicting impulses. Thus, the function
of money may be related to suppressed but unconsciously
omnipresent envy (being an expression of the aggressive or
“death” instinct).
Much of psychopathology can be related in one way or another
to failings of this ritualised interplay of aggressive impulses and
reciprocal fear impulses that normally maintains us in social hier-
archies, including compulsive gambling, hoarding, and other pro-
blems subsumed by the authors under “addiction to money” but
with which money essentially has very little to do. The “miser’s
hoarding” and the “spendthrift’s self-destructive carelessness”
are both ways of dealing with interpersonal anxieties that
abound in groups and societies organised by ritualised aggression
with the omnipresent threat of rejection.
What is there to suggest that money “seems to be capable of
giving the illusion of trade and reciprocation even when it is
absent” or that money “acts like a drug on that centre, activating
it even when there is no real possibility of trading” (sect. 5.2, para.
5)? In its social dimension, trade may not be altruistic but yet
another culturally ritualised expression of intraspecific aggression
aimed at organising hierarchies in social groups. McDougall
(1924) argued that the parental instinct is the only truly altruistic
instinct in man. One should not postulate a “trading instinct” just
because trading is ancient and adaptive, in as little as one can
speak of a tool-making instinct. We are not endowed biologically
with a specific disposition to trade, although we do have various
physiological needs for which trading is primarily a culturally
conditioned strategy through which to ensure their satisfaction.
There is no difference in principle between trading and foraging.
If Tool Theory suggests that money “is an incentive only
because and only insofar as it can be exchanged for goods and ser-
vices” (sect. 2.1), then this should be true for its social function too:
Money is an incentive because it can be exchanged for social status
(if only in one’s fantasy), thus satisfying intraspecific aggression in
a culturally ritualised manner. As L&W acknowledge: “the possi-
bility that money is used for purposes such as social display, social
communication . . ., or social protection . . . merely extends the
range of uses for money as a tool” (sect. 2.1). It seems the drug
metaphor had to be invoked to make acceptable the otherwise
unfeasible argument that our desire to obtain money is related
to a trading instinct. The fact that money acquisition is not
obviously adaptive to such instinct had to be reframed as deceit
(“parasitic action on a functional evolutionarily adaptive
system”; sect. 2.2.4). In contrast to the authors’ assertion that
money “gives direct access to the systems that subserve . . .
rewards . . . in an illusionary, nonfunctional way” (sect. 2.3)
(money as a “functionless” drug), it can be summarised here
that, unlike drugs of abuse, money’s access to these systems is
real and functional because it is linked to the culturally adaptive
satisfaction of an instinct – that of intraspecific aggression.
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Money as civilizing ritual
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Abstract: Although theorizing the non-tool motivations for desiring
money is a worthwhile goal, Lea & Webley (L&W) offer a view that is
too individualistic, too biological, and ultimately too linked to a tool-
based view of money motivation. I argue that our fascination with
money is social, learned, and ritualistic. Through the magic of money
rituals we overcome biological motivations and become civilized.
Lea & Webley’s (L&W’s) contention that money is a tool with
which to accomplish objectives is hardly surprising, new, or a
challenge to existing thought. It might have been more so if,
rather than as a utilitarian tool, money had been regarded as a
metaphor for possibility. It frees and stimulates our imagination.
As Sartre (1943) observed, “Stop before a showcase with money
in your pocket; the objects displayed are already more than half
yours” (p. 753). It is this imaginative hedonism (Campbell 1987)
that leads to consumer culture. That money is a drug is a more
novel contention, but it is sketched out so roughly that no impli-
cations or predictions can be drawn. That is, the present account
offers little theoretical understanding of money as drug.
The non-tool, “drug uses” of money discussed are especially
centered around restrictions on money usage (sect. 4.5), or
what McGraw and Tetlock (2005) call taboo exchanges. L&W
explain that “Gifts and sex are the currency of the moral and
romantic economy, and to confuse them with the currency of
the material economy is somehow to contaminate them” (sect.
4.5, para. 4). This is an important observation, but it is ill-
explained without invoking ritualistic notions (e.g., Belk 1996;
2005; Belk & Coon 1993). Recognizing that gifts and romance
are key ritual motifs in contemporary society is necessary for
understanding these “magical” non-tool uses of money by
individuals.
Ritual money magic is also found at the institutional level.
While U.S. monies proclaim “In God We Trust,” in using
money we express our trust in social institutions including
money-coining governments, lending, savings, and credit insti-
tutions, merchants, stock markets, insurers, and retirement
funds. These are the social institutions that “magically” safe-
guard, multiply, and guarantee the worth of our money. The
rituals that these institutions perform, and in which we partici-
pate, are civilizing rituals that express our shared peaceful and
cooperative intent, without which our lives would be solitary,
poor, nasty, brutish, and short.
Seeking a non-ritualistic, non-cultural, biological basis for
money motivations is misguided. As L&W point out, money is
too recent a human development to have direct evolutionary
bases. Their attempt to link it to other supposed instincts with
presumably evolutionary bases is not useful. That such links
might be speculated offers no evidence of their merit. It would
be similarly specious to speculate on biological motivational
links for other recent strong incentives like television viewing,
Internet usage, or fashion purchasing. Such behaviors are more
likely socially motivated and learned. They too are part of our
cultural rituals. Any connection of these acts to biological
motivations is tenuous, superficial, overly speculative, and quite
probably fallacious.
Even if it were worthwhile speculating on biologically linked
money motivations, the choice of reciprocal altruism and play
as underlying “instincts” is problematic. Reciprocal altruism is a
cynical view of human nature based on problematic sociobiologi-
cal analogies. Non-reciprocal genuine altruism also exists (e.g.,
Rachlin 2002), and not just among close kin. Learned motivations
better explain our exchange-related money behaviors. Children
have no inherent attraction to money and must instead learn to
desire it, use it, and thus become “civilized.”
Play is a more likely a basic human motivation, but its link to
money motivations is very weakly developed by L&W. Based
on their reference to children exchanging toys on the playground,
it appears that L&W see play as a tool facilitating trade rather
than as an end in itself. Like reciprocal altruism, this conception
of play is ultimately described by L&W as more tool-like than
drug-like. Contrary to assertions by L&W, children’s play with
toys is initially more possessive than exchange-based (e.g.,
Furby 1978). Like shopping, (e.g., Falk & Campbell 1997), chil-
dren’s exchange of toys is another socialized, imitative, civilizing,
ritual behavior that must be learned.
Alternative underlying non-tool motivations for money-related
behaviors are more likely than reciprocal altruism and play. They
include the drive for power, the need for distinction, and the
desire for social acceptance. Money is a means to power.
Money and the things it can buy can bring prestige and status.
Certain things money can buy make us more attractive to
others and help us fit in with similar others. Within these social
realms, accumulated money can become a means of “keeping
score.” However, because we learn civilizing rules not to directly
tell people how much money we have, we indirectly make claims
to wealth, power, and taste via our possessions and expenditures.
Money motivations are learned in the same way that manners
are learned. This learning includes “civilizing” social rituals that
facilitate mating and social relationships (e.g., rituals of
romance and gift-giving), that announce or claim individual or
group status (e.g., conspicuous consumption, consumption com-
munities, and displays of cultural capital), and that curb envy
(e.g., tipping, staging banquets, and other forms of wealth redis-
tribution involving either real or symbolic sops; cf. Foster 1972),
thereby reducing the threat of violence by the have-nots of
society toward the haves. Most of these civilizing rituals overcome
rather than indulge more basic motivations. They are social and
cultural in nature rather than purely psychological or biological.
They are what make us most fully human.
Money as tool, money as resource: The
biology of collecting items for their own sake
David A. Booth
School of Psychology, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham,
West Midlands B15 2TT, United Kingdom.
D.A.Booth@Bham.ac.UK http://psg422.bham.ac.uk/staff
Abstract: Money does not stimulate receptors in mimicry of natural
agonists; so, by definition, money is not a drug. Attractions of money
other than to purchase goods and services could arise from instincts
similar to hoarding in other species. Instinctual activities without
evolutionary function include earning a billion and writing for BBS.
Stephen Lea and Paul Webley (henceforth L&W) spoil a strong
case for a biologically based desire for money itself by inventing
the incoherent concept of a “cognitive drug.” They fail to
recognise the hoarding instinct as a likely evolutionary origin of
enjoying accumulated money for its own sake. More broadly,
they do not allow that an inherited capacity can provide the
basis for nonfunctional activities. Most generally of all, they
seem to presuppose that, to have a biological basis, behaviour
must be reducible to operations on material entities such as nic-
otine, saccharin, and coins; as a result, they miss the realities in
social institutions and culture, and indeed of conscious and
unconscious mental processes.
Many species collect items of food, in stocks far larger than
needed at the moment or anticipatable from past individual
experience (Morgan et al. 1943). Size of cache is not tightly regu-
lated by selective value to ancestors, such as duration of seasonal
lack of food or of torpor while hibernating (Munro et al. 2005).
Ageing affects hoarding in mice nonfunctionally (Chen et al.
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2005). Laboratory rats even hoard blocks of wood. That is, adap-
tive behaviour is not always functional. Indeed, evolution could
hardly work without useless activities becoming functional in
new ecologies. A hoard of flints knapped by hominids (Wynn
2002) need not be evidence of an instinct for armouries among
survivors of battles between groups; the collecting instinct
could have run free in makers of axes for butchering or hunting.
Thus, adaptive capacities for hoarding could account for
accumulation of coins. The gold or silver need not be felt to be
beautiful to look at or delightful to touch (as reductionism dis-
poses L&W to suggest). The miser may simply be scrabbling
through his hoard. The cop-out of invoking play is unnecessary,
gambling is not analogous and it is unhelpful to relate drug addic-
tion to obsessive-compulsive disorder (Grisham & Barlow 2005).
Hoarding needs no coins (nor money-processing chips, as
L&W revealingly invoke twice), nor marks on a screen or in a
ledger; the miser can go through his fortune in his head. Some
people find entertainment in mining caches of data. Selfishness
or incompetence about potential for knowledge from one’s own
database is a serious problem in the information industry
(Lai et al. 2005).
Just credit information can be “a functionless motivator,”
although the strength of a delight in money as such is likely to
come from its use to acquire immediate or delayed access to
goods and services. It adds nothing to claim that money activates
the brain’s bump for collecting (or the cultural role of a collec-
tor). Like any mental processes, thoughts and feelings about
money activate neural pathways and also pathways through the
economy when overt in social activity. Hence, locating critical
brain areas for people’s normal or abnormal collecting of
useless objects (Anderson et al. 2005) in no way substantiates
the “metaphor” of a drug; it merely provides a starting point
for characterizing the cellular expression of genes for the instinc-
tual capacities that develop into accumulation of resources – or
of junk. The irreducibly social system of an economy is also
necessary for the hoarded resource to be the tool for collecting
any purchasable resource.
So why do L&W start with the idea of a psychoactive drug’s
mimicry of neurotransmitters at receptors in the brain and
then stepwise empty it of all content, even metaphorical? The
only necessity is if money’s power has to be physical, in cause
and in effect. Psychoactive drugs are substances that alter ion
movements at synapses. What L&W call “sensory drugs” are
material stimuli to sensory receptors of the rare sort that elicit
greater and greater reactions as the stimulation becomes extre-
mely strong. This monotonic relationship is peculiar to unlearned
reflexes however; liking for sweetness becomes contextualised
socially or nutritiously to the particular level familiar in a food
or drink, for rats (Booth et al. 1972) as well as for people
(Booth et al. 1983; Conner et al. 1988). Furthermore, this may
be the only piece of appetitive behaviour that is innate in
human beings. (The baby-like rounded profile does not elicit
particular movements.) The game is up when the only example
of a “cognitive drug” (the metaphor for money) is pornographic
pictures and text. Contrary to L&W, there is little or no evidence
in human beings for innate sexual arousal at the sight of the real
thing: the power of pictorial erotica results from acculturation,
not genetically programmed wiring between inferotemporal
cortex and autonomic efferents to the genitalia. The clincher is
textual erotica, and indeed spoken words: linguistic capacities
may be instinctive but not English or French verbiage, about
sex or food.
Sexy sights or sounds are not “illusory” either. What’s missing
when they are bought rather than freely offered, in the flesh or
just by photo or phone, is the other person. Even intense sweet-
eners are not illusions: their sweetness conveys what the consu-
mer wants them for (Freeman et al. 1993). Similarly, it is not
an illusory quality of money that makes monetary gifts “socially
awkward,” nor is it a trade instinct somehow separate from reci-
procal altruism. A gift is expected to be attractive to the particular
recipient: resorting to money instead of a personally appropriate
object shows lack of empathy, which is poor acculturation of the
biological capacity for altruism.
In summary, the capacity to develop the cooperative or indi-
vidual activity of collecting items for their own sake is likely to
have selective advantage in ecologies where resources are much
more limited at some times than at others. In a species with
much nonmaterial culture and activity, resources hoarded to
no extrinsic purpose can include artefacts of society that are
also nonmaterial, such as a balance at the bank that others
only dream of. Money may derive all its attractions from
services and goods it buys. Then (contrary to L&W) money
can fulfill the hoarding instinct in biosocial cognitive actual-
ity – no illusion and not dependent on brains that can use
coins as neurotransmitters.
Hoarding behavior: A better evolutionary
account of money psychology?
Paul Bouissac
Department of French Linguistics, University of Toronto, Victoria College,
Toronto, Ontario, M5S 1K7, Canada.
paul.bouissac@utoronto.ca http://www.semioticon.com/bouissac.htm
Abstract: The target article authors have been drawn into two
metaphoric models of attitudes toward money that have prevented
them from developing a convincing evolutionary theory able to account
for the various behaviors they list and categorize as either tool-type or
drug-type. Instead, hoarding could provide an evolutionary model that
is better supported by behavioral and neurological evidence and could
account for the whole range of behaviors they review. Moreover, the
authors’ focus on money as the common denominator of these
behaviors brings an ideological bias to their inquiry.
Metaphors play an important role in scientific heuristics. The
spontaneous or systematic identification of common properties
across distinct categories of objects and the transfer of models
across phenomenal modalities may indeed reveal essential simi-
larities that were not obvious in the first place. This is often the
first step toward the construction of a hypothesis which may
eventually lead to a scientific theory that explains a set of pre-
viously unrelated observations as resulting from the same
general laws. Metaphors are nevertheless double-edged
because there is always a risk that they trap the imagination of
scientists and preclude further advances. Niels Bohr’s planetary
model of the atom provides an example of this phenomenon.
Lea & Webley (L&W) select two metaphors among the many
that may bear upon money in contemporary Western cultures.
Mindful of the limits involved in the heuristic use of metaphors,
they nevertheless embrace drug and tool as the most likely to
provide insights into the biological significance of the behavior
of contemporary humans toward money. The case they make is
persuasive, but in the rhetorical rather than scientific sense, as
it is difficult to see how their dual theory could be falsified. Of
course, as topologist Rene´ Thom used to say, a metaphor
cannot be false. But the point is: how much trust can we place
in such intuitions and for which purpose? All that glitters is not
gold. At best, the authors’ two root metaphors can help classify
the other metaphors which have been propounded in the past
to explain money-oriented behaviors.
It is surprising that L&W have not taken into consideration
hoarding behavior, also called collecting behavior, as a possible
evolutionary ground to account for the various forms of attitudes
toward money that they review. From the beginning of modern
psychology, hoarding has been considered a human “instinct”
(e.g., James 1890, Ch. 24); and the continuum between this
self-preservation strategy and the behavior of many animals
(mammals, birds, and insects) that hoard food or collect
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nonfood items that may be displayed in courtship is well docu-
mented (e.g., male bower birds). The adaptive value of storing
nonperishable food in caches when seasonal variations bring
scarcity is obvious (e.g., Sherry 1985; Smith & Reichman
1984). Likewise, the adaptive value of demonstrating fitness by
flaunting collections of nonfood items can be construed as a
behavioral “handicap,” in the evolutionary sense of the term
(Zahavi & Zahavi 1997), similar to phenotypic features such as
oversized feathers or other conspicuous and costly ornamental
appendages. In archaeology, hoarding is also considered to be
an expected behavior in past cultures at least from the Neolithic
on (Hamon & Quilliec 2005). However, hoarding behavior
appears in L&W’s article only marginally in association with
the term “miser,” perhaps because it has come to designate in
contemporary psychology a behavioral dysfunction, usually
associated with cluttering, and often connected with senescence.
But this is a recent semantic change particular to clinical psychol-
ogy. As noted above, it has kept its functional value as an adaptive
strategy in other fields of inquiry.
Anderson et al. (2005) offer a neurologically based model of
hoarding behavior that could explain more economically within
a single evolutionary theory the two types of behaviors toward
money contrastively described by L&W in the target article.
Anderson et al.’s investigation of patients with mesial prefrontal
lesions who show compulsive collecting behavior suggests that
the drive to collect and hoard, which “primarily originates from
subcortical bioregulatory nuclei” (p. 208) (i.e., limbic subcortical
and mesolimbic cortical structures), is modulated by self-
regulatory functions associated with mesial prefrontal regions.
Anderson et al. tentatively submit that “the drive to collect
would be assisted in part by a weighting system, whereby the
neural representation of a stimulus item would be associated
with a particular signal value, which would serve as an index of
the relative worth of the stimulus” (p. 208). This is all the more
relevant to the case of money attitudes in that it does not
appear that “the targets of acquisition behavior are specified at
a genomic level” (p. 207).
In view of such evidence and plausible assumptions, it is
possible to formulate a hypothesis: Natural selection both
favored (1) a drive to collect and hoard a broad range of items,
as this behavior enhances self-preservation and reproductive
fitness; and (2) an inhibitory system that monitors the process
and decides when this drive runs the risk of reaching a maladap-
tive threshold either by overloading the carrying capacities of the
organism at the expense of other vital functions, or by collecting
and hoarding indiscriminately. The latter could be explained by
the fact that the properties of the stimuli should not be too
narrowly specified, since excessive specialization would not
be adaptive with respect to changing environments. It can also
be expected that, if both behaviors are indeed genetically con-
trolled, it will ensue that there will be variations among individ-
uals in congruence with the emerging structural variation
theory of the human genome (Check 2005). Therefore, it is not
necessary to hypothesize a maladaptive addictive model (the
drug metaphor), but simply natural variations and occasional
dysfunctions that cause a more or less drastic disinhibition of
the hoarding drive. As frontal cortical functions are associated
with cognitive competences, such as the representation of the
context and the comparative evaluation of stimuli, it is natural
that they would appear to constitute the rational norm that is
captured by the tool metaphor. From this point of view, money
would not be a specific object but a mere cultural index for
resources, and the intellectual conundrum created by the discre-
pancy of the two attitudes identified by L&W would result from
the incompatibility between the two root metaphors rather than
from the attitudes to which they refer.
But there is more. By using the abstract notion of money as the
common denominator of all the forms of behavior they take into
consideration, L&W operate a conceptual reduction by creating
a kind of epistemological commodity that tends to erase all
cultural, ideological, and socio-economical differences. Thus,
they remain within the universalist discourse of the political
economy that regulates contemporary globalization, construing
capital as a tool to generate profit but ignoring the immediacy
of salaries (or food coupons) as a scarce index of threatened live-
lihood. Hence, their surprising notion of money as a “functionless
motivator” (sect. 2.2.2) that can “mimic. . .natural incentives” (see
Abstract, sects. 2.4, 5.1) – a case that may perhaps apply to
Monopoly type of games or extreme financial speculations, but
not to everyday experiences in the greater part of the world.
By shifting the focus toward the evolution of the behaviors
concerned and their neurological substrates (which could not
have evolved with respect to the too-recent institution of
money), the hoarding model seems to be more apt for explaining
in evolutionary terms, and more economically, the range of beha-
viors L&W address in their article. Confronted with this some-
what baroque, two-headed theory, one cannot help thinking
that the authors could have made a better use of Occam’s razor.
Money, play, and instincts
Gordon M. Burghardt
Department of Psychology, University of Tennessee, Knoxville,
TN 37996-0900.
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Abstract: The metaphor drug model of money slights the possibility that
money may literally tap into and exploit brain systems underlying
motivational systems, and it also ignores growing evidence on the
common neural substrates of behavioral and “physiological” addictions.
Additionally, many objects other than money can gain such drug-like
properties. The treatment of play in the evolutionary explanation for
the unique role of money in people ignores key conceptual and
empirical issues.
One of my professors at the University of Chicago back in the
1960s, the brilliant David Bakan, was very pleased with his defi-
nition of money as “a medium of exchange accepted by stran-
gers.” Lea & Webley (L&W) realize, however, that money does
not just have an instrumental or tool function; there are con-
straints on its use. They point out that money is not considered
an appropriate gift in some contexts (though, of course, that is
also true of any other object). L&W invoke money as a drug,
mimicking human instincts, to deal with all those aspects of
money that their “tool theory” cannot accommodate. They
argue that money readily comes to act as a motivator similar to
biologically based instinctive drives.
Skinner and his followers viewed money as the ultimate gener-
alized reinforcer developed through instrumental (tool) con-
ditioning. That the ultimate bedrock of even the most artificial
and arbitrary training regimes for rats, pigeons, and people was
access to primary or secondary reinforcers (or “drives”) was
assumed as obvious, though uninteresting and not in need of
an evolutionary explanation beyond the connections made in
Skinner (1966). Now we find out that the operant approach
was based on money (tokens) as drugs. I rather thought that
token economies, when instituted in mental hospitals, were
means to wean people from unproductive, destructive, incompe-
tent, impulsive, compulsive, or self-injurious (e.g., drug-like)
behaviors we now know to be largely due to malfunctioning neu-
rotransmitters resulting from genetic and developmental events.
Are we now to consider token economies as just another drug
therapy, a trading of one addiction for another?
Although L&W make much of the fact that money developed
late in human history, automobiles appeared even more recently.
Like David Bakan, my major professor at Chicago, Eckhard
Hess, was also very pleased with one of his definitions: an auto-
mobile is merely a means to get from point A to point B safely
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and efficiently. To him a car was totally a tool, confirmed by the
fact that he rarely drove except to travel out of town. But he,
nevertheless, bought his wife, Dorle (a stylish and artistic
matron from European wealth), a Mercedes convertible. As
she zipped around Hyde Park with the top down and her
blond hair blowing in the wind, Hess realized that for his wife
a car was far more than a means of transportation, and he felt
obliged to humor her “drug” habit. Fast sporty cars are fun,
even exhilarating, to drive, and a Mercedes in the 1960s was
still an uncommon status symbol as well. Obviously, there were
constraints on what one could do with such a vehicle. It was
not very useful for transporting more than two persons, had
limited trunk space, and insurance and repairs were costly. So,
I guess the way to understand automobiles is to invoke both
the tool and drug metaphors. But wait, any use of food that
does not just provide nutrition and calories should be looked at
in this way also – as a drug. Food was also one of the first
mediums of exchange and the spice trade a most important
early part of international trade.
The point of these examples is to argue that, as formulated, I
find this proposed drug metaphor an “emperor” theory of
money that has no clothes. Oops, clothing also is both instrumen-
tal and a drug of choice for shopaholics, and has been an import-
ant means of exchange (cloth, silk, cotton, wool, not to say
boutique “rerun” shops).
Does money act as a drug on dopamine receptors in the basal
ganglia and related structures or is the drug idea merely a meta-
phor? The authors opt for the latter, but much of the article
seems to argue the former. To them money “intrudes on the
normal functioning of the nervous system” (sect. 2.2.1) by
mimicking substances involved in basic instincts that are, in
fact, centered in these same brain areas. Although still somewhat
controversial, these areas seem to contain often overlapping
systems involved in basic motivations, cravings, feelings, compul-
sions, conditioning, and both behavioral and drug-based addic-
tions, including excessive running, gambling, and so forth
(references in Burghardt 2001; 2005). I think that the drug
word may have shock value, but essentially adds nothing since
any behavior not based on rational or instrumentally adaptive
behavior is, for L&W, acting as a drug. This dichotomy is just
another learning– instinct contrast that neglects the biological
processes connecting instrumental and instinctive behavior.
L&W also assert that money is unique in having no intrinsic
drive-reducing or instinctive properties based on current or
past environments, and thus is an entirely new phenomenon
that needs formal incorporation into an evolutionary account of
behavior. In doing this they have to deal with the origins of
money in our evolutionary past. This they view as a challenge
since they claim that money is unique to our species (an interest-
ing assertion itself since tool use, tool making, language, count-
ing, altruism, even moral behavior have fallen by the wayside
as qualitative distinctions between humans and other species).
So what to do? After going through the first four sections of
the target article, I awaited the new ideas that were going to
emerge from their evolutionary analysis. Surprisingly, the critical
heart of the paper on the origins of money is in but a fraction of
the text (sects. 5.2 and 5.3) where we find that reciprocal altruism
and play are the roots of the origins of money as drug.
Insofar as altruism as a source of money is concerned, I will
focus just on the claim that, while altruism is old, the trading
instinct is unique to our species; an assertion that cannot be sus-
tained. We have known for decades of gift-bearing flies and gift
exchanges among birds (see Judson 2002). Indeed, these gifts
may become divorced from their original reinforcer (food) and
become symbolic. Although ethology (Tinbergen 1951) is cited,
the seminal concept of ritualization is not. While such “gifts” in
other species may not always be explicit payoffs or serve as gen-
eralized reinforcers, they certainly are trades. Furthermore,
exchanges are the essence of many social insect societies, even
interspecifically (aphids pay for protection with secretions).
Mutualism, symbiosis, and similar “trading” phenomena are
endemic in organic life. The roots of trading may run deep in
our phylogenetic heritage, and the evolution of money may
have been a small evolutionary step, albeit with major
consequences.
The second instinct that is invoked to explain the origins of
money is play. Having just written a treatise on this topic
(Burghardt 2005), I was anxious to see how L&W deployed the
concept. I was surprised that play is invoked without any con-
sideration of what it is or the nature of its instinctive origins. In
fact, the only topic discussed is toy exchange, based on the
authors’ own studies published in economic venues. To end
their paper on such a thin two-paragraph thread of support is dis-
appointing. First, whether play, even object play, is a separate
instinct (or behavior system) or is derived from other systems
(such as predatory or fighting), is still an open issue in many
species. Second, whether exchanging toys is a means of learning
how to manage resources rather than a behavioral relic or a pre-
cocial performance of adult behavior with no important “prac-
tice” component, is largely unknown. A just-so story does not
constitute data, especially when the adaptive function of play in
juvenile animals has rarely been demonstrated experimentally
(Burghardt 2005). If play exchange is training for money manage-
ment, as L&W assert, the problems so many people have with
money management makes such play quite ineffective.
Finally, the loose use of the term “instinct” is disturbing and
shows that the new style of evolutionary psychology, by largely
eschewing engagement with data on other species, is in danger
of losing any claim to be a naturalistic evolutionary science.
The classical ethologists, along with their critics, made remark-
able progress in conceptualizing instinctive behavior and motiva-
tional systems. I fear that articles such as this one will make the
current incarnation of evolutionary psychology problematic to
both evolutionary biologists and social scientists.
Money as epistemic structure
Sanjay Chandrasekharan
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Abstract: A testable model of the origin of money is outlined. Based on
the notion of epistemic structures, the account integrates the tool and
drug views using a common underlying model, and addresses the two
puzzles presented by Lea & Webley (L&W) – money’s biological roots
and the adaptive significance of our tendency to acquire money.
Epistemic structures (ESs) are structures that organisms add to
their environment to lower the cognitive complexity associated
with tasks (Chandrasekharan 2005). For instance, wood mice
(Apodemus sylvaticus) distribute small objects, such as leaves
or twigs, as points of reference while foraging. Such “way-
marking” has been shown to diminish the likelihood of losing
interesting locations, and is exhibited even under laboratory con-
ditions, using plastic discs (Stopka & MacDonald 2003). The
male bower bird builds colorful bowers (nest-like structures),
which are used by females to make mating decisions (Zahavi &
Zahavi 1997). Bacterial colonies use a strategy called “quorum
sensing” to know that they have critical mass to attack a host.
Individual bacteria secrete molecules known as auto-inducers
into the environment; when the chemical breaches a threshold,
the colony attacks (Silberman 2003).
We have developed and implemented an evolutionarily plaus-
ible model of the origin of such external structures, using artificial
agents that possess only reactive behaviour (the agents just sense
and act, they do no internal processing). The model uses
cognitive load reduction in a recursive fashion: it is an effect of
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ES generation, but it is also the cause that drives generation. We
make two assumptions: (1) organisms sometimes generate
random structures in the environment (pheromones, leaf piles,
etc.) as part of their everyday activity; and (2) organisms can
track their physical or cognitive effort (i.e., they get tired), and
they have a bias to reduce tiredness. The term “tiredness” indi-
cates the “felt” quality of the feedback, which allows tracking of
cost using affect – that is, without using a separate computational
module.
Some of the randomly generated structures in the world are
now encountered by the agents, and in some random cases,
these structures make tasks easier for the organisms (following
pheromones reduces travel time, avoiding leaf-piles reduce fora-
ging effort). In other words, these structures shorten paths in the
task environment (see Kirsh 1996). Given the postulated bias to
avoid tiredness, these paths get preference, and they are
reinforced. Since more structure generation leads to more of
these paths, structure generation behaviour is also reinforced.
We have implemented this model using both genetic algorithms
(evolutionary learning) and the Q-Learning algorithm. The latter
implementation shows that reactive agents can learn,within their
lifetime, to add ESs systematically to their world to lower cogni-
tive load (Chandrasekharan & Stewart 2004). Such within-
lifetime learning to reduce cognitive load has recently been
shown in homing pigeons. They follow railways and highways
to reach their target, even taking exits (Guilford et al. 2004).
The tiredness model explains the process underlying the
generation of two of the three ES types possible (structures for
oneself, structures for oneself and others, structures exclusively
for others). It only partially explains the third. The second type
is explained by appealing to the similarity of systems: if a struc-
ture provides congeniality for me, it will provide congeniality
for other systems like me. The similarity of agents led to them
forming structures that were useful for everyone, even though
they were just concerned about reducing their own tiredness.
A similar learning system could explain the first of Lea &
Webley’s (L&W’s) puzzles: the origin of money. The tiredness
approach is suited to modeling money because, given a barter
system, money lowers both physical and cognitive effort, as it
helps lower the number of physical transactions, and reduces
the computational complexity of tracking branching transactions
(agent X has Good B and she wants Good A, but agent Y, who has
Good A, doesn’t want Good B. Agent X now needs to find an effi-
cient and guaranteed path from her Good B to Good A.). With
multiple goods, the branching transaction problem becomes
extremely complex, particularly with added constraints like per-
ishability, security, and so forth. Money can be seen as an episte-
mic structure that emerged to shorten such complex paths in the
barter environment, by providing a common structure that can
connect any path, reducing both cognitive and physical load.
Applying our model of ES generation to such a view of money,
given any barter environment with sufficient cognitive load and
transaction costs, and agents that seek to lower their tiredness,
a commodity that is in demand by most agents (salt, sugar,
spice, gold, etc.) would be used to connect branching paths effi-
ciently. The commodity would acquire this money role the same
way pheromones acquired an epistemic role in our simulation. In
this view, money emerges not because of evolutionary or genetic
advantages, but because of a central survival advantage – the low-
ering of energy utilization. To test this hypothesis, we are cur-
rently designing a network-based barter experiment and a
parallel simulation model.
What about L&W’s second puzzle: the tendency to acquire
money? In the model above, this could be explained by including
dopamine as a second reinforcement factor, acting in tandemwith
tiredness. So, once the use of money is learned by agents in a
barter environment, a dopamine-based system takes over. This
system “extends” the use of money as a path-connecter – to a ten-
dency to acquire money. Schultz (1992; reported by Braver &
Cohen 2000) has shown that dopamine responds initially to a
rewarding event, but with training this response “migrates” to pre-
dictive cues. This behaviour, where learning chains backwards in
time to identify (and reinforce) successively earlier predicators of
reward, has been modeled byMontague et al. (1996) using a tem-
poral difference learning algorithm (similar to Q Learning). Such
a dopamine-based model would explain the tendency to acquire
money (and the pleasure it provides) as an adaptive extension of
money’s role in lowering tiredness.
Besides cognitive load, two other factors could drive this
migration. One, epistemic structures like money significantly
expand the space of actions possible (see Kirsh 1996). Being
the connector of all possible paths in a trading system, money
expands the action space of agents exponentially. Two,
epistemic structures make a system more robust, by raising
task-success in noisy and high processing load environments
(see Chandrasekharan 2005). These two advantages, combined
with lowered energy use, make the tendency to acquire
money a highly adaptive response.
Money and the autonomy instinct
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Abstract: Applying the reciprocity instinct to monetary transactions
implies that the reaction to monetary debt and monetary credit are
similar. However, evidence suggests an asymmetry. I suggest that the
“autonomy instinct” fits better with human behavior towards money. I
show that people value autonomy, and I show how money can serve
this instinct.
I concur with Lea & Webley’s (L&W’s) analysis that human
behavior towards money is consistent with Drug Theory rather
than with Tool Theory. I also concur with their claim that this
implies that money should hinge on a pre-existing instinct. I do
not concur with L&W’s claim that money mainly parasitizes on
humans’ reciprocity instinct.
Applying the reciprocity instinct to monetary transactions
requires two cognitive tools: a sensitivity to what others owe
you (cf. cheater detection module; Tooby & Cosmides 1992)
and a sensitivity to what you owe others (cf. the reputation
concern; Axelrod 1984). The function of both is to bridge the
time lag between the two transaction phases (i.e., giving and
receiving) that define an exchange situation. L&W claim that
money fills the gap between giving and receiving. Money
removes the temporary imbalance between giver and receiver
and the negative affect related to that imbalance.
It is critical to L&W’s claim that people are willing to fill the
time lag between the two transactions with money in both direc-
tions. They should be motivated not only to get the money they
deserve but also to pay the money they owe. Credit cards
should be equally as aversive as prepay cards. However,
common intuition and recent findings suggest that people do
not want to pay their debts as quickly as possible to get rid of
the feelings of obligation. People are willing to live on credit
and use simple heuristics to decide how much they can borrow
(Soman & Cheema 2002). Credit cards are very popular (turn-
over in Europe in 2004: E617.3 billion), whereas prepaid cards
remain marginal and often remain tied to one retailer (e.g.,
BþS Card Service GmbH 2005), although there is no practical
reason why people would not be willing to prepay their expenses.
There just seems to be no demand for such a product, although
prepay cards would be an efficient way to self-regulate expenses
(Trope & Fishbach 2000). Further, there is evidence that living
on credit does not hurt when durables are involved (Prelec &
Commentary/Lea & Webley: Money as tool, money as drug
184 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2006) 29:2
Loewenstein 1998). Finally, the mental accounting framework
(Shefrin & Thaler 1988) does not fit nicely with the reciprocity
principle: People borrow money even when they have money
available on different (mental) accounts. By borrowing, they
increase the amount they owe without increasing what others
owe them. Borrowing increases the imbalance between giver
and receiver, which is inconsistent with a reciprocity instinct.
My claim is that money either (1) parasitizes only on the
receiving part of the reciprocity instinct (cf. cheater detection)
or (2) parasitizes on another instinct. A candidate alternative
instinct is the need for autonomy (Deci & Ryan 1985). I first
present a series of human behaviors that suggest the existence
of this instinct. I proceed by explaining how money might
hinge on this instinct. I finish by reviewing several money
phenomena that fit better with the autonomy instinct than with
the reciprocity instinct.
The value of autonomy can be inferred from several human
behaviors. I here define autonomy as independence from social
influence. Autonomy reduces the likelihood that others can
exploit the agent for their own benefits, and therefore increases
survival. Is there evidence that such an instinct exists? Brehm
(1966) showed that people are willing to forgo their favorite
option in order to establish that they are in charge. Bown et al.
(2003) showed that people prefer options that allow further
freedom of choice. People also prefer a larger option set for its
own sake (Suzuki 1997). Iyengar and Lepper (2000) replicated
this finding but added that people are less likely to come back
to the same choice situation, which suggests that choice has a
cost. Together, these findings support the notion that people
are willing to incur costs to preserve their freedom of choice.
How might money serve this instinct? Money may provide a
buffer against dependency. In times of scarcity, poor people have
to sell their labor or their bodies to survive. Rich people manage
to acquire the means and the labor they need to survive. As a
result, people might value money for its own sake, even in times
of plenty when they cannot spend all the money they possess.
I sketch four observations suggesting that money might be a
drug fitting the autonomy instinct rather than the reciprocity
instinct. (1) Parents are allowed to give money to their offspring,
but not vice versa. Although parent-offspring relationships
become reciprocal later in life and are reciprocal in the long
run (e.g., when children care for the elderly), this monetary
asymmetry survives adulthood. Gaining autonomy from parents
is an important step in life, which suggests that the monetary
asymmetry between parents and offspring is related to the auton-
omy instinct. (2) Intrinsic saving motives (Wa¨rneryd 1999) do not
make much sense from a reciprocity perspective because they
reduce reciprocity. Money that is not spent is removed from
the social dependency network and does not build reputation
in a reciprocal interaction. However, intrinsic saving motives
do make sense from an autonomy perspective. Saving leads to
accumulation, which increases independence. (3) Borrowing
money from third parties while owning money is difficult to
understand from a reciprocity perspective. In fact, borrowing
increases the amount you owe others (which is aversive if recipro-
city underlies behavior towards money), without increasing what
others owe you. However, borrowing from third parties distri-
butes social dependency and hence increases average autonomy.
(4) According to the autonomy instinct, money should function as
a signal of some hidden intrinsic quality of the owner. Money may
signal that the owner managed to become independent from the
environment. According to the reciprocity instinct, however,
accumulated money should raise concern of cheating. Money
reflects that the owner received more money than he gave
away. Probably both evaluative reactions to wealth exist, but I
found evidence only for the first one (Christopher et al. 2005).
To conclude, I submit that human’s behavior in the context of
money fits better with an autonomy instinct than with a recipro-
city instinct. Money might reduce interpersonal dependency
rather than organize interpersonal dependency.
Individual differences, affective and social
factors
Adrian Furnham
Department of Psychology, University College London, London, WC1 OAP,
United Kingdom.
a.furnham@ucl.ac.uk
Abstract: The target article overestimates the power of money as a
motive/incentive in order to justify trying to provide a biological theory.
A great deal of the article is spent trying to force-fit other explanations
into this course categorization. Lea & Webley’s (L&W’s) account seems
to ignore systematic, individual differences, as well as the literature on
many negative affective associations of money and behavioural
economics, which is a cognitive account of money motivation.
The authors are to be congratulated on an interesting, innovative,
and thoughtful paper on a woefully neglected topic. The under-
standing of how people think about and use money seems at once
the concern of all disciplines and of none. Economists have been
consistently wrong in asserting that money is the measure of all
things but is itself unable to be measured. The everyday
meaning and use of money may be a neglected topic in the beha-
vioural sciences but that situation is thankfully changing
(Furnham & Argyle 1998).
Perhaps the first point to be addressed and one that is comple-
tely overlooked in the target article is the extent to which money
is a powerful motivator, particularly at work. Although both psy-
chologists and lay persons hold the view that money is indeed a
powerful motivator, the psychological research is far more scep-
tical about the power of money as a work incentive. Important
experimental (Deci et al. 1999) and popular (Kohn 1993) litera-
tures have demonstrated that money has paradoxical and nega-
tive effects on work motivation. In the old Herzbergian
terminology, money is a hygiene factor, not a motivating factor:
it prevents dissatisfaction rather than causing satisfaction.
Money, in short, is over-rated as an incentive. It seems not be
a powerful incentive, instinct, or motivator except under specific
circumstances.
Indeed, Lea & Webley (L&W) overlook the literature which
suggests that social comparison in terms of money earned is a
much more important source of satisfaction and motivation
than absolutes earned (Furnham & Arygle 1998). It is unclear
how either Tool Theory or Drug Theory copes with that. More-
over, the literature on what people are willing to trade-off money
for (e.g., time) seems at odds with either theory.
Further, there is a literature on the affective associations on
money – that is, on what people associate with money (see
Furnham & Argyle 1998). For money to be a positive cognitive
drug one would imagine that nearly all associations would be
positive. The results suggest precisely the opposite: Money is a
major source of anxiety, worry, and depression for many –
hardly an incentive.
It seems that L&Wwant to start with a powerful motive so that
they can offer a novel biological or evolutionary psychological
explanation and theory that parsimoniously explains the pro-
cesses and mechanisms for money motivation better than all
the other theories. But what is the nature of those theories?
Are they any better than simple metaphors? The authors seem
happy to dismiss Tool Theory as such but want to supplement
it with Drug Theory. The ideas are novel but I believe the
authors fail on three counts.
First, half of the target article is dedicated to showing how all
the other theories in areas as diverse as classic psychoanalysis,
economics, and developmental psychology can be fully
accounted for by either the tool or drug metaphor. So we get
many sections (Depth psychology; Cognitive development) in
which, after a short description, the authors suggest that the
area fits into one or other metaphor. This is woefully overplayed
and often not well argued. Depth psychology is categorized as a
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Drug Theory and cognitive development is categorized as a Tool
Theory, yet it seems pretty simple to suggest a way in which it is
the opposite way around. The authors seem far too eager to
“scoop up” all the explanatory processes and mechanisms from
all areas of behavioural science in terms of their two metaphors.
Second, there are many characteristics of a good theory apart
from its heuristic appeal: parsimoniousness, consistency, validity,
and so forth. A good theory both explains the current data and
leads one to be able to derive clear testable hypotheses to
verify the theory. It seems unclear as to how tool/drug theory
does this. For instance, whence money pathology and the
whole issue of individual differences? How does tool/drug
theory explain pathological and irrational money hoarding or
spending or gambling any better or differently than psychoanaly-
sis? And what is the source of gender differences in money use
(which should not be particularly problematic from an evolution-
ary perspective)? In short, what is the incremental validity of the
theory/metaphor from what has gone before, or is it merely a
classificatory device for all other theories in the area?
Third, the question must be asked: Is L&W’s theory only one
theory of why people seek out money as well as of how and when
and why they save and spend it? Is the theory aiming to be a new,
overarching, universalist theory of money usage which supplants
all earlier “partial and inadequate” theories that ignore all import-
ant biological factors, or simply a corrective taxonomic challenge
to those working in the area? I would suggest it succeeds as the
latter but not the former.
Metaphysics of money: A special case of
emerging autonomy in evolving subsystems
Robert B. Glassman
Department of Psychology, Lake Forest College, Lake Forest, IL 60045.
Glassman@lakeforest.edu
http://campus.lakeforest.edu/glassman/
Abstract: There is “something more” to money, as this incisive review
shows. The target article’s shortcoming is its overextension of the
“drug” metaphor as a blend of features that do not fit the rationalistic
economics and behavioral psychologies summarized as tool theories,
but this may be resolved by viewing money as a particular case of the
more general evolutionary phenomenon of emergent subsystem
autonomy.
Money is not alone. Examples of robust, “drug-like” phenomena
other than money include humor and music. How did these
things originate and become widespread and varied? To what
degree can these pervasive human phenomena be explained in
terms of exaptations or present adaptiveness? Another possible
analogy to the emergence of money: How do humans come by
the remarkable aptitude and brain circuitry for reading written
words and passages, given that the history of writing seems to
be only several thousand years old?
When a fleeting occurrence in living systems repeats itself, and
then becomes frequent and widespread, it may achieve its own
“entification” or “thinghood.” Entification entails further oppor-
tunities to accumulate additional raisons d’eˆtre. Sufficient robust-
ness may then be achieved to abet new evolutionary branches,
and proliferation of forms. Gradually increasing autonomy in
subsystems of complex systems (either living or engineered by
humans) is a much more general phenomenon than is captured
by Allport’s personality theory principle of “functional auton-
omy,” which Lea & Webley (L&W) cite (target article, sect.
3.2.3; Allport 1937).1 This crucial aspect of complex systems
(Glassman 1973; Glassman & Wimsatt 1984; Simon 1996)
underlies the fact that every evolved entity or feature of every
living system originates as something else.
The biological and social living world is always in motion.
Features that had served a particular function within one
species of complex system, come to serve other functions in
descendents of that system, while still retaining sufficient resem-
blance to their precursors to be recognizable as homologs. There
are innumerable examples. Engineering examples include the
modification and reuse of subroutines in the development of
computer programs (perhaps especially “object-oriented”
programs; e.g., Kehtarnavaz & Kim 2005), and the “evolution”
of large buildings and bridges (Petroski 1985). Natural examples
include the evolution of the human hand and the bird’s wing
from the primordial vertebrate forelimb; also, the evolution of
innate components of behavior, such as the patterns of rhythm-
generating circuitry in the spinal cord that serve swimming in
fishes and walking in terrestrial animals, and the emotions under-
lying greeting behavior in diverse species of social animals.
Enhanced depth perception, attending overlapping binocular
visual fields, is another robust phenomenon with diverse uses;
it serves largely to increase the accuracy of traveling among
tree limbs by monkeys and the accuracy of predatory pouncing
by cats. For only the past 100 years or so, this complex neurobio-
logical apparatus has been subject to a new form of natural selec-
tion, as humans try to accurately drive cars at highway speeds,
and often live to tell the tale.
Related to emerging autonomy, the concept of “modularity” is
widely used in present-day biological and social theorizing. This
concept is now also deeply rooted in cognitive science theorizing,
whose beginnings, circa the 1960s, happen to be coincident with
those of evolutionary grand theories. However, typical uses of the
concept of modularity do not sufficiently capture the degree of
autonomy of evolving subsystems. Money, for example, virtually
has a life of its own. L&W note that it has quickly taken root in
every society that has discovered it. The ferment of multiple
ongoing changes in every complex evolving system means that
even when none of these dynamics is internal to a particular sub-
system, the subsystem’s buffeting about among other subsystems
is tantamount to a process of “seeking.” This point, approximately
the same insight that led Darwin to use the term “natural selec-
tion,” has been explained particularly well by Donald
T. Campbell in his works on evolutionary epistemology. Camp-
bell discusses the ubiquity of “unjustified variation and selective
retention,” or “blind variation and selective retention” (Campbell
1974a; 1974b; Kim 2001). I would push L&W’s history of the
origins of biological “grand theories of everything” to earlier in
the mid-twentieth century, certainly at least as far back as
E. O. Wilson’s grand tome Sociobiology (Wilson 1975), which,
by the time of Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene (Dawkins 1976; cf.
target article, sect. 1.1), was in its fourth printing. Campbell
(1976) announced it vigorously in his presidential address to
the American Psychological Association.
L&W provide some important examples from ethology (sect.
2.2.2), but their use of these examples, particularly in regard to
dishonest signaling, parasitism, and other “drug-like” phenom-
ena, seems inherently conservative in its emphasis on a seamy
side of evolution. L&W also cite Thorstein Veblen (1899), who
offered a delightfully droll and cynical view of the seamy side
of the social evolution of uses of wealth, while describing the
sheer, showy nuttiness of some of those familiar uses (also see
Brooks 1981). But new evolutionary branches may also be
“good” ones. Yes, human archetypes are often exploited in adver-
tising or for other selfish ends; however, they are exploited as well
in great literature, which helps its human consumers to better
orient themselves and to find new adaptations as they face
civilization and its discontents.
Citing Campbell, Konrad Lorenz perceptively argued that a
high degree of subsystem autonomy, coupled with internally
generated spontaneity, is crucial in any living system, for
reliability and continued survival (Lorenz 1969; Eibl-Eibesfeldt
1970). It is unfortunate that the more speculative aspects of
Lorenz’s work elicited polemics that have led to the neglect of
many of his ideas by English-speaking behavioral scientists. For
example, Lorenz compellingly explains the vital importance of
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spontaneity of the heart’s atrioventricular node, which ordinarily,
but not always, remains subordinate to the sinus node, as a model
instance of the much more general phenomenon of subsystem
spontaneity and semi-autonomy (Lorenz 1966, p. 86). These
ideas about subsystem spontaneity also seem related to William
James’s argument that “Man has more instincts than any other
mammal” (James 1890, pp. iv–v, 383–441).
Whether the spontaneous “motion” of a subsystem is generated
internally or by the “chaos” of its surroundings, the principle of
natural selection implies that when the subsystem encounters
an opportunity in its environment, it may exploit that opportunity,
and will then persist in its new form or behavior, so long as any
costs or risks of its new functionality provide a net increase in its
“inclusive fitness,” or longer-term probability of survival in itself
or the copies it generates. Taking a few steps back from such indi-
vidual cases to better conceptualize “the forest” over and beyond
its individual swaying “trees,” we can envision the larger ecology of
a living environment comprising autonomously “entified” loosely
coupled components and features of components. All of these are
engaged in the same general game of seeking new opportunities
for exploitation of each other or for mutualism. In human social
systems such ferment is extremely rich because our exquisitely
developed abilities to learn, remember, and imitate make it par-
ticularly easy for a feature to decouple from its host entity and
jump to a new vector. In other cases, instead of such decompo-
sition and recomposition, an entity or feature of an entity simply
accumulates additional functions, thereby achieving greater and
greater robustness. In much of their argument for “money as a
drug” I think this is what L&W are getting at.
NOTE
1. I thank the fourteen undergraduates in my Psychology 325 class
(“Persuasion and truth in sales communications”) for their enlivening dis-
cussion of the L&W target article during our September 26, 2005 evening
meeting.
Keeping up with the Joneses: The Desire
of the Desire for money
Paul Jorion
Interdepartmental Program in Human Complex Systems, University of
California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095.
pauljorion@ucla.edu http://pauljorion.com
Abstract: The biological basis of money lies in a three-term relationship
between one subject and some others, with money acting as a mediator.
The drive to acquire money is a special case of a desire for recognition.
What is aimed at by subjects is their desire for the desire of some
others: the former derive satisfaction from representing to themselves
the admiration, or envy, of these others. This raises reproductive
advantage.
The object of Lea & Webley’s (L&W’s) inquiry is to find a “bio-
logical basis” for money, meaning a basis reducible to aDarwinian
trait such as reproductive advantage. Both their “tool” and “drug”
approaches refer to a two-term relationship where a subject
experiences cognitive and emotional states linked to a represen-
tation centred on money. The most obvious instance of this,
which the authors unfortunately fail to mention, is sustenance.
For anyone below the poverty level, cash remains foremost
the means to the essential end of subsistence. The “biological
basis” of money needs therefore to be understood in the
authors’ analysis as meaning “when cash as a tool for straight-
forward biological survival has been discounted.” Examples of
such a two-term relationship would then be those of Harpagon,
Molie`re’s Miser, clinging to his cherished casket, or Uncle
Scrooge, diving and tunnelling through gold coins and hundred-
dollar bills in his pool-designed vault. In such cases, cash has
been “fetishized,” adulated as such, as a symbol of wealth.
One can talk of a “biological” response to gold because of its
shininess and hue, and its feature of being rust-proof, leading
to its universally evidenced function as a symbol for immortality.
Paper banknotes and coins of vile metal are of a different nature
and their link to riches is conventional; in financial parlance, their
nature is “fiduciary,” requiring an act of trust that a central bank
will honour cash of this sort, guaranteeing it will maintain it in its
role of a universal equivalent of worth. L&W mention times
(such as in the aftermath of the American Civil War) when con-
vertibility of cash into precious metal gets suspended. When this
happens, precious metal is restored in its role of a depository of
value, confirming that money as such might very well be – as the
authors hint – an entirely cultural phenomenon, impossible to
analyze profitably within any alternative framework.
Analyzing money as a cultural phenomenon, beyond immedi-
ate survival concerns, does not preclude tracing it back to its “bio-
logical basis.” It requires, however, an extension from a two-term
relationship between a subject and money to a three-term
relationship between one subject and at least one other, with
money acting as a mediator between the two. In the two-term
model, a subject holds a representation of money (as with cash
as a “fetish”); in the three-term model, a subject owning money
holds a representation of another subject’s representation of
him/herself owning that cash.
The three-term nature of money is best illustrated in a
“Keeping up with the Joneses” example: Let’s buy a 7000 flat
screen TV because the Joneses own a 5000! The drive behind
the purchase is not improved viewing (only a secondary benefit
here) but competition: the satisfaction obtained derives from
representing to oneself the Joneses’ envious state of mind. By
out-competing them we’ve made ourselves the centre of their
own attention: their attention has been captured by us; they
are, literally speaking, captivated. Money is used as a tool to
achieve this effect and its drug-like quality lies in the altered
state of consciousness we reach when subordinating some
other subjects’ attention to our persons, meaning that we’ve
altered at the same time their own mindsets.
L&W say of their tool/drug dichotomy that “the two theories
seem to exhaust the range of possibilities between them” (sect.
2.3, para. 1). This is correct but, as we’ve just seen, not in the
simple “either/or” way they imply: the complexity of the relation-
ship requires a more sophisticated model combining both tool
and drug within a three-term model. In that perspective, the
drive to acquire money amounts to a special case of a desire for
recognition. A psychological theory of recognition has been pro-
posed before; its source lies in philosophy where it was initially
formulated by G. W. F. Hegel as the “desire of desire” – that is,
my desire for another’s desire, either of an object or, in the
case of love, of my own person (Hegel 1807/1949, pp. 225–27;
Roth 1988, p. 97). The theory was further developed in the twen-
tieth century by Alexandre Koje`ve (Koje`ve 1969, pp. 6–7; Roth
1988, pp. 97–99), then given a psychiatric/psychoanalytical for-
mulation by Jacques Lacan (Wilden 1968, pp. 83–85, 192–96).
In Lacan’s interpretation, the “desire of desire” becomes the
linchpin of a theory of the Self where the sole foundation for
my own Self – my proper identity – is the attention other subjects
are paying to me, that is, it is constituted of my own capacity for
captivating others. What constitutes the subjects’ Self is therefore
not internal to them but distributed among a network of other
subjects, although centred on them.
When applied specifically to money, the “desire of desire”
model means that what is aimed at by subjects through their pos-
session of money is their desire for the desire of some others: the
satisfaction they derive from representing to themselves the
admiration or the envy of others. The theory is instrumental (it
has a “tool” quality), in that money is in truth sought after to
obtain something, but that something is not of a material
nature: it is the altered state of consciousness achieved (hence
the “drug” quality) through captivating the attention of a
number of other subjects. One example presented by the
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authors, that of playground exchanges of toys, confirms a desire
of desire interpretation much more convincingly than it does a
“trading instinct” hypothesis of a drug-like nature, as it is the
simple fact that another child holds an object that makes it desir-
able for a second one.
As for the Darwinian fitness advantage that money confers,
subjects who are admired extend the range of their potential
partners, gaining access in particular to those who are themselves
objects of admiration. The overall benefit of admiration is fitness
or reproductive advantage. Cash is a universal tool to this aim. In
other words, the psychological function of money turns out to be
precisely what the popular press assumes it to be.
Operant contingencies and “near-money”
Simon Kemp and Randolph C. Grace
Department of Psychology, University of Canterbury, Christchurch,
New Zealand.
simon.kemp@canterbury.ac.nz randolph.grace@canterbury.ac.nz
Abstract: We make two major comments. First, negative reinforcement
contingencies may generate some apparent “drug-like” aspects of money
motivation, and the operant account, properly construed, is both a tool
and drug theory. Second, according to Lea & Webley (L&W), one
might expect that “near-money,” such as frequent-flyer miles, should
have a stronger drug and a weaker tool aspect than regular money.
Available evidence agrees with this prediction.
Lea & Webley (L&W) describe an interesting and provocative
framework for the analysis of money-related behaviour. Their
goal is to provide a biological account of money motivation,
and they claim that, if their attempt fails, the alternative would
be a purely cultural explanation. But they overlook the role of
conditioning and learning processes that operate within an indi-
vidual’s lifetime. An operant theory of money, properly con-
strued, may be difficult to distinguish from L&W’s drug/tool
theory, although money-related behaviour is so varied and
complex that all three levels – biological, individual learning,
and cultural – are probably necessary for a full understanding.
In their discussion of the operant theory, L&W do not mention
the role of negative reinforcement or avoidance contingencies. It
is well known that avoidance responding is highly resistant to
extinction; dogs that learn to jump over a hurdle in a shuttlebox
to avoid an electric shock continue to respond vigorously long
after the shocks have been discontinued (Solomon et al. 1953).
Neo-liberal economic reforms that create “incentives” to work
by reducing social welfare expenditure can be viewed, at least
in part, as massive avoidance contingencies. Thus, it is possible
that some apparent “drug-like” effects of money, such as worka-
holism, reflect the resistance to extinction of responding main-
tained by negative reinforcement. Although the aversive
event – joblessness, poverty – may never be experienced, the
workaholic individual, like the unfortunate dogs in Solomon
et al.’s experiment, lives in fear of an unhappy future.
According to L&W, traditional operant theory, based on the
idea that money functions as a conditioned reinforcer, is a “pure
Drug Theory” (target article, sect. 3.2.2). But it has long been
recognized that stimuli that function as conditioned reinforcers
have discriminative as well as reinforcing (i.e., hedonic) properties
(Rachlin 1976). For example, a keylight that signals transition from
a lower- to a higher-valued situation in terms of reward rate comes
to act as a conditioned reinforcer for pigeons (i.e., discriminative
function; Baum 1974a). And recent research has found that
single dopamine neurons show a spike in activation following
the onset of a stimulus that predicts subsequent reward that is
similar to the spike following the reward itself. This phenomenon
provides neurophysiological support for the traditional view,
dating back at least to Pavlov (1927), that conditioned stimuli
have hedonic value (Fiorillo et al. 2003; see Schultz [2004] for
review). Therefore, the operant account is not easily categorized
as either a tool or drug theory, because it combines aspects
of both.Moreover, because the tool/drug distinction is closely ana-
logous to that between the discriminative and hedonic properties
of conditioned reinforcers, ultimately it may be difficult to
distinguish L&W’s account from the operant theory.
Nevertheless, we outline one approach to testing L&W’s
theory, and show that some existing data are consistent with it.
We are not attempting to distinguish their account from the
operant theory, but rather to test the idea that money has both
tool and drug properties.
Money is understood to resemble a drug with “the idea of a
drug as a deceiver” (sect. 2.2.4). The implication is that, insofar
as money operates as a drug rather than a tool for a particular
individual or in a particular situation, it will be overvalued, in
the same way that, for example, the taste of saccharin promises
a food value that it does not actually have (sects. 2.2.2, 5.2).
Misers can be thought to fall victim to this deception (sect.
4.10); however, as a general test of the theory, misers are unsatis-
factory since their behaviour is counterbalanced by that of spend-
thrifts, who, in the eyes of most of us, do not attach sufficient
value to money. Is there any phenomenon that suggests that
the average person might generally overvalue money?
One approach is to examine the way that people value “near-
money” (the phrase is from Lea et al. 1987, p. 328). Near-
money, like primitive money, is a currency that can be used
to buy a limited variety of services. One prominent example
of near-money in Western societies is frequent-flyer miles.
Frequent-flyer miles have many of the attributes of money and,
indeed, airlines often set up “accounts” for their customers. We
suggest that, in terms of L&W’s theory, frequent flyer schemes
are set up so as to retain as much as possible of the drug
nature of money, while having rather little (although still some)
of its tool nature. Given this assumption, we would expect to
find even more overvaluation of a near-money such as fre-
quent-flyer miles than of regular money. Or, alternatively,
because of this greater drug component, near-money should be
overvalued relative to regular money.
This possibility has not been rigorously researched, but two
recent studies have produced results suggesting it might be
true. Liston-Heyes (2002) found that respondents in the
United Kingdom were willing to pay more for 100 air miles
(about 23 pound sterling) than the air miles were apparently
worth (around 7 to 12 pound sterling). Kemp (2005) found
New Zealand respondents were willing to pay a median NZ
$50 for 1,000 Air New Zealand frequent-flyer points. Estimates
of the real cost of these were NZ $12.50 (based on cheap ticket
cost) and NZ $3.61 (Air New Zealand company estimate of the
marginal cost). Moreover, members of frequent-flyer programs
were willing to pay more than non-members (median ¼ $20),
as might be predicted from the drug theory.
Thus, at least one independent test of L&W’s tool/drug theory
seems to support it.
Show me the status: Money as a kind
of currency
Kevin M. Kniffin
Department of Anthropology, University of Wisconsin–Madison, Madison, WI
53706.
kmkniffin@wisc.edu
Abstract: Currencies that are recognized as money cannot be easily
distinguished from alternative currencies such as status. Numerous
examples demonstrate the need for status to be recognized as a
motivator alongside, at least, money. Lea & Webley (L&W)
acknowledge the roles of status; however, a closer focus is warranted.
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To the extent that we can commonly recognize “money,” we can
also agree that it is not a category that is carved at Nature’s joints.
Although Lea & Webley (L&W) acknowledge some examples, it
is worth clear recognition that money coexists as a currency
alongside a range of alternatives that includes meat, frequent-
flier miles, collectibles (e.g., special coins or clothing), and
status. Indeed, the way in which frequent customers of airline
and hotel companies are recognized with redeemable credits
that can accompany “elite” (or “gold,” “silver,” or “platinum”)
“status” provides an entertaining juxtaposition of currencies.
Illustrative of the reasons why money and other currencies
need to be considered alongside each other, Frank (1985) notes
that people who work closely with others often appear willing
to make trade-offs between salaries and status. Frank reports a
pattern of within-firm salaries in relatively interactive or social
organizations where high-performers are paid less – and low-
performers are paid more – than would be predicted by
traditional economic, pay-for-performance models. Frank con-
cludes that (1) high-performing individuals who work closely
with peers accept lower-than-predicted salaries in exchange
for higher within-firm status while (2) lower-performing co--
workers endure lower within-firm status in exchange for
higher-than-predicted salaries. This notion that people can buy
and sell status is similarly illustrated by the willingness of hotel
and airline “frequent-users” to narrow their shopping of compe-
titors and sometimes pay above-competitor prices and consume
more in pursuit of increased “status.” Loyalty programs, in
general, rely on this incentive to build their associated businesses.
Adopting one of L&W’s models, status has many “drug”-like
features and, in fact, has been shown to affect individuals’ bio-
chemistry. When considering the evolutionary basis, or origin,
for their Drug theory, L&W accept that “trade could be a
human instinct on which the money motive might be built”
(sect. 5.2). While the authors’ recognition of the social nature
of commerce (and childhood play) is interesting and relevant, it
is also true that status could be a human instinct on which the
money motive might be built. Research showing drug-like
changes in human biochemistry after changes in status (e.g.,
Mazur & Booth 1998) provides material support for this
argument.
More consequentially in the genetic domain, Smith (2004)
shows that relatively successful hunters in hunter-gatherer com-
munities tend to have relatively greater reproductive fitness.
Similar to L&W’s observation that “we cannot reasonably talk
about a ‘money instinct’” (sect. 1.4), it would be incorrect to
infer from Smith’s findings that hunter-gatherers have an instinct
for dead animals. Instead, it is helpful to recognize the fact that
status can motivate individuals (e.g., to be among the best
hunters) and, when acquired in sufficient quantities, relatively
high status can translate into material benefits (e.g., relatively
high reproductive fitness).
L&W ably show that money cannot be reduced to some uni-
versally liquid currency of status; however, the use of money
can, and should, be recognized in large part as a consequence
of individual “status instincts.” Predictably, just as money,
meat, and furs carry different values across individuals, we
should expect variation among individuals with regard to the
importance of personal status. Schwartz et al. (2002) report a
series of studies in which they find individuals vary according
to whether they tend to be “maximizers” or “satisficers.” Maxi-
mizers strive to be the best, to complete perfect projects, and
get the best deal, while satisficers are more easily accommodated
and less demanding of themselves and others. This dimension of
individual differences might profitably guide future research on
money as drug or tool.
Good examples of the importance of status regularly originate
with professional athletes since their contract negotiations are so
deeply open to media coverage. When professional athletes who
are already earning millions of dollars and are dominant
members of their team argue that they are underpaid, they and
their agents are staking claims on the need for maximized
status (independent of how closely they consider their relation-
ships with teammates). The leapfrogging that happens in this
and other contemporary environments (Gerhart & Rynes 2003)
is driven in part by a concern for status in which salary is inter-
preted as a reflection of one’s relative standing. In the movie
Jerry Maguire (Brooks et al. 1996), when a dominant football
player and his sports agent celebrate their goal of a superior con-
tract and exclaim “Show me the money!,” they might as well be
shouting “Show me the status.” L&W acknowledge the roles of
status in parts of their paper; however, (1) the distinction
between money and status cannot be neatly made, and (2) the
importance of concerns about status over the course of human
evolution warrants closer focus.
Sacredness in an experimental chamber
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Abstract: I focus on the problem of whether a specific biologic basis
exists for reinforcing the power of money. I argue in favor of its
existence based on a new interpretation of data obtained in
experiments with pigeons and rats in an experimental chamber. The
experiments demonstrated that in the animals’ behavior we can observe
some features that had been considered pertinent to human beings
only, such as making certain sources of utility “sacred.”
We all know cases in which people agree to receive lower
payment for work related to higher values than for equal work
unrelated to such values. For example, a person requires
smaller salary for participation in building a cathedral, than in
commercial construction. Thus, some “agencies” where a
person exchanges his labor for money possess a special quality
that will be called sacredness (Lefebvre 2003). A person agrees
to work for these agencies for smaller reward than for other
agencies. Something similar can be observed in the behavior of
rats and pigeons
Experiments with rats and pigeons were conducted in a
chamber with two pedals (left and right keys), each connected
to its own food-hopper from which food bits were distributed
according to a special schedule (Baum 1974b). Animals were
studied individually in a series of sessions; in each session a
schedule of reinforcement was fixed for the pedals. An import-
ant detail is that the frequency of reinforcements could be
regulated by the animal itself by means of multiple pushes on
the pedals. In analyzing the animal behavior in the experimental
chamber, we use the metaphor of an “agency”: the left key with
its food-hopper being the first agency, the right key with its
food-hopper being the second agency. The animal behavior
consisted of “addressing the agencies” and performing “work”
by pushing a pedal, and this was reinforced with a scarce
food supply.
For a time it seemed that in these experiments the animals
chose a specific line of behavior which is described by the Gen-
eralized Matching Law (Baum 1974b), but recently Baum put
forth a hypothesis that this law only approximately describes
the behavior of animals and in reality there are two different
behavioral patterns (Baum 2002). Analysis of these patterns
allows us to suppose that in each session the alternatives
(pushing a left or a right pedal) were polarized by the animal’s
cognitive system, and one of them started playing the role of
the positive agency, and the other that of the negative one. By
using the reflexive model of bipolar choice (Lefebvre 2004) we
obtain the following correlation describing the behavior of the
animals:
N2=N1 ¼ exp (S)n2=n1, (1)
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where N1 and N2 are numbers of addresses to the positive
and negative agencies, and n1 and n2 are numbers of
reinforcements received from the positive and negative
agencies during one session. The value of S is constant
on the entire set of sessions and S  0.
Correlation (1) indicates the existence of the analogue to
sacred behavior in animals. Let us demonstrate this.
It follows from (1) that
n1=N1  n2=N2: (2)
Ratio n1/N1 can be interpreted as the mean payment for one
appeal to the positive agency and n2/N2 as the mean payment
for one appeal to the negative agency. We can see from (2) that,
on average, the subject never requires more payment for one
appeal to the positive agency than for one appeal to the negative
one. Is it possible that in these experiments, we observe behavior
evolutionarily preceding the sacral behavior of human beings? If
it is so, then the sacral aspect of money has deep biological roots.
Money and motivational activation
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Abstract: Different aspects of people’s interactions with money are best
conceptualized using the drug and tool theories. The key question is when
these models of money are most likely to guide behavior. We suggest that
the Drug Theory characterizes motivationally active uses of money and
that the Tool Theory characterizes behavior in motivationally cool
situations.
Money acts as a drug or as a tool in different circumstances. We
suggest that money acts like a drug when there is a strongly active
current goal that may or may not relate to money. In contrast,
money is treated as a tool in motivationally cool states, such as
those for which there is significant psychological distance
between the individual and the choice situation. To illustrate
this point, we refer to specific data.
Research on mental accounting suggests that people set up
mental accounts for different kinds of money to protect active
short-term goals from desired long-term goals (Brendl et al.
1998; Shefrin & Thaler 1992). This view is consistent with the
drug theory of money. When people are faced with tempting
short-term alternatives, they are likely to spend money without
recognizing that money spent in the present has opportunity
costs in the future. Thus, people create both mental accounts
and physical forms of money that are hard to spend in order to
create barriers that protect long-term goals, precisely because
they cannot treat money as a tool (see also Zelizer 1994b).
Consistent with this interpretation, we have data suggesting
that people do not recognize the general value of money as a
tool in motivationally hot states (Brendl et al. 2003). In one
study, we approached German college students who were ciga-
rette smokers after they had completed a long lecture class
(in which they were not permitted to smoke). Half of the students
were kept in the classroom and were given a cup of coffee
(which stimulated their need to smoke). The other half were
brought outside the classroom, were encouraged to smoke, and
were also given a cup of coffee. Thus, the participants inside
the classroom had a high need to smoke, and those outside the
classroom had a low need to smoke.
Participants were offered the opportunity to purchase raffle
tickets for 25 pfennigs apiece. For half of the subjects, the prize
was three cartons of cigarettes. For the other half, the prize was
an amount of cash about equal to the cost of three cartons of ciga-
rettes. Participants were only aware of the raffle they were
offered. The students were told that the raffle drawing would
be held the following week, so any prize could not be used to
satisfy their current goals.
Those offered the raffle to win cigarettes were slightly more
likely to purchase tickets when they had a high need to smoke
than when they had a low need to smoke. This greater preference
for a goal-related item when the goal is active than when it is inac-
tive is called valuation. Of importance, students who were
offered the raffle to win cash purchased tickets at a reasonably
high rate when they had a low need to smoke, but rarely pur-
chased tickets when they had a high need to smoke. This lower
preference for a goal-unrelated item (cash) when the goal is
active than when it is inactive is called devaluation (for more dis-
cussion, see Brendl et al. 2003; Markman & Brendl 2005).
This finding suggests that cash is not considered relevant to the
goal of smoking when people have a high need to smoke. This
result is consistent with the drug theory of money, for money is
being treated as a specific entity that is relevant in particular cir-
cumstances. Other needs, such as smoking, can lead to devalua-
tion of money. Had money been conceptualized motivationally as
a tool, then it should have been perceived to be relevant to any
situation in which it could be used to purchase an object that
would satisfy an active goal. On the basis of evidence like this,
we believe that money is treated as a drug in motivationally
active states.
There are also cases in which money is conceptualized as a
tool. One area where this view of money is obvious is in studies
of taboos and social exchanges. As an example of a taboo,
Tetlock et al. (2000) showed that people find it morally repugnant
for a hospital to consider denying an expensive treatment to a
patient in order to save money for another hospital project.
Even considering the proposal taints the decision maker.
As a second example, McGraw and Tetlock (2005) describe
varieties of social exchanges. Most transactions in our culture
permit money to be used freely. Indeed, currency is the basis
of our day-to-day purchases. Nonetheless, we have certain
special relationships for which money is inappropriate. If a neigh-
bor helps us to fix a flat tire, we can reciprocate by helping him or
her to rake leaves in the yard, but not by paying them money. An
offer of money for help from a neighbor would likely be seen as
an insult. As another example, parents perform duties for their
children without keeping track of the effort spent and with no
expectation that the effort will be returned in like kind. Again,
the idea that parents would receive payment for their services
is strange.
Determining that it is inappropriate to offer money directly in
exchange for human lives or in certain close social relationships
rests on money being recognized as a tool. A significant com-
ponent of the negative reactions to these situations arises
because people do not wish to place these dimensions into the
market economy where they can be traded against other goods
and services for which money can be used.
These moral and social exchange situations involve psychologi-
cal distance between money and the situation in which money is
used. Most considerations of the taboo uses of money involve
situations in which one is not actively engaged in the choice
process itself. Indeed, most of the evidence obtained by
Tetlock and his colleagues is done using vignette studies that
assess people’s reactions to hypothetical situations. Likewise,
our social relationships are maintained in situations that do not
have strongly active goals relating to exchanges. Thus, it is
easier in these contexts than in motivationally active contexts to
treat money conceptually as a tool.
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The investigation of neural correlates of
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Abstract: Money is a specifically human incentive. However, functional
imaging techniques bring striking evidence that neural circuits pertaining
to more “natural” addictive and rewarding processes are involved in
response to monetary reward. Main results are evoked here, with
specific brain responses demonstrated along the different stages of the
process.
With regard to a drug theory of money, Lea & Webley (L&W)
address the question: “Is there a biological reason why money
is such a powerful incentive?” (sect. 1.5). Interesting results
related to this question have emerged from modern neuro-
imaging techniques, and these results have converged with
studies about decision processes in fields such as neuroeco-
nomics (Glimcher & Rustichini 2004).
Studies developed by Breiter and colleagues are of primary
interest. After a focus on the effects of cocaine on brain circuits
in a cocaine users sample (Breiter et al. 1997), neural circuits
involved in monetary gain and losses were investigated (Breiter
et al. 2001). A game of chance performed in the scanning
session included an “expectation” phase where different possible
monetary amounts were presented and an “outcome” with the
presentation of the gain or loss. A striking result of this study
was that an incentive unique to humans (i.e., money) induced
brain activations in areas such as the nucleus accumbens, the
sublenticular extended amygdala, and the orbital gyrus (in the
prospect and outcome phases) that overlap brain activations
observed in response to cocaine infusions in addicted subjects
(Breiter et al. 1997) or to low doses of morphine in drug-naı¨ve
individuals (Breiter et al. 2000). Such an overlap could partly
explain that a dysfunction in this cerebral network could contrib-
ute to impulse disorders, such as compulsive gambling.
The study performed by Breiter et al. in 2001 identified an
overlap between cerebral areas involved in monetary rewards
and those involved in drug addiction, but few differences were
recorded in brain activations for different stages (e.g., the pro-
spect and outcome phases) of cerebral processes related to mon-
etary reward. The growing development of neuroimaging
techniques has allowed several studies to focus on specific prop-
erties of the cerebral networks involved in response to monetary
stimuli, and some results have identified brain activation differ-
ences occurring during different stages of the process. Based
on primate work, Knutson et al. (2001a) used a parametric task
that elicited anticipation of monetary reward or punishment.
Within a sample of eight healthy volunteers, this study was the
first to demonstrate a selective recruitment of the nucleus accum-
bens (a part of the ventral striatum) for monetary gain but not for
loss; moreover, the activation was proportional to the amount of
the reward. Most often, neuroimaging studies on the neural cor-
relates of monetary reward have used tasks that involve prospect,
choice, and outcome phases. As theses phases can be temporally
close, the event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) method with a good temporal resolution should allow
identification of specific brain activations related to these phases.
On this topic, a recent study by Ernst et al. (2004) brought very
interesting results: whereas the prominent recruitment of the
ventral striatum was confirmed, the choice phase involved
more “cognitive” areas such as parieto-occipital ones (visuo-
spatial attention), the dorsal part of the anterior cingulate
cortex (conflict monitoring), parietal (manipulation of quantities)
and premotor areas. This study also showed that high risk/reward
conditions are associated with greater neural response during the
choice phase but not the prospect phase. Likewise, were there
specific brain activations that characterized the outcome of a
monetary reward? With the same parametric task described
earlier, Knutson et al. (2003) showed that a particular region of
the mesial prefrontal cortex is activated when an expected
reward is obtained, and a previous study (Knutson et al. 2001b)
showed that this particular region is deactivaed in response to
reward omission. Thus, the use of fast neuroimaging techniques
would allow demonstration of a dissociation between ventral
striatum areas involved in the prospect phase of the reward
and more prefrontal ones involved in the outcome phase.
Clearly, neural circuits involved in the prospect and the
outcome phases, although partly distinct anatomically, should
be functionally linked. This point has been addressed in studies
seeking to identify the reaction of monetary reward circuits
when a difference occurs between the expected value and the
real value of the monetary reward obtained. Still using event-
related fMRI, Ramnani et al. (2004) examined cerebral activity
related to the failure of expected rewards and the occurrence
of unexpected rewards, independently of any goal-directed
actions or decisions. Principally, this study showed that each
type of prediction error evokes activity in a distinct frontotem-
poral circuit: whereas unexpected reward failure evokes activity
in the temporal cortex and frontal pole (Brodmann area 10),
unpredicted rewards evoke activity in the orbitofrontal cortex,
the frontal pole parahippocampal cortex, and the cerebellum.
The study also showed that the activity time-locked to prediction
errors in frontotemporal circuits is involved in encoding the
associations between visual cues and monetary reward. For the
purpose of this commentary, this result is very important
because it shows that neural mechanisms are not only temporary
and activated either during the prospect phase, the stimulus
presentation, or the outcome phase, but also that networks are
devoted to the association between these successive phases.
Since 1999 several neuroimaging studies have explored the
neural circuits involved in other goal-directed behaviors such as
human sexual motivation (Mouras & Stole´ru, in press; Stole´ru
& Mouras, in press). Following these reviews, several brain
areas have been shown to be related to both monetary reward
and sexual motivation. For example, most studies on neural cor-
relates of sexual motivation have identified anterior cingulate
cortex activations (often interpreted as involved in action pre-
paratory processes), and a recent study by Williams et al.
(2004) reported a similar role for monetary reward processes.
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Abstract: If Tool Theory is buttressed by fundamental concepts of
conditioned reinforcement and extinction, a dependence on Drug
Theory may not be necessary.
Lea & Webley (L&W) insist that a Tool Theory of money, which
encompasses only purely ontological behavior, is inadequate to
deal with the profound motivational power displayed by human
behavior in relation to money. In their provocative analysis, the
authors depend much on the notion that money “can mimic
the satisfaction both from the instinct to play and from the
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instinct to trade” (sect. 5.3). Without a biological (evolutionary)
basis, such motivators would be seen as “scandalous” from
certain subsets of psychology. However, empirically based the-
ories of motivation, such as the Premack Principle, explicitly
state that any desirable behavior or tangible item can serve as a
basis for motivation. Within this framework what qualifies for a
motivator does not depend on its biological or adaptive value,
but rather on the item or behavior’s value in relation to all
other possible behaviors or items. This idea about primary and
secondary reinforcement is consistent with Skinner’s behavioral
position and suggests that it is unnecessary to consider Skinner’s
view as Drug Theory. Money has an important place in the hier-
archy of value because of its flexibility. Not only can it be used to
make other reinforcers available, but – like a good tool – it
extends their reach, making them available at future times
when they may be even more desirable than they are at
present. It can be argued that computers, too, are extremely
desirable tools because of their extraordinary flexibility; one note-
book computer can replace a roomful of equipment. And, like
money, computers are the objects of a great deal of preoccupa-
tion on the part of their users.
L&W also assert that token reinforcers maintain their motiva-
tional power without explicit pairings with unconditioned rein-
forcers. Indeed, such reinforcers can exert motivational
influence even when devalued or when presented in a different
context (e.g., Fantino 2000; O’Daly et al., in press). However,
such influence is typically fleeting. In fact, the authors point
out that in many historical societies where rapid devaluation of
currency occurred, the old devalued currency was abandoned
and either money with a stable value was used or bartering
ensued. This devalued money could then be used as a more
literal “tool” as in Figure 1, which shows a woman in post-
WWI Germany using a pile of devalued Marks as kindling.
Extinction is a key component in the process of operant con-
ditioning. When one tangible item or behavior leads to uncondi-
tioned or conditioned reinforcers, those tangible items or
behaviors will be motivators. Other equally tangible items or
behaviors that do not, or no longer, lead to reinforcers will not
be motivators. This means-ends relationship is identical to Tool
Theory. Drugs are no different in this respect. Once a drug no
longer offers any physiological satisfaction, its use stops. This
chemical action is biological, but obviously has no evolutionary
advantage to the individual. In most cases, as the authors point
out, the opposite effect can be observed. But, other conditioned
stimuli may still elicit the craving for the drug. Presenting these
conditioned stimuli without the drug also causes a decrease in
that response. Therefore, drugs can also be thought of in a
means-ends analysis when the concept of extinction is
considered.
The proposition that seemingly ubiquitous human behavior
can be explained in evolutionary terms (instincts) has led to
gross overgeneralizations throughout the history of psychology
(for a discussion, see Fantino & Logan 1979, pp. 297–301).
There is no doubt that the ontological biology of a person will
change in response to the use of money or tokens (i.e., changes
in neural circuitry will occur). But neural changes accompanying
conditioning do not require Drug Theory. Tools, be they money
or computers, are likely to be powerful generalized reinforcers
since, as discussed above, they are paired with so many good
things. A broadened concept of generalized reinforcers together
with the concept of extinction can go a long way to making a
dependence on Drug Theory superfluous.
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Abstract: Lea & Webley’s (L&W’s) non-exclusive distinction between
tool-like and drug-like motivators is insufficiently discriminating to say
much about money that is useful, as the distinction’s equivocal
application to sex, food, and drugs shows. Further, it appears as though
the motivations of problem gamblers are non-metaphorically like those
of drug addicts.
Lea & Webley (L&W) make clear that their topic is a choice of
metaphors for money. They take care to distance themselves
from the idea that one of their two favoured metaphors could
be altogether “correct” at the expense of the other. So, arguing
against them that money is not a drug but (more like) a tool,
might seem to miss their point. We instead raise doubts about
the value of their dichotomy of metaphors in the first place.
We then say why there is indeed an interesting, but non-meta-
phorical, relationship between drugs and money.
L&W’s discussion depends on a distinction between motiva-
tors that directly subserve biological functions (tools) and what
they call (in sect. 2.2.4) “functionless motivators” (drugs). They
recognize that money serves some biological functions much of
the time and so is, to that extent, a tool. But then they argue
Figure 1 (Romanowich et al.). Inflation – 1923. Devalued
Marks are used as kindling in post-WWI Germany.
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that it doesn’t always serve this function, and even systematically
subverts fitness in some circumstances (e.g., when used to
facilitate transactions within families), and so is also, to that
extent, a drug.
This distinction applies to too many things too easily. Most
sexual activities of modern humans are recreational and costly,
and so do not support, and sometimes subvert, their expected
fitness. In wealthy societies, the same goes for food. Psychoactive
drugs, for that matter, are also tool-like; consider the familiar
sequence that begins with a drink bought in a bar and leads to
the production of children. Perhaps L&W would say that sex
and food are both tool-like and drug-like, just as money is,
while drugs are also tool-like. But metaphors are valuable only
insofar as they discipline and structure thought. Contrasts that
exclude nothing are (functionally) empty.
L&W say things that suggest the following response. Sex and
food are pre-cultural motivators, but money is not. Therefore,
sex and food in general must be tools for enhancing fitness,
whereas in the case of money the jury is out until we devote
theoretical reflection to the matter. But L&W have no indepen-
dently stable ontology of types of motivators at their disposal.
There is no human instinct for “sex in general”; there are just dis-
positions to particular sorts of sexual activity in particular sorts of
circumstances and not any one of these dispositions is always
fitness-promoting.
Our objection would be churlish if money were, like cocaine
but unlike most sex, typically pathological with respect to func-
tion (fitness-enhancing or otherwise; again, sex is typically patho-
logical with respect to fitness). But this would be so only if true
miserliness – sheer hoarding of money for the sake of having it
and not for status, security, and so forth – were widespread.
Such miserliness is in fact extremely rare. (When they mention
it in support of their argument, L&W cite no prevalence
studies, surprising or otherwise.)
The poverty of L&W’s case here is a special case of the poverty
of a whole species of evolutionary psychology. This species aims
to identify a restricted set of basic pre-cultural motivators. Then
it hypothesizes modules for seeking and evaluating instances of
these motivators. The modules, being narrow specialists, can be
fooled into misevaluation by things that mimic the targets for
which the modules were selected; these are drug-like rewards.
Human cognitive architecture is probably modular to some
extent. But hunting for definite, cross-environmental reward
types that are the agents responsible for selection of the
modules reflects a simplistic and naive view of evolutionary
dynamics and complexity. Such hunts can sometimes have heur-
istic value if they are taken with a pinch of salt and if the expla-
natory target has very shallow cognitive interpenetration – for
example, human preferences for sweets and fats, or male hetero-
sexual preferences for curvaceous women, the prototype
instances that show off evolutionary psychology in its best light.
Money isn’t very much like ripe fruit or rounded hips in that
respect – very little of widespread attraction to people is. So
money, like almost everything, is tool-like and drug-like. Is
saying this really a helpful contribution to scientific
understanding?
L&W twice allude to a truly powerful way of studying reward
when they mention “neuroeconomics,” including the study of
differential brain responses to variances in reward types, fre-
quencies, delays, and contexts. They are wrong, though, to cite
neuroeconomics, specifically Glimcher (2003), as having ident-
ified a “trade module” or a distinctive neural response to trade-
related stimuli. There is no such finding. What Glimcher and
other neuroeconomists report are neural capacities to learn to
predict values of rewards in many contexts, not in specifically
trade-related contexts. In fact, the early progress in neuro-
economics is bad news for evolutionary psychology of L&W’s
type, for it shows that brains nimbly learn to compare rewards
across whole ranges of settings and cultural manipulations of
setting (e.g., McClure et al 2004), not that they are systems
that refer their input robotically back to a fixed stock of ancestral
reward types and thereby get tricked in bars and casinos. Biologi-
cal brains, that is, are multi-modal evaluation and resource allo-
cation machines; it would be surprising if any creature capable of
representing multiple such evaluations to itself proved incapable
of latching onto money given the chance. Capuchin monkeys, for
example, have been trained to use multiple fungible fiat currency
(Chen et al., in press).
Study of the brains of problem gamblers suggests there is
indeed an interesting relationship between drugs and money,
but not one resembling L&W’s metaphor (see, e.g., Potenza
et al. 2003). Problem gamblers don’t appear to value money for
its own sake. But they do appear to be typical, perhaps even pro-
totypical, addicts. Cocaine addicts may not value cocaine for its
own sake. Rather, gamblers and cocaine addicts have more diffi-
culty than other people convincing their brains that they are
receiving enough reward, at a fast enough rate, as a generalized
target. Here reward just means: anything that mobilizes neural
attention. Thus, as Rachlin (2000) has stressed, gambling and
chemical stimulants are close substitutes for social interaction.
Behavior with respect to money is just like behavior with
respect to stereotypical drugs because money is such a reliable
tool for getting what the brain is always looking for, namely,
relief from boredom. But it isn’t money itself that is the drug,
it is gambling. Money in the gambling addict is – literally – a
tool for getting drugged.
Tools, drugs, and signals in the road
from evolution to money
Federico Sanabria
Department of Psychology, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-1104.
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Abstract: The problem of the biology of money is twofold: It subsumes
both the identification of behavioral mechanisms that account for the
power of money as an incentive, and the elucidation of the phylogeny
of such mechanisms. The drugs–tool distinction, as articulated by Lea
& Webley (L&W) in their fascinating synthesis, is a welcome step
toward their solution. Compared to the direct invocation of instinctual
drives, however, conditioning processes provide a conceptually and
empirically clearer road from evolution to money.
The nearly absolute displacement of weaker non-monetary
modes of production by the global expansion of capitalist econ-
omies, begs the question that the authors ask: Why are people
so interested in money? The answer is less trivial than it
appears. The obvious answer is not incorrect, but rather, as is
made crystalline in the target article, it is incomplete. To
explore the shortcomings of that explanation, the authors have
christened it as “Tool Theory,” characterized its means-to-end
connotations, and moved forward to evaluate one exciting possi-
bility: that there is a biological rationale, beyond the mere utili-
tarian, for the rewarding character of money. For motivation
theorists, the reality of a connection between biological functions
and motives is as obvious as Tool Theory (e.g., Maslow 1943);
nevertheless, biological explanations are, at best, a growing but
still marginal element of economic discourse. The science of
money is still disconnected from the science of life, and the
target article insightfully points at issues that may bridge this gap.
The question of the biology of money is meaningful only if it
inquires about how a specific motivated behavior (money
seeking) is mapped to specific evolutionary demands. The con-
ventional character of money and its short natural history,
however, preclude any direct connection between money and
nature. This point is well argued by the authors, who conclude
that there cannot be a “money instinct.” Consequently, the
research question is only viable through a roundabout: Money
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must operate through basic behavioral mechanisms which them-
selves are related to (or, rather, must be related to) fitness max-
imization. The mediatory role of these presumed behavioral
mechanisms breaks the problem of the biology of money into
two parts: (a) what behavioral mechanisms are involved in
money seeking (proximate causes)? and (b) what is the evolution-
ary rationale of such mechanisms (ultimate causes)? These two
distinct problems are not clearly separated by the authors, as evi-
denced by the mechanisms selected for their synthetic theory of
monetary behavior.
According to L&W, money may be metaphorically described
as a tool, or as a drug. These two functions are easily mappable
to two general behavioral mechanisms familiar to behavior ana-
lysts: operant and Pavlovian conditioning. In operant terms,
money may serve as the lever that, when properly manipulated,
yields reinforcing consequences. In Pavlovian terms, money
may serve as the cue signaling the availability of attractive
stimuli, eliciting responses of approach and anticipation, among
others. The tool versus drug distinction, however, does not
fully match the operant versus Pavlovian dichotomy. Tools
yield “real” rewards, whereas drugs are “nonfunctional” substi-
tutes for “real” rewards. The tool–drug dichotomy presumably
encompasses all possible motivational roles of stimuli like
money, which in themselves are not “real” rewards. The terms
in quotation marks are defined by their contribution to fitness.
Certainly, operant and Pavlovian conditioning, as general mech-
anisms, are significant contributors to the fitness of complex
organisms, and they are demonstrably facilitated by a congruency
of stimuli and responses that is only attributable to evolutionary
processes (e.g., Garcia & Koelling 1966). But once operational,
conditioning is agnostic of the “reality” of the reinforcement
process. And so is money: it may work as a tool to obtain
fitness diminishers like crack cocaine, and it may work as a “func-
tional drug,” signaling incoming food ingestion when we inspect
our wallet in a restaurant. It is not clear how either one of these
two cases fits the tool versus drug distinction. The completeness
of the tool–drug approach is undermined when we consider the
possibility of using a tool to obtain a drug, or of using a drug as a
tool. The basic metaphors are conceptually close to conditioning
mechanisms, but they need to reconfigure their link to selective
advantage as a separate problem.
In the target article, the Skinnerian operant approach is
described as a “Drug Theory” on the basis of its characterization
of money as a conditioned reinforcer. Interestingly, “operant
money theory” could be described also as a “Tool Theory” on
the same basis, if one is of the persuasion that conditioned
reinforcement derives its value from signaling the relative proxi-
mity of other reinforcing events (e.g., Preston & Fantino 1991). If
such is the case, there is no reason to agree with the authors’
claim that conditioned reinforcers must work in the same way
as unconditioned reinforcers. Furthermore, positive informative
signals may elicit behavior completely unrelated to the signaled
reinforcer (e.g., a ringing phone may signal an awaited call, but
few would engage in a conversation with the phone), or very
similar to the consummatory response (e.g., autoshaping in the
pigeon; Allan & Zeigler 1994). In other words, money, qua con-
ditioned reinforcer, may be described as a tool or as a drug, and
neither description appears to be exclusive. The compatibility of
these descriptions is an issue that goes beyond money and into
the discussion of the interaction/identity of operant and
Pavlovian conditioning (e.g., Lajoie & Bindra 1976).
Although reciprocal altruism and play may be involved in the
interest for money, their invocation as instincts to explain monet-
ary behavior is unwarranted. The connection between behavioral
mechanisms and evolution is not examined to such an extent as to
rule out the empirically verifiable possibility that both behaviors
are derivable from general mechanisms. Consider the situation of
cooperating in a prisoner’s dilemma game, when playing against a
perfectly reciprocating strategy (or tit-for-tat; Axelrod 1984).
Sanabria et al. (2003) have demonstrated that pigeons may
learn to cooperate in this game, but only if each choice
between cooperation and defection produces a stimulus that is
predictive of reciprocation (i.e., a conditioned reinforcer or
punisher). Pigeons are obviously not hardwired to reciprocate
the actions of a computer at the expense of immediate gratifica-
tion, but they can learn it. Maybe money operates, partially, as an
analogue of the cooperation stimulus, bridging over what we give
up for money, and what we obtain for it.
The tool–drug metaphors bring economic motivations closer
to their biological substratum, but they can be improved. Their
symmetry with conditioning mechanisms suggests a fruitful
course of action. These mechanisms may well function as
mediators between evolution and some socially arranged beha-
vior (Gutnisky & Zanutto 2004; Skinner 1984). Such function,
unlike instinctual drives directly linked to evolution, is readily
verifiable in nature.
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Abstract: Lea & Webley’s (L&W’s) Drug Theory solves many puzzles
surrounding money-related behavior. I explore supplementing the
Drug Theory with ideas from gene-culture coevolution theory and
memetic theory.
Lea & Webley’s (L&W’s) discussion of money as a drug rep-
resents an ingenious synthesis of disparate literatures. The
theory is, however, specifically oriented toward explaining the
origins of money (“our task is to offer the best account we can
of the biological origins of the money motive”; sect. 1.4). I
would like to raise the possibility that a theory that moves
beyond the origins of money to focus on its ongoing manifes-
tations might find a greater role for culture. That is, once
money is in existence, the symbolic aspects of money-related
behavior may function in such a way as to make them not
simply classifiable as instances of the Drug Theory (as argued
in sects. 3.3.2 and 5.2). To account for the ongoing manifestations
of money-related behavior, I believe that the Drug Theory will
need to be supplemented with ideas from gene–culture coevolu-
tion theory and memetic theory.
In L&W’s discussion, “function” always refers to biological
function. This is true in both their Tool Theory and their Drug
Theory. In the former, money gives indirect access to biological
rewards, and in the latter, money “covers cases where it gives
direct access to the systems that subserve such rewards but in
an illusory, nonfunctional way” (sect. 2.3). But what about
human goals and desires that have completely slipped their
genetic/biological moorings? Neither the Tool nor the Drug
Theory would seem to have much to say about such cases, or at
least both theories need to be supplemented to encompass this
situation. The alternative is to contest a fundamental assumption
of most memetic theorists – that memetic goals can become
detached from genetic fitness considerations and indeed can
become detached from the interests of the vehicle (person)
hosting them (Blackmore 1999; Dennett 1995; Stanovich 2004).
A view of money that recognizes memetic goals that are
detached from genetic goals does have affinities with views in
the modern sociology of money discussed by L&W. However,
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broader notions of symbolization than those represented in the
sociological literature might not be as easily subsumed under
the Drug Theory – for example, notions of symbolic utility associ-
ated with Robert Nozick. Nozick defines a situation involving
symbolic utility as one in which an action (or one of its outcomes)
“symbolizes a certain situation, and the utility of this symbolized
situation is imputed back, through the symbolic connection, to
the action itself” (Nozick 1993, p. 27). Money use in highly afflu-
ent societies can often have this property. Nozick notes that we
are apt to view a concern for symbolic utility as irrational when
the lack of a causal link between the symbolic action and the
actual outcome has become manifestly obvious, yet the symbolic
action continues to be performed. Many dysfunctional inter-
actions surrounding money seem to have this property of being
detached from real-world outcomes and becoming attached to
very abstract memeplexes (political memeplexes that seem
to serve neither personal interests nor genetic interests come to
mind). L&W recognize the difficulty here when they acknowl-
edge “that money is essentially a symbol, perhaps multiply
symbolic (cf. Lea et al. 1987, Ch. 12), seems hard to reconcile
with any kind of biological analysis of money motivation; it
leads, furthermore, to a cognitive rather than a motivational
analysis of behaviour towards money.” This seems right, and
the cognitive substrate that it relies upon would seem to be in
the domains of simulation and metarepresentation (Carruthers
2002; Currie & Ravenscroft 2002; Dienes & Perner 1999;
Nichols & Stich 2003; Sperber 2000) – precisely the domains
upon which memetic evolution is dependent.
If the origins of money are in the mechanisms outlined in the
Drug Theory, then I would argue that a further exaptation has
taken place in the service of memetic evolution. An exaptation
for memetic purposes would likewise be consistent with the
many findings of biological nonfunctionality that L&W find sup-
portive of the Drug Theory, and it would additionally be consist-
ent with many findings in the heuristics and biases literature
which show that interactions involving money are instrumentally
irrational (Kahneman & Tversky 2000; Raghubir & Srivastava
2002; Shafir et al. 1997; Stanovich 1999), that they do not serve
the interests of the individual (whether or not they are consistent
with genetic fitness maximization; see Stanovich 2004).
In L&W’s Drug Theory, money parasitizes trading that is
derived from reciprocal altruism. However, L&W might just as
easily (and additionally) have posited money parasitizing
trading derived from strong reciprocity (Fehr & Fischbacher
2003) – altruistic acts performed when no reciprocal benefit is
possible. This uniquely human form of behavior is increasingly
viewed as the product of gene/culture evolution (Fehr &
Fischbacher 2003; Gintis 2003; Gintis et al. 2003; Richerson &
Boyd 2005). This, in part, puts the Drug Theory on a memetic
foundation as well as a biological one.
Money motives, moral philosophy, and
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Abstract: Lea & Webley (L&W) provide two alternative biological
accounts of human monetary motivations, the Tool Theory and the Drug
Theory. They argue that both are required for an adequate explanation.
I explore the applicability of these models to philosophical discussions of
how we might justify such motivations. I argue their approach is not
entirely satisfactory for normative questions, since it precludes the
possibility of rational non-instrumental attitudes towards money.
Lea & Webley’s (L&W’s) target article explores the important
question of what the biological basis of our monetary motives
might be. One obvious explanation involves their Tool Theory,
according to which money is a tool and our reasons for desiring
it are to be understood like our desire for any tool in terms of
what other goods it is able to help us obtain (sect. 2.1). L&W
argue that while this has some intuitive appeal, a Tool Theory
of money motivation fails to explain fully the strong pull of
money as a motivator. A full explanation requires that we under-
stand money as acting sometimes, in a metaphorical sense, as a
drug. According to their Drug Theory, money intrudes meta-
phorically on the normal functioning of the nervous system:
money acquires its incentive power because it mimics the
psychological action of some other more natural incentive (sect.
2.2.4). Accordingly, it involves irrationality.
My interest here concerns money motives and morality. What
applicability might this have to normative theories regarding the
extent to which we should be motivated by money in the way that
we so obviously are. For the moral philosopher, any interest here
would be in justification rather than explanation. How well might
L&W’s template fit onto the history of what R. H. Tawney (1926)
called “economic casuistry”? Unlike more radical approaches that
would cast all monetary motives as immoral, the economic casuist
distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate monetary
motives.
We can discern two central schools of thought regardingmoney
motives in this more moderate tradition. The first of these derives
from the work of Immanuel Kant, and sees money as a tool or
instrument which is only to be used for buying “tool-like”
things. For Kant, money is a pure means. He contrasts this with
persons who are ends-in-themselves and should be accorded
respect in keeping with their status as persons. Kant argues that
every thing has either a price or a dignity and if it has a price it
cannot have a dignity (Kant 1785/1946). Although it is quite legit-
imate to regard mere things as means and therefore to ascribe to
them a price, this is not the case with persons. Clearly, what we
have here is a Tool Theory of normative evaluation. Money is a
tool and it is wrong to treat persons as if they were tools.
The second great tradition is Aristotelian in origin and focuses
on the role that money plays in the best possible life. Aristotle,
and later philosophers such as Aquinas, regarded money as the
very embodiment of an instrument and, as such, it could not
be a proper end of activity (Aristotle 1952). However, immersion
in commercial life often leads people to regard money as an end-
in-itself. For the Aristotelian this is an irrational mistake. In
explaining this irrationality, Aristotelians focus on the inability
of money to function as an ultimate goal. Proper activities have
a realizable goal. When one aims to build a boat, one realizes
one’s goal when the boat is completed and ready to sail. But in
the case of money there is no point at which one realizes one’s
goal of making money. Having no satisfaction conditions, it end-
lessly iterates (Walsh 2004). Obviously, this second tradition can
be cast as a Drug Theory. According to the Aristotelian tradition,
the person who takes the pursuit of money as their fundamental
goal is irrational since the very nature of money is such that it
cannot function in this way.
It appears, then, that L&W’s template fits neatly onto the two
main ethical traditions in Western philosophy that seek to dis-
tinguish between legitimate or illegitimate money motives.
These accounts of the moral difference conform either to the
Drug model or to the Tool model, since the normatively undesir-
able motives here are either understood as cases of “inappropri-
ate tool-treatment” or of irrational drug-like behavior. Built into
such a model is the assumption that non-instrumental motives
towards money must be irrational. We can see this assumption
at work in L&W’s discussion of restrictions on money use (sect.
4.5). Money is said to function as a drug in those cases where it
is “found to have a value and an emotional charge that are not
predicted by its economic use” (sect. 4.11). If not a means,
then the behavior belongs to the realm of irrationality.
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But should we accept this last assumption? In moral philosophy
the suggestion that non-instrumental attitudes are fundamentally
irrational is highly controversial. Value pluralists, such as Raz
(1986) and Anderson (1993), have argued persuasively for the
existence of forms of moral value that arise from the ideals and
attitudes expressed in action itself, rather than its consequences.
Anderson, in particular, explores how our use of money might
express ideals and attitudes that in certain circumstances might
be inappropriate. She claims that in such cases it is rational to
refuse monetary exchanges on grounds which are fundamentally
non-economic and which reflect the basic values of the agent
concerned. This seems right, for surely one can refuse money
for some good, no matter how much money is on offer, without
being thought irrational. If this is correct, then there would
appear to be cases in moral theory not covered by the Tool and
Drug Models, at least as described – namely, those where one
might rationally choose, on non-instrumental normative
grounds, to avoid certain monetary transactions.
Although the account is insightful, my concern is that if it
were to be applied in its current form to the normative
realm, it would exclude rational non-instrumental attitudes
towards money from the possible set of human motives in
this area. This would be an undesirable outcome. A further
question, which might be pursued elsewhere, concerns the
extent to which rational non-instrumental attitudes towards
money could have a role in biological explanations of our
desire for money.
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Abstract: Our response amplifies our case that money is best
seen as both a drug and a tool. Some commentators challenge
our core assumptions: In this response we, therefore, explain in
more detail why we assume that money is an exceptionally
strong motivator, and that a biological explanation of money
motivation is required. We also provide evidence to support
those assumptions. Other commentators criticise our use of the
drug metaphor, particularly arguing that it is empirically
empty; and in our response we seek to show how it can be
submitted to test – aided by some commentaries which suggest
such tests. In addition, we explain, with evidence, why we do
not think that the notion of money as a generalised conditioned
reinforcer provides a satisfactory alternative to the tool/drug
account. The largest group of commentaries suggests
alternative instincts on which the drug-like effects of money
might be based, other than the reciprocation and play instincts
we propose; in our response, we explain why we still prefer our
original proposals, but we accept that alternative or additional
instincts may indeed underlie money motivation. A final group
of commentaries carries the argument further, suggesting
extensions to the tool/drug model, in ways with which we are
broadly in sympathy. The purpose of the tool and drug
metaphors is to encourage reflection on the biological origins
of money motivation, and to that extent at least we believe that
they have succeeded.
R1. Introduction
Our target article started from four core assumptions
(sect. 1): (1) For humans (but not for other species),
money has an extraordinary incentive power, similar to
that of other motivators such as food and sex. (2)
Whereas the incentive power of food, sex, and most
other motivators is easily understood in biological terms,
that of money is not. (3) A biological explanation of the
incentive power of money therefore needs to be provided
because “the science of money is still disconnected from
the science of life” (to use Sanabria’s elegant expression),
and the gap needs to be bridged. (4) This task has hitherto
been neglected.
From those assumptions we argued, through a consider-
ation of past theories and current data, to three con-
clusions (sect. 5.4): (i) The “obvious” Tool Theory of
money motivation, according to which money is valued
because it enables us to fulfil other biologically explicable
instincts, is inadequate; (ii) the inadequacies of a Tool
Theory can be overcome by combining it with a Drug
Theory, according to which money provides illusory fulfil-
ment of other instincts; and (iii) the instincts for which
money particularly provides illusory fulfilment are the
instincts to trade and to play.
We predicted (sect. 5.4) that our three conclusions
would find decreasing levels of acceptance, and a
reading of the commentaries bears this out. Similarly,
not all of our assumptions were challenged: everyone
pretty much agrees that the biological explanation of the
money motive has been neglected. However, by no
means does everyone agree that such an explanation is
needed; some commentators clearly feel that the biology
of money has been neglected, is continuing to be neg-
lected, and ought to be neglected further.
Hence, we can divide the arguments in the commen-
taries into those that challenge our assumptions; those
that (broadly) agree with our assumptions but challenge
our conclusions, because they challenge the arguments
by which we reached them; and those that accept our
assumptions and our conclusions as far as they go, but
seek to extend them in various ways. Naturally, several
of the commentaries involve elements of all three of
those positions. In responding to the commentaries, there-
fore, we reflect on these three approaches in succession,
rather than taking each commentary in turn. We start
with a response to critiques of our assumptions.
R2. Money is an important human motivator
Several commentators (e.g., Burghardt, Glassman) chal-
lenge our assumption that the money motivation is unique.
To some extent these challenges miss the point of our
article. For example, we have no problem with the fact
that human sexual motivation is decoupled from procrea-
tion (Ross & Spurrett); that does not undermine its bio-
logical continuity in the terms in which we define it (sect.
1.4). A more serious challenge, however, is Furnham’s
claim that money is not in fact a very powerful motivator.
Furnham argues that money is actually a hygiene factor (in
the sense of Herzberg et al. 1967) rather than a motivator.
In support of this claim, he points out that at least some
affective associations with money are in fact negative,
Response/Lea & Webley: Money as tool, money as drug
196 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2006) 29:2
and that this is not what one would expect from a cognitive
drug, nor from something that is a strong motivator.
It is fundamental to our argument that money is a
powerful motivator. Accordingly, at the risk of belabouring
the obvious, we need to briefly review some of the evi-
dence that supports our position. Such evidence comes
from everyday discourse, the stylised facts of the ordinary
labour market, empirical studies of some less usual
markets, and finally from direct experiment. The culturally
invasive nature of money, which we discuss in section R4.1
of this response, provides additional evidence.
R2.1. Everyday discourse: Proverbs, aphorisms, and
familiar quotations
Both formal literature and traditional wisdom contain
large numbers of aphorisms and comments referring to
money. Indeed, there are so many that Furnham and
Argyle (1998) are able to open each of their chapters
with a list, and Jackson (1995) has collected a comprehen-
sive anthology. Formal analyses of such lists have been
carried out: for example, Doyle and Li’s (2001) compari-
son of Chinese and Japanese proverbs about money.
Examination of lists of such aphorisms suggests that
they fall into two types, which we call the cynical and
the sceptical. Cynical aphorisms assert the power of
money, in the face of explicit or implicit protestations to
the contrary. Sceptical aphorisms assert the limitations
of the power of money, in the face of an assumed consen-
sus that such limitations barely exist. It might be thought
that the two groups cancel each other out. However,
given the social function of aphorisms, it is clear that
both types are evidence that there is a widely held belief
in the power of money.
Examples of cynical aphorisms include: “[Money] is the
sovereign queen of all delights: for her the lawyer pleads;
the soldier fights” (R. Barnfield, spelling modernised from
the 1598 original); “What makes all doctrines plain and
clear? – About two hundred pounds a year” (Butler);
“Wine maketh merry; but money answereth all things”
(Ecclesiastes 10:19) (all quotations from Benham 1935).
On the more sceptical side we have, from the same
collection (Benham 1935): “No man’s fortune could be
an end worthy of his being” (F. Bacon); “A good name is
rather to be chosen than great riches” (Proverbs 22:1);
“Honour and money are not found in the same purse”
(Spanish proverb).
Of course, literature as such is not evidence. But these
sayings are evidence that people have long believed
money to be a powerful force, and that some people
have believed it to be a dangerously powerful force in
people’s lives.
R2.2. Stylised facts: The labour market and crime
The second line of evidence for the power of the money
motive again comes from the realm of everyday experi-
ence, though it belongs to the academic disciplines of
labour economics and occupational psychology and partly
to criminology. Put crudely, there is no job so unpleasant,
hazardous, or immoral that no one will take it if the pay
is right.
This generalisation may seem questionable. In any
society, there are some people who refuse to take the
only jobs offered them for the pay they are offered, prefer-
ring to become marginalised or outcast, or to work in the
subsistence economy. There are jobs that people take
only with great reluctance, and where the pay has to be
at a premium because of their non-pecuniary disadvan-
tages: prostitution and related occupations such as
topless dancing are the obvious examples (see Reynolds
1986; Thompson et al. 2003). But the evidence of labour
market history is that there is no job that absolutely no
one could be induced to do, if sufficient money was
offered. And beyond legitimate employment, it is clear
that if a crime is apparently profitable, there is no level of
punishment, up to and including death, that will completely
eliminate it so long as there is some chance of escaping
detection. In the right circumstances, then, money has
the capacity to overwhelm all other motivations.
We are not saying that the money motive is all-powerful.
We are not saying that anyone can be persuaded to
perform any act for enough money: some people are
able to resist bribery. But the same is true of other power-
ful motives; the power of hunger or sex are not disputed
because some people manage to fast and many people
are sexually faithful.
R2.3. Empirical studies: Unusual markets
Just as some people will, under some circumstances, do
almost anything for money, so also some people, under
some circumstances, will sell almost anything for money.
The most discussed example in the recent literature is the
sale of organs for transplantation, particularly kidneys, and
there is extensive discussion in the medical ethics and
policy literature as to whether this should be encouraged
or not (e.g., Kahn & Delmonico 2004). Significant
numbers of people have made this kind of sale: Goyal
et al. (2002) found more than 300 individuals who had
done so in one city in India – about .05% of the population.
In everyday speech, someone who would do anything
for money is described as being ready to sell his grand-
mother. There is no formal evidence that people do
exactly that, but they will certainly sell their children.
The widespread tradition of brideprice is, objectively, a
matter of selling a daughter, though it might be thought
a relatively innocuous example. The public concern
about international adoption in recent years has partly
been driven by the possibility that it can lead to the sale
of children (Hollingsworth 2003). It is also claimed that
child prostitution in developing countries often involves
the sale of children by their parents. Some widely circu-
lated stories (see, e.g., Flowers 2001) are hard to docu-
ment, but even authors who are sceptical of them
recognise that there are parents in some of these countries
who are willing, however reluctantly, to be supported by
their adolescent daughters’ earnings from the sex trade
(Bagley 1999).
As in the case of crime, the existence of these markets
does not mean that people are universally or even com-
monly willing to sell their body parts, or their children,
for money. What it does show is that in the right circum-
stances, the money motive will overwhelm even the
motives to preserve one’s own body and one’s own descen-
dants. Biologically speaking, that places the money motive
at the highest level there is.
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R2.4. A formal demonstration of the strength of the
money motive
Few experimental psychologists have thought it necessary
to demonstrate the strength of the money motive.
However, Schwab (1953) has reported an experiment in
which he asked patients to hang from a horizontal bar in
a gymnasium for as long as they possibly could, which
turned out to be about 45 seconds. If he subjected them
to “suggestion and strong urging (hypnosis in some
cases),” they managed to hang on for somewhat longer,
about 75 seconds. But if he held out a $5 bill (worth
around $30 at today’s prices), and told them they could
have it if they beat their previous records, they managed
to hang on for an average of 110 seconds. Any incentive
that enables someone to perform at tasks at 250% of
their previous best level has, we argue, some right to
be regarded as strong.
R2.5. Is money a uniquely human motivator?
While not questioning the strength of the money motive
for humans, Ross & Spurrett raise the possibility that
animals other than humans can also acquire the motivation
to use money. They cite the results of Chen et al. (in press),
showing that capuchins would trade tokens with an exper-
imenter in exchange for food reward. Impressive as these
results are, they do not add anything in principle to other
demonstrations of conditioned reinforcement in animals.
A number of other commentators have also suggested
that conditioned reinforcement provides an adequate
alternative biological explanation of the money motive.
We respond to this argument later, in section R6.2.
R3. Money motivation is unusually difficult to
explain biologically
Few if any commentators suggest that money is easy to
explain biologically. However, some commentators ques-
tion whether it poses a special or unique difficulty. Essen-
tially they argue that many or even all human motivations
are so transformed by our uniquely cultural biology that
they are as detached from any obvious function as
money is. As we have pointed out in the preceding
section (R2), however, this is to misunderstand what
we mean by biological continuity. Continuity does not
require that a human function is identical to that of
other primates. It does require that there should be a
plausible path of evolutionary and historical development
from the kind of motivations seen in other animals (and,
therefore, presumably shown by our prehuman ancestors)
to those seen in modern humans. There is a plausible path
from chimpanzees’ monkey hunting (Teleki 1973)
to “Laughing Stock Farm pork cooked two-ways with
winter squash and red wine panade and Belgian endive”
at Chez Panisse; but there is no such path to the platinum
American Express card with which we might pay for the
dish. We do not even know where such a path would start.
R4. The culture and biology of money
Commentators differ sharply on whether there is a real
need for a biological explanation for money in the sense
in which we mean such an explanation. A number of com-
mentators express concerns about our biological approach
to money, feeling that in taking this approach we had paid
insufficient attention to cultural and social explanations.
This view is expressed most forcefully by Belk, who
claims that money motivations are learned along with civi-
lising rituals that overcome rather than indulge basic
motivations. Others (Jorion, Kniffen) have drawn atten-
tion to the significance of money as a marker of status.
The general issue here is the nature of the relationship
between biology and culture: behaviours may be largely
determined by genes, there may be gene–culture coevolu-
tion, or behaviours may be “off-the-leash” and basically
culturally determined.
R4.1. Is money purely cultural?
The most radical alternative to our kind of biological expla-
nation is the one that we identified early in the target article
(sect. 2.3): money must be understood purely at a cultural
level, detached from human biology except insofar as bio-
logical evolution has given humans the capacity to be cul-
tural beings. The position taken by Belk seems to us to
fall within this camp; where we see drug-like effects, he
sees the effects of social ritual. The trouble with this pos-
ition, as we have argued elsewhere (Lea & Webley 2005),
is that, like nineteenth- and twentieth-century economic
theory, it “abolishes the body” (Gagnier & Dupre´ 1999).
Of course, we cannot abolish culture either: we are not pro-
posing, as Belk seems to suggest, that children come into
the world desiring money. We entirely agree that they
have to learn the desire for money – that is precisely why
it is biologically problematic. As economic psychologists
we have a responsibility to account for tastes, in Becker’s
(1996) phrase: we have to explain why this particular
desire is learned when other possible desires are not, and
why this desire becomes so strong. If money motivation is
indeed learned in the same way as manners are learned
(as Belk argues), then either people should be a lot less
interested inmoney, or we should be a lot bettermannered.
To put it another way, if money is a pure cultural artefact
and behaviour towards it a pure function of ritual, then
its presence or absence in societies, the forms it takes,
and the taboos about it, would be essentially arbitrary, con-
strained only by history. They are not, and the evidence on
the cultural history of money shows that they are not.
Money is not an inevitable result of human culture. A
great many of the world’s cultures did not use any form
of money until they came into contact with the European
or East Asian cultures that had invented the kinds of
money we are familiar with. Complex economies could
be sustained by other means, such as systems of ritual
(see, e.g., Dole & Carneiro 1958) or barter (Chapman
1980; Humphrey & Hugh-Jones 1992). A large number
of “primitive” societies did use money, however, and
studies in economic anthropology have shown that their
moneys included a wide range of materials. Some
examples are listed by Einzig (1966) and they include fam-
iliar examples such as cows and cowrie shells, but also less
likely sounding objects such as bolts of cloth, granite
boulders, pearl necklaces, and woodpecker scalps. Com-
pared with this rich array of different money substances,
the number of independent inventions of money seems
to have been quite small, probably fewer than twenty
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(Grierson 1978). So all the different money-using societies
must have acquired the idea of money from this relatively
small number of roots, with subsequent cultural radiation
of the actual substances used as money. This shows that
the money idea is culturally highly contagious, or, to put
it another way, powerful. If a money-using society and a
non-money-using society come into contact, it is likely
that the non-money-using society will adopt money; it is
unheard of for a money-using society to stop using
money. Furthermore, the developed world’s style of
money, using coins, notes, and bank accounts, seems to
be as dominant within money use as money use is over
other exchange systems. When modern money makes
contact with a more primitive money system, even
though there may be some initial resistance, the modern
form quite quickly displaces its primitive competitor.
We conclude from this evidence that money in general,
and modern forms of money in particular, are culturally
invasive. This in turn suggests that they are not arbitrary;
rather, they are peculiarly compatible with enduring fea-
tures of human nature, and it follows that if we are to
understand money fully, we must understand its biological
as well as its cultural history.
R4.2. What kind of biological explanation should we
have?
Some commentators accept, to a greater or less extent, that
a biological explanation is needed, but disagree with the
particular kind of biological explanation we seek to
provide. We are accused of peddling a style of evolutionary
psychology which is universalistic (Agassi), or intellec-
tually feeble; of relying on modular explanations (Ross
& Spurrett); of not being part of a naturalistic evolution-
ary science (Burghardt); or of believing that brains can
use coins as neurotransmitters (Booth).
We will turn to Burghardt’s and Booth’s comments in
sect.R4.4 below. On the issue of modularity in human
cognition (or motivation), our target article takes no
explicit position. As a matter of fact, we prefer to construe
evolutionary psychology in the broad sense rather than
the narrow sense: we are much more persuaded by the
assumption that modern human behaviour can be inter-
preted in the light of evolutionary theory, than by the
details of Tooby and Cosmides’ “adaptive toolbox” (Lea,
in press; for the distinction between broad and narrow
constructions of evolutionary psychology, see Buller
2005). We might argue that the idea of a restricted set of
pre-cultural modules is more plausible in the motivational
than the cognitive realm, but we would be quite happy
with the idea that money motivation arose as a flexible
extension from some other human motivation that has a
convincing biological basis. However, the case for that
idea has yet to be made. We argued in the target article
(sect. 5.1) that the Drug Theory of money is feeble
unless we can specify what biologically-grounded
motives money mimics. The same is equally true of any
alternative that is offered: If money motivation is to be
explained as a result of the flexibility and situation-
dependency of human motivation (cf. Ross & Spurrett),
that argument needs to be filled out with specific and
testable proposals as to what flexibility, applied to what
motivations, in what situations, has produced modern
levels of motivation towards money.
R4.3. Gene–culture coevolution
Stanovich takes a more radical, and to us a more interest-
ing, approach to biological explanation: he argues that, in
order to explain current behaviour with money, a biologi-
cal approach needs to be supplemented by a cultural
approach (specifically ideas from gene–culture coevolu-
tion and mimetic theory). He believes that there are a
number of human goals and desires that have “slipped
their genetic/biological moorings,” that money is one of
these, and that this leads to situations where money
becomes attached to abstract “memeplexes.” Although
we might wish to disagree with some of the details of
Stanovich’s proposals, we agree with the general position
that human behaviour has to be understood in terms of
gene–culture coevolution, and that this applies to econ-
omic behaviour as much as to any other behaviour
(cf. Lea & Newson 2005). In our view, nature-nurture
arguments are sterile, and in arguing for a biological
basis for money motivation we certainly are not arguing
against a cultural basis for the expression of that motiv-
ation. Neither could exist without the other. Therefore,
we agree with Jorion’s position that analysing money as
a cultural phenomenon does not preclude tracing it
back to its biological basis, though we disagree with his
conclusions from that position (see sect. R5).
R4.4. The problem with instinct
Finally, and inevitably, we need to explain again our use of
the term “instinct.” Both Behrendt and Burghardt seem
to misunderstand it. Although we have no quarrel with the
Lorenzian concept of fixed action patterns, or with rituali-
sation as a possible account of their emergence, we are not
talking about this kind of microinstinct (cf. Lea 1984) but
about instinct in the sense of a reasonably universal human
motive of plausibly biological origin. Behrendt has no
problem with a biological approach as such; for other com-
mentators (e.g., Booth), using the term “instinct” seems to
suggest that our argument can be dismissed as biological
determinism. But, as we point out repeatedly (e.g., sect.
1.4 of the target article and sect. R4.3 above) and as
most commentators (e.g., Agassi) understood, we are
fully of the view that culture plays an essential and co-
determining role in human behaviour. It is hard to under-
stand how Booth, for example, can think that we would
deny that acculturation is involved in pornography, when
we proceed to discuss pornographic texts. Does he think
we believe that children are born with an instinct to
speak English or French? The idea of an instinct,
however, remains essential for distinguishing between
motivations like hunger, that do have obvious biological
origins and are universal or nearly so, and those like the
desire for money, that are not universal and have no
obvious biological origins.
R5. Is Tool Theory enough?
We turn now to those arguments that (to a greater or less
extent) accept our initial assumptions, but reject our con-
clusions. We consider first a set of critiques that essentially
argue that a tool theory, suitably modified, can provide an
adequate biological account of money motivation.
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Among these arguments we classify those put forward
by Jorion. He makes three main claims: (a) that “for
anyone below the poverty line, cash remains foremost
the means to the essential end of subsistence,” and there-
fore, that no explanation of the desire for money is needed
for the very poor; (b) that the drive to acquire money is a
special case of the drive for recognition (for the desire of
desire); and (c) that people who are admired (desired)
extend the range of their partners – in other words, that
cash is a universal tool for reproductive advantage. It is
useful to consider Kniffen’s complementary commentary
at the same time. He claims that the distinction between
money and status cannot be made easily and that the
importance of status in an evolutionary context deserves
looking at (status can motivate individuals, relatively high
status then translates into reproductive fitness).
We disagree with the first of Jorion’s points. The fact
that money is spent on food does not mean that no expla-
nation of the desire for money is needed – in our terms,
what Jorion is saying is that among very poor people, the
desire for money is fully explained by its use as a tool.
We do not find this convincing because for most of
history money has not been used by poor people to
obtain subsistence, nor was it even very useful for doing
so. Until the mass urbanisation of the twentieth century,
for most people in the world (and especially for most
poor people) cash was not in fact important for subsistence.
Food was something one farmed or hunted, andmost other
things that provided for people’s basic needs were not part
of the cash economy. This is still true in many parts of the
world, if not for the majority of the population. So the
desire to have money seems to have no necessary connec-
tion with the need for subsistence. Furthermore, Jorion’s
second and third points (and those of Kniffen) essentially
claim that money equals status. Put simply, people want
money for the goods they can obtain, goods give them
status, and status leads to higher inclusive fitness. This is
very clearly a tool theory of money. In the target article
we devoted much space to showing that tool theories as a
class are not wrong but inadequate, because money has
an emotional value that is not predicted by its role as a tool.
We agree with the idea that status leads to greater
inclusive fitness, and money (representing overall assets)
obviously plays a part both in signalling status and in secur-
ing its benefits. But we find it hard to believe that this is
where the biological roots of the desire for money are to
be found. Two points are relevant here: the idea of
spheres of exchange (discussed in the target article) and
the role of money in subsistence societies. On spheres of
exchange, it is arguable that money does not provide
access to women, whereas other status markers do
(Bohannan 1959). On the role of money, there are many
societies that have had money in some form for centuries
or even millenia, but where the cash economy is a very
recent development. Polynesia is a good example: the
core of Polynesian society was land and the sea (and
their products), not cash. And it was chiefs, not the
market, who controlled and distributed land and produce.
R6. Critiques of Tool/Drug Theory
The majority of commentators accept that a pure Tool
Theory will not do. However, many do not agree with
our second conclusion, that its inadequacies are best
remedied by supplementing it with Drug Theory (of
course, some welcome this conclusion, e.g., Ainslie;
Dewitte; Markman, Blok, Dennis, Goldwater, Kim,
Laux, Narvaez & Rein [Markman et al.] and some
others share our belief that money is valued for more
than its exchange value even if they do not find the tool/
drug dichotomy helpful, e.g., Behrendt). Two classes of
critique emerged: attacks on the tool/drug metaphors as
such, and alternative proposals for overcoming the
deficiencies of Tool Theory, of which by far the most sig-
nificant is the proposal that operant conditioning could
bridge the gap between biology and money motivation.
R6.1. The use and abuse of metaphor
The most trenchant comments on the tool and drug meta-
phors are those from Ross & Spurrett and Burghardt.
Both claim that the distinction between tool-like and
drug-like motivators is vacuous and could be applied to
virtually anything that is desired (e.g., automobiles, cloth-
ing, sex, food). Furnham claims that anyway, Tool/Drug
Theory is simply a classificatory device for all other
theories and has very limited incremental validity; further-
more, he disputes our classification of historic theories as
“tool” or “drug,” implying that the distinction is not well
defined. Other commentators feel that our notion of a
cognitive drug is poorly specified (Belk) or incoherent
(Booth).
It is important to be clear about what we are claiming in
the target article. Tool Theory and Drug Theory are
indeed broad classes of theories rather than theories in
themselves. (Furnham is right that this is a classificatory
device.) They are two distinct general ways of explaining
money and, as Walsh says, this is a distinction that fits
neatly into the two main ethical traditions in Western
thought as they try to distinguish between legitimate and
illegitimate uses of money. On the one hand, Kant
asserts that money is a “pure means” – in our terms, a
tool – whereas persons are “ends in themselves,” and
ethical rules about the roles of money in society derive
from the fact that, in Walsh’s words, “Money is a tool
and it is wrong to treat persons as if they were tools.” On
the other hand, Aristotle recognises that some people
pursue money as an end in itself (as Walsh notes, a Drug
theory), but condemns such people as irrational because
in reality money can only be the means to an end and
not the end in itself. According to a Kantian analysis,
therefore, drug-like uses of money are wrong because
money is a tool and to use it as a drug offends against
the dignity of persons. And according to an Aristotelean
analysis, money can be a drug but to use it as one is
wrong because it is irrational. We are not claiming that
these classes of theory are unique to money, and in fact
it would be surprising if they were. Just like money, cloth-
ing and cars can be either a means to an end (clothes might
help you get a job, a car might help you get a partner) or an
end in themselves (clothes keep you warm or dry, cars get
you from A to B as Burghardt’s professor pointed out). So
we agree that our tool/drug distinction could be applied to
other areas; indeed, in the target article we cite Mintz’s
(1986) argument that sugar should be regarded as a
“drug food.” But we are not aware of a wide range of car
or clothing behaviour that needs to be explained, or car
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and clothing theories that need to be classified, whereas
money motivation is in serious need of deeper explanation
than it currently receives.
The idea of a cognitive drug was felt by some to be weak.
According to Booth, the only cognitive drug we mention is
pornographic pictures and text – and “there is little or no
evidence for innate sexual arousal at the sight of the real
thing.” What we actually say (sect. 2.2.3) is that we can
be emotionally engaged by many kinds of text and that
any such text can be thought of as a cognitive drug. Porno-
graphy is just an extreme example. Fiction and film are
more general examples: these elicit responses (tears,
laughter, fear) without the effects that make these
responses adaptive.
On one point, we entirely agree with these critiques of
Drug Theory. As we argue in section 5.1, a drug theory
of money is only useful if one can specify what the
natural incentives are that money mimics (see sect.
R4.2). Tool/Drug Theory as such may well be difficult to
falsify, an issue that bothered Bouissac and Ross &
Spurrett, though Kemp & Grace manage to derive a
testable prediction from it. However, what Drug Theory
does is to direct attention to the question: What more
ancientmotivations ismoneymotivation related to?Hypoth-
eses of this kind – specific drug theories, if you will – are
potentially falsifiable, though, like all evolutionary hypoth-
eses, they need to be specified in a disciplined manner.
R6.2. Is operant psychology enough?
Three commentaries (Romanowich, Fantino & Stolarz-
Fantino [Romanowich et al.]; Sanabria; and Kemp &
Grace), in rather different ways, make the case that
operant psychology could provide the necessary link
between evolution and socially maintained behaviours,
such as those associated with money. For these commen-
tators, the idea that money functions as a powerful gener-
alized conditioned reinforcer is not a pure drug theory (as
we claim in sect. 3.2.2 of the target article) but can encom-
pass all the phenomena we attribute to both drug and tool
theories – especially if the phenomena of negative
reinforcement and extinction are properly taken into
account. If this argument is correct, it would make our
tool/drug distinction redundant. The argument of these
commentators is attractive because it appears to place
the biology of money within a well-established framework
of experimental facts about conditioned and token
reinforcement. However, the evidential base for the
claim that conditioned reinforcement can explain human
interest in money is in fact much weaker than is often
claimed. It rests on unproved assertions about animal
behaviour, and unproved generalisations from animal
behaviour to human behaviour.
The basic assumptions required to underpin the asser-
tion that conditioned reinforcement can provide a biologi-
cal account of human money motivation are the following:
1. Arbitrary stimuli (including physical tokens) associ-
ated with reinforcers can acquire reinforcing power, and
are then called conditioned reinforcers.
2. When stimuli such as tokens are paired with multiple
unconditioned reinforcers, they can become associated
with all of them.
3. Conditioned reinforcers associated with multiple
unconditioned reinforcers will show a reinforcing effect
regardless of whether the subject is motivated to obtain
any particular associated unconditioned reinforcer.
4. Such functionally autonomous conditioned reinfor-
cers will be unusually powerful.
5. These phenomena are shown in a wide range of
species and thus result from biological processes that are
common to humans and our prehuman ancestors.
If all these assumptions were true, conditioned
reinforcement would indeed do the job that the commenta-
tors want it to do. Kemp & Grace furthermore point out
that if the conditioned reinforcing effect was based on
avoidance learning, wemight expect it to be highly resistant
to extinction, and we agree that that could happen. Nor do
we question proposition (1): conditioned reinforcement is a
real phenomenon (and both Kemp&Grace andChandra-
sekharan present physiological data that offer a mechan-
ism by which it might work). The problem is that (1) is
the only one of the five propositions that is well supported
by data from any species other than humans. Virtually all
studies of token reinforcement (or other kinds of con-
ditioned reinforcement) involve pairing the token with a
single type of unconditioned reinforcer. Under these cir-
cumstances, the incentive value of the token then varies
as a function of deprivation states that affect the incentive
value of the unconditioned reinforcer. This is as true of
modern demonstrations of token exchange in an avowedly
economic context (e.g., Chen et al., in press) as it is of the
classic operant experiments on token reinforcement
described, for example, by Kelleher (1957; 1958). Even
proposition (2) fails: it has proved very difficult to link con-
ditioned reinforcers to more than one unconditional rein-
forcer at all (Lea & Midgley 1989; Midgley et al. 1989).
Consequently, there is no evidence to support (3) or (4).
Furthermore, in relation to proposition (5), the simple
application of principles of animal operant psychology to
human behaviour has been proved to be highly proble-
matic (e.g., Horne & Lowe 1993). We therefore need to
look for direct evidence of functional independence in
human conditioned reinforcement. But the evidence for
conditioned reinforcement from studies with human par-
ticipants is slender. It is certainly true that token reinforce-
ment systems can work very powerfully with humans, as in
the classic studies of token economies (e.g., Ayllon & Azrin
1968); however, in all such studies, it is entirely possible
that it was the clients’ prior understanding of money that
allowed the token economy to work, rather than the
success of token economies providing evidence for a
Skinnerian explanation of money. In sum, the explanation
of money as a generalised conditioned reinforcer is at
present no more than a plausible speculation.
For these reasons, we do not believe that the
conditioned reinforcement theory can replace the Tool/
Drug Theory, at least in the present state of the evidence.
Nonetheless, it remains one of the best articulated
accounts of money motivation, and because it is strongly
grounded in empirical ideas it does lead to interesting
elaborations and falsifiable hypotheses.
R6.3. In support of Tool/Drug Theory
Some commentators provided additional evidence in
support of Tool/Drug Theory. For example, Kemp &
Grace reinterpret our tool/drug distinction as an analogy
to that between discriminative and hedonic properties of
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conditioned reinforcers (and give some recent neurophy-
siological evidence to support this). They also deploy the
tool/drug distinction to make a prediction about behaviour
towards near monies, and furthermore the prediction
turns out to be correct: people do in general overvalue
money (as when they are willing to pay £23 for 100 air
miles that are actually worth £7–12). Kniffin agrees that
users of near-moneys may pay more than they are worth.
Similarly, Lefebvre interprets the well-established “con-
trafreeloading” phenomenon to argue that for animals
(like humans) certain forms of utility are different
(Lefebvre uses the term “sacred”) in that the animal will
work in some areas for smaller rewards than in others.
He thus argues that “the sacral aspect of money has
deep biological roots”; while we would not necessarily
agree with his interpretation of contrafreeloading, if it is
accepted, it tends to support the idea of a dual motiva-
tional role for money.
R7. Human instincts: Some alternative
candidates for the biological underpinnings
of money
In a key section of the target article (sect. 5) we proposed
two instincts (or motives) that we believe are universal
among humans and that are manifested in modern
culture as a desire for money. We do not claim, and we
certainly do not take for granted (pace Agassi), that
these are the only possibilities. The commentators have
enthusiastically put forward several additional or alterna-
tive specific candidates. We shall explain in this section
why we prefer our original choices to these specific
alternatives, but we should say at the outset that if the
general structure of our argument is accepted, it is more
likely than not that there will be changes or additions to
be made to the list of more basic instincts on which the
drug-like aspects of the money motive depend. In the
end we may even arrive at a list as long as that offered
by Ainslie, though he basically argues that there need
not be any specific underlying motives, so we leave discus-
sion of his proposal to section R8.
At the outset, too, it is important to noteMouras’s obser-
vations on the neural correlates of monetary award. Mouras
provides an fMRI perspective and reviews a range of
imaging data to show that neural circuits linked to natural
addictive/rewarding processes are involved in monetary
reward. In other words, money has been found to induce
brain activations in areas that overlap those induced by
cocaine, and several brain areas are involved in both
monetary reward and sexual motivation. Studies have also
shown different areas being activated at different phases
of a task. What one can deduce from this (though this is
not spelled out by Mouras) is that money mimics a range
of natural incentives, some of which are clearly “drug-
like” in form (the cocaine example). If this is the case,
further fMRI work may help clarify what are the natural
incentives that money mimics.
Some of the commentators put forward objections to
our two proposed underlying instincts. Burghardt, for
example, argues on the one hand, that trading is not as
we suggested unique to humans, and on the other, that
the question of whether play is an independent motive is
still open. We agree with both these arguments up to a
point. Indeed, we pointed out (sect. 5.2) that barter can
be induced in laboratory animals. But we are not con-
vinced that either this, or the examples of ritual
presentation that Burghardt gives, really constitute the
integration of division of labour into a system of trade,
which is how we characterised human trading (sect. 5.2).
On play, our own reading of the evidence is that,
however much the adaptive value of play may come
from other motivational systems such as aggression,
within the life of the individual organism it is motivation-
ally independent from them.
An impressive list of alternative instinctual origins for
the drug aspects of money is produced. We consider first
the proposal that a wholly asocial motivational system
may be a sufficient explanation. Bouissac and Booth
both argue that natural selection favoured the evolution
of a hoarding “instinct” and an inhibitory system, and
both point out that such instincts are found quite widely
in the animal kingdom and commonly show a dissociation
from their obvious functions. Here they diverge, however,
with Bouissac making money essentially a cultural index
for resources (corresponding to other commentators who
seek to explain money motivation in terms of status and
power), and Booth linking money motivation to the
general tendency of humans to collect things for their
own sake. This idea seems strange to us: most people are
not collectors of money – in general, as Katona (1975)
pointed out, we save less than we intend or think desirable.
Misers are interesting, but as Ross & Spurrett point out,
they are also unusual.
Several commentators seek to root a money instinct in
social motivations other than the trading instinct that
we propose. There are many differences among these
approaches, but we draw them together here because
they all point to instincts that are more competitive than
cooperative. Agassi claims that people desire wide
options (and that is what they want money for), and also
that money provides power.What Agassi appears to be pro-
posing is that the natural incentives that money mimic are
not just trading and play, but curiosity and power. Curiosity
seems to us to be rooted in the play instinct, so this does not
add to our synthetic account, though it might provide an
alternative way of looking at it. Agassi’s emphasis on
power, however, allies him with other commentators who
see the major origin of money motivation in the drive to
social status (e.g., Jorion, Kniffin; see also Dewitte’s
idea that money serves as a signal for the intrinsic quality
of the owner). Dewitte argues for a second similar motiv-
ation, the need for autonomy. Behrendt proposes that
the pursuit of money is a “culturally ritualised expression
of the aggressive instinct.” He further suggests that
money is used as a tool to obtain status, which in turn
allows the aggressive instinct to be expressed, and he
suggests that the function of money may be related to sup-
pressed envy in a psychoanalytic sense. Kniffin argues that
status itself has many drug-like properties.
Status, power, and the desire for freedom from con-
straint and control over one’s own behaviour and fate
are certainly powerful human motivators, and money
undoubtedly facilitates them in a modern society. But
we are not convinced that their links with money trans-
actions are direct enough for them to be plausible as the
origins of money motivation. For an instinct to underlie
money motivation, it is not enough for it to be strong:
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there also has to be a reasonable evolutionary and histori-
cal pathway from it to the money motivation. Money is
directly concerned with trading, but only indirectly with
power, status, or autonomy, and this is why we favour a
trading instinct as the most likely candidate to underlie
the money motive. As for Behrendt’s arguments from
Lorenzian drive-depletion theory and psychoanalysis, we
do not find these persuasive as general systems and
there seems no particular reason to apply them to money.
To us, the most interesting suggestion for an alternative
instinct on which the money motive might be based comes
from Dewitte. Like us, he argues for multiple instincts
underlying the drug effect of money. We have noted his
argument for an autonomy instinct earlier, and we are
not persuaded by it. However, like us, Dewitte sees reci-
procation as also involved. But he makes the interesting
observation that giving and receiving, credit and debt,
though logically interdependent, are not psychologically
equivalent. This is undoubtedly true; when we first
started to investigate the psychology of debt (see Lea
et al. 1993), we expected it to be the mirror image of the
psychology of saving (see Wa¨rneryd 1999), but we found
little relation between the two. Furthermore, Dewitte’s
observation gains support from evidence cited by
Mouras that monetary gain and loss have different neuro-
physiological effects. However, we disagree with Dewitte’s
interpretations of the observations he lists (which partly
depend on his idea that the key instinct for understanding
money is the need for autonomy). To take in turn three of
the observations he draws attention to:
(a) The persistent asymmetry in monetary gifts
between parents and children, which Dewitte argues con-
tinues until children gain psychological autonomy from
their parents. We would argue that the asymmetry is
based (in the first instance) simply on the fact that there
is an asymmetry between the amount of money parents
and children have. If the relative financial situations are
reversed (as when a young adult wins the lottery), giving
money to parents is perfectly acceptable.
(b) Intrinsic savings motives, which Dewitte argues do
notmake sense from a reciprocity perspective but are easily
explained by a need for autonomy. A number of distinct
savings motives have been identified. Some are indeed
related to autonomy: Canova et al. (2005) found that auton-
omy was one of three superordinate goals for saving. But
people also save in order to provide money for their chil-
dren and in order to be able to lend money to friends
(which makes a lot of sense from a reciprocity perspective).
(c) Borrowing whilst owing money. We disagree with
Dewitte’s view that this is hard to understand from a reci-
procity perspective. Since both borrowing and lending
build up social networks and patterns of obligations, we
would expect people to both borrow and save.
Dewitte also argues that people are willing to live on
credit, and that this disagrees with the reciprocity principle.
However, this observation is at odds with the data mar-
shalled by Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) showing that
people generally prefer to prepay, at least for ephemeral
commodities, and hence that they like to keep their mental
accounts in credit. Prepay cards are in fact quite common,
though they usually occur in near-money situations such as
pay-as-you-go cellphones or multi-trip transit tickets.
While we have explained here why we favour our
original hypothesis about the instincts supporting the
drug effect of money, we do welcome these alternative
suggestions. The drug metaphor will have served its
purpose if it sparks an empirically driven debate about
the origins of the money motive, whatever conclusion
that debate then comes to.
R8. Some extensions
Finally, we turn to some commentaries that take our basic
argument and seek to extend it. Ainslie’s thoughtful and
insightful contribution argues that whilst money clearly
has an emotional value over and above its value in
exchange, this need not be linked to particular underlying
instincts like play and reciprocal altruism (indeed, he
believes this approach is unnecessarily specific). Second,
he claims that money gains its emotional power through
being authenticated as a “prize”– but that money is not
special in this respect. This is also true for a wide range
of other facts through which we pace our emotions, such
as sporting feats or news items – in fact anything that is
scarce, which links his view to that of Ascoli &
McCabe. They argue that scarcity is an excellent expla-
nation for the drug-like properties of money – but also
for the drug-like properties of food and other generalised
reinforcers. Because both barter and food have been hard
to obtain throughout human history, and because (cru-
cially) future availability of both is uncertain, it makes
good sense that people are addicted (i.e., want too much
of) both food and money. In an affluent society, one con-
sequence is that people eat more than is good for them
(they get obese and have shorter life expectancies) and
(by extension) work more than is good for them to
obtain more money. This corresponds to our view that
money needs to be conceived of as a drug, but places
emphasis on trading (barter) rather than play, and puts
the ecology of early man (when barter was scarce) at the
heart of the explanation. However, in an interesting
reverse of the conditioned reinforcement account, Ascoli
& McCabe see money as a reinforcement for barter.
Like the operant psychologists, we would expect the
relationship to run in the opposite direction.
Both of these contributions seem to us to be valuable
extensions of our argument. As Romanowich et al.
remind us, we have known since Premack (1965) that rela-
tive scarcity can turn anything into a reinforcer. However,
we do want to defend the idea of looking for specific
instincts on which the money motive is based, because
without that specificity Drug Theory becomes dangerously
vague. It can also be argued that money is not a particu-
larly good prize, for some of the same reasons that it is
not a particularly good gift: it is not special (i.e., scarce)
enough, even if it is difficult to acquire a lot of it.
Two commentaries suggest mechanisms that might
account for the drug effects of money. Chandrasekharan
uses his concept of epistemic structure and shows how it
could explain the origin of money and the tendency to
acquire money, given a general “tiredness” or avoidance-
of-effort motive. This links well to the classic economic
observation that money makes exchanges easier, which
we see as part of the tool account, but also explains how
something that provides epistemic structure might come
to be independently valued. We are not convinced,
however, that this adds more than some useful labels to
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fairly standard evolutionary arguments. Glassman makes
the valuable points that every evolved feature of a living
system originated as something else – it achieves
autonomy as it evolves – and that a sub-system naturally
accumulates additional functions, thereby becoming more
and more robust. Like conditioned reinforcement theory,
Glassman’s concept of “entification” provides amore explicit
alternative for Allport’s underspecified concept of functional
autonomy. It thus locates money as a special case of a more
general phenomenon – other examples being music or
reading (echoing Ainslie’s suggestion).
Markman et al. extend the drug/tool distinction in a
different way, by mapping it into a dimension of motiva-
tionally active uses or cool uses: to them, motivationally
active uses of money exemplify Drug Theory and motiva-
tionally cool uses fit Tool Theory, and they cite experimen-
tal evidence in support of this. We find this interesting,
and we support their empirical argument – we too have
evidence that transactions such as repaying neighbourly
help with money can be taboo (Webley & Lea 1993a).
However, we are concerned about too easy an identifi-
cation of “tool” with “rational” and “drug” with “irrational”
(we have a similar issue with Walsh’s argument). Tool uses
of money are, perhaps, rational by definition if we adopt a
descriptive sense of rationality – they involve valuing
money strictly for what it can be used for. But that, as
Simon (1978) long ago pointed out, need not imply that
behaviour is governed by a rational process, nor need
drug effects of money imply irrational processes.
Finally, Kniffin gives the argument one more twist by
pointing out that money is itself a protean metaphor,
used to give value to near-moneys and other commodities;
we must recognise that if the money motive is built on
more basic instincts, additional motives may still be built
on to the money motive.
R9. Envoi
By responding first to those who challenged even the foun-
dations of our argument, we have constructed this response
on a steadily rising plane of agreement. However, wewould
not wish it to appear that we are searching for affirmation.
The commentaries have includedmuch that is complimen-
tary of our argument, along with many challenges. But the
comment that gave us most pleasure came in the Note to
the contribution by Glassman, who thanked a student
class which had had an enlivening discussion of the target
article. The tool and drug metaphors for money motivation
may continue to be discussed, or they may not. But they
will have served their purpose if they stimulate discussion:
discussion among those whose profession is to understand
money, about the origins of our interest in it; and discussion
among those whose profession is to understand origins,
about our interest in money.
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